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1 Introduction 
1.1 The personalization of politics 
In a chapter entitled The Personalization of Politics in the Oxford Handbook of Political 
Behavior, McAllister (2007, p. 571) starts by stating that “in a trend that has been shared by 
all of the liberal democracies, politics has become increasingly personalized”. However, not 
everyone would agree with this statement. There is no consensus on the existence and the 
degree of the personalization of politics. As Karvonen (2010, p. 106) puts it in the 
reflections of his comparative study on personalization of politics: “The kind of mixed 
results that this study has presented easily provokes the perennial debate about whether the 
glass is half empty or half full. Surely, both believers and sceptics will find evidence to 
support their views”. But apart from whether you think of the glass as half empty or half full 
(or possibly even completely empty or completely full), no one would deny that the 
personalization of politics is a topic that receives a lot of attention in the media, in politics 
itself as well as in the academic world. 
The basic assumption of the personalization hypothesis "is the notion that individual 
political actors have become more prominent at the expense of parties and collective 
identities" (Karvonen, 2010, p. 4). Different factors have been used to explain this process of 
personalization in the academic literature. Broadly speaking, it is argued that two 
developments have contributed to the personalization of politics: the weakened relationship 
between voters and parties and a process of ‘mediatization’ (Van Aelst et al., 2012). Dalton 
et al. (2002) argue that because of weaker ties between voters and parties, voters have to 
base their voting decisions on something else. One of the factors that have become more 
important is the candidate, resulting in more ‘candidate-centred politics’. The mediatization 
process can be traced back to the introduction of television and is a process in which 
political actors are increasingly dependent on mass media. The way the mass media report 
on politics has a great influence on politics itself, for example, by depicting elections as 
‘horse-races’ and focusing on the party leaders instead of the parties themselves (Mazzoleni 
& Schulz, 1999).  
Political personalization has been studied in relation to institutions (e.g. Rahat & 
Sheafer, 2007), the media (e.g. Langer, 2007), governments (Hazan, 1996; Maddens & Fiers, 
2004; Mughan, 1993; Poguntke & Webb, 2005), and elections (Aarts et al., 2011). 
When it comes to electoral personalization, the argument is that votes are 
increasingly being influenced by candidate evaluations and less by political parties in 
general. The study of electoral personalization primarily looks at the impact of party leaders’ 
popularity on their parties’ electoral fortunes (Aarts et al., 2011; McAllister, 2007; 
Wattenberg, 1991). For example, because of the importance of television, and the fact that 
mass media see political leaders as the embodiment of their parties, the influence of political 
leaders becomes more important. The political leader is the most important person in the 
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party and since he or she is so visible, he or she has a lot of influence on the party. This type 
of personalization has been referred to as first order personalization (Van Holsteyn & 
Andeweg, 2012, p. 163). In addition Van Holsteyn and Andeweg distinguish ‘Second Order 
Personalization’ (2012, p. 163): “a preference for an individual candidate having to do with 
that person [being] embedded in a prior choice for the candidate’s party”. Balmas et al. 
(2014, p. 37) make a distinction between centralized personalization and decentralized 
personalization, which relates to the distinction between first- and second-order 
personalization. “Centralized personalization implies that power flows upwards from the 
group (e.g. political party, cabinet) to a single leader (e.g. party leader, prime minister, 
president). (…) Decentralized personalization means that power flows downwards from the 
group to individual politicians who are not party or executive leaders (e.g. candidates, 
members of parliament, ministers)”. I will study second-order personalization. 
1.2 Second-order electoral personalization 
For the Netherlands, Van Holsteyn and Andeweg estimate that personalization embedded 
within a prior party choice is more widespread than leader personalization at the expense of 
parties. In a counterfactual thought experiment they found that roughly half of the voters 
are pure party voters and 9 per cent pure person voters. For the other 39 per cent “the 
choice of an individual politician within their party of preference clearly matters: (…) 
[they] indicate support for an individual politician, as long as (s)he does not leave their 
preferred party” (Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2010, p. 633). Other studies show that in the 
context of a single transferable vote system, compared to the findings of Van Holsteyn and 
Andeweg, an even larger number of voters consider the person to be more important than 
the party, although overall the party is still more important for voters (Curtice & Marsh, 
2008; Marsh, 2007). Van Holsteyn and Andeweg (2010, p. 633) argue that “there is no 
reason to suspect that [their results show] a uniquely Dutch phenomenon, and to the extent 
that it can also be found elsewhere, personalization-within-parties considerably amends our 
understanding of personalization in politics”. 
In addition to the tension between first- and second-order electoral personalization 
(i.e. whether the process of personalization has an impact specifically on leaders of parties 
or on all candidates within a party), there is also a tension between the party and personal 
dimension of representation (J.M. Colomer, 2011). Results of elections, especially in 
proportional systems, are mostly discussed in terms of party competition. For example, in 
media coverage around elections constant updates on opinion polls predicting the election 
results for the parties are shown. The candidates who will enter parliament after the 
elections are of less interest. 
Some studies in the 1980s already noticed this gap in the literature and paid 
attention to the intraparty dimension of electoral systems (Katz, 1980, 1985, 1986; Marsh, 
1985). These studies focused mainly on a classification of preference voting systems and 
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argued for greater attention to this phenomenon. In addition, the importance of other 
candidates was recognized (Manin, 1997). However, three decades later progress was 
limited: the personal dimension is still largely ‘neglected’ (J.M. Colomer, 2011) and 
candidates still receive “much less attention” (Karvonen, 2010, p. 41). 
However, comparative research on preference voting is complicated, because 
electoral systems are not easily compared and because the phenomenon of voting for 
candidates differs per electoral system. There is not even consensus in the literature on how 
this phenomenon – voting for an individual candidate in an electoral system where voters 
have the opportunity to choose between different candidates from the same list - should be 
called. Terms which are used are “personal voting”, “person voting”, “preference vote”, 
“intraparty choice” (see Karvonen, 2004) or “intraparty preference voting” (Katz, 1986). I 
will use the term 'preference vote' in this study1. 
Research on preference voting is relevant for various reasons. First, in terms of the 
personalization debate one could argue that if politics indeed has become more 
personalized, it is reasonable to think this also has an effect on other candidates than party 
leaders. If individual persons become more important, one may expect that intra-party 
competition also becomes more important, because voters do not only base their vote on 
party ideology but also on characteristics of the candidates, i.e. all candidates. This is 
supported by findings of Karvonen (2010, p. 63), who argues that “in those countries where 
the possibility of choosing between individual candidates has existed for a long time, the 
relative importance of individual candidates seems to have increased”. This trend is for 
example visible in the Netherlands and Belgium (see figure 1.1). In the Netherlands, voters 
can only vote for candidates. Therefore, only votes for candidates other than the first 
candidate on the list are usually considered to be preference votes. In Belgium, voters have 
the option to cast a list vote, and therefore all votes for candidates are considered to be 
preference votes. Until the 1980s the percentage of preference votes in the Netherlands often 
stayed below 10 per cent, whereas during the most recent elections this has fluctuated 
around 20 per cent, with a peak in 2002 of 27 per cent (Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012). 
After a small drop in percentage after 2002, in the most recent elections of 2017 yet again 27 
per cent of the Dutch voters cast a preference vote. In Belgium, a much larger percentage of 
voters cast a preference vote nowadays compared to previous decades, with a peak of 
preference votes in 2003, when almost 70 per cent of the voters cast a preference vote 
(André et al., 2012). In recent elections the number of preference votes dropped slightly 
below 60 per cent. However, the increase in the use of preference votes did not lead to a 
dramatic increase of candidates being elected out of list order, but this issue will be explored 
later on in this study. 
                                                                
1 Arguably the term intraparty preference vote would be even better; to emphasize the fact that it is an intraparty 
choice. This would fit the argument that voting for a candidate within a party is a result of a sequential decision 
process, namely to first choose the party and then choose the candidate after the choice for a party has been made. 
However, for readability I use the shorter term preference vote. 
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Figure 1.1 Levels of preference voting in Belgium and the Netherlands 
 
Source: Van Holsteyn & Andeweg (2012) and own calculations (the Netherlands) and Wauters & 
Rodenbach (2014) (Belgium). 
 
Second, preference voting determines (or might determine) which candidates are 
elected. Depending on the electoral system voters have more or less influence on which 
candidates are elected to parliament. A recent study shows that in many countries the 
formal weight of preference votes has increased (Renwick & Pilet, 2016), making it easier for 
candidates to be elected based on their own electoral performance. Preference votes 
therefore have an important function in representative democracy. While political parties 
still perform an important role when it comes to how voters are represented in parliament, 
a more direct link between voters and candidates might help to improve the 
representativeness of democracy. Although more candidate-centred electoral systems seem 
to have a negative influence on voter turnout (Söderlund, 2017), research has shown that 
allowing voters some intraparty choice has a positive influence on voter satisfaction with 
democracy, since “such systems promote a greater sense of fairness about election outcomes 
among citizens” (Farrell & McAllister, 2006, p. 742). If a voter has the option to vote for an 
individual candidate he or she trusts to be a good MP, this might benefit the idea of a 
representative democracy. In the Netherlands the constitution states that MPs can vote 
‘zonder last’ (in English: ‘without burden’): an MP cannot be forced (directly) by either a 
party or a coalition agreement to vote in a certain way. The constitution thereby states the 
importance of the role of an individual MP. This privilege for an MP is furthermore 
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guaranteed by the fact that if an MP would be removed from a parliamentary party group, 
the MP can keep his seat in parliament as an independent MP. Despite this constitutional 
strong position of MPs, parties still have a large influence on which candidates are elected. 
Preference votes could help voters to choose certain candidates, thereby reinforcing the 
representativeness of parliament. 
Third, preference votes might also have other consequences for the candidate, such 
as a better list position at the next election if the candidate performed well in terms of 
preference votes (André, Depauw, Shugart, et al., 2017; Crisp et al., 2013).  
1.3 Research questions and overview of the book 
The main research question of this book therefore is: what are the causes and consequences 
of preference voting? The existing literature is partly able to answer this question, but we do 
not know everything there is to know about preference voting yet. This study therefore is 
not an exhaustive study on preference voting, but a study that tries to build on what we 
already know about four different aspects of preference voting. I argue that there are three 
aspects that have an impact on the number of preference votes which are cast: constraints 
(i.e. electoral rules that dictate what voters can and cannot do), the demand side (the voters 
who cast a preference vote) and the supply side (the candidates who receive and compete 
for preference votes). In addition, preference votes might also have consequences for other 
factors. Figure 1.2 shows the relationship between these variables. To be clear, this figure is 
not included here to show a comprehensive causal model, but as an illustration of how the 
different aspects relate to each other. What the figure shows, in terms of causality, is that in 
three of the following chapters, preference votes will be the dependent variable and in one 
chapter (about the consequences) preference votes will be considered as the independent 
variable. In the remainder of this section the four different aspects will be introduced 
shortly. Chapter two, three, four and five all deal with one of these aspects, and these 
chapters all have their own theoretical and methodological foundation. 
In chapter 2 the constraints will be discussed. According to Marsh (1985, p. 370) 
“the most obvious incentive [to cast a preference vote] is the expectation that the preference 
vote will affect the allocation of seats”. Only open preferential list systems - where 
preference votes determine which candidates are elected – have an effect that is this strong. 
There are many differences between electoral systems that allow preference voting, which 
makes comparative research on preference voting extremely complex (see for example Katz, 
1986; Marsh, 1985; Van Erkel, 2017, p. 5; Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012). What 
constitutes as a preference vote in one electoral system does not automatically constitute as 
a preference vote in another system. Electoral systems that allow preference voting share 
two important features. First, a voter can cast a vote for an individual candidate or several 
candidates and thereby influence which candidates are elected. Second, the total number of 
seats a party receives is based on the total number of votes for all candidates for that party 
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Figure 1.2 Overview of aspects discussed in the book 
 
 
(Karvonen, 2011a). According to Karvonen (2011a) there are four dimensions of 
preferential list systems that influence preference voting. First, lists can be open or flexible. 
In an open list system the number of preference votes for a candidate is the only factor that 
determines which candidates are elected. In flexible list systems the order in which 
candidates are ranked on the list by their parties also influences which candidates are 
elected. Since preference votes have more impact in the former system, personal reputation 
is more important in these systems (Carey & Shugart, 1995, p. 421). Second, preference 
voting can be compulsory or optional. In some countries voters have the option to either 
cast a list vote or a preference vote. In these countries preference voting is optional: if a 
voter does not have a preference for a specific candidate or agrees with the order of the list 
determined by the party, he or she can simply cast a list vote, i.e. a vote not for a candidate 
but for the party. In other countries the option of the list vote is not available and therefore 
a voter must vote for a specific candidate. Third, a voter can have only one vote or more 
than one vote. According to Carey and Shugart (1995, p. 423) in systems where a voter can 
only cast a single vote, personal reputation is most valuable for an individual candidate2. 
The fourth dimension is whether there is a threshold for an individual candidate or not. 
Depending on the combination of these rules in a certain electoral system voters are 
                                                                
2 Carey and Shugart (1995) also distinguish two other variables that have an influence on the value of personal 
reputation. These two are whether votes are pooled and district magnitude, but do not relate to Karvonen’s 
dimensions. Personal reputation is less valuable in systems where votes are pooled, as is – by definition – the case 
in all preferential list systems, since in such a system the party also has an important influence on who and how 
many candidates get elected. The influence of district magnitude on the value of personal reputation depends on 
the other variables. In closed list systems the value of personal reputation declines as district magnitude increases, 
while in other systems the value of personal reputation increases while district magnitude increases (since there are 
more co-partisans to compete with). 
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constrained in their options to cast a preference vote. We do not know what the effects of 
these constrains are. For example, if a voter does not have the option to cast a list vote, and 
therefore has to vote for a candidate, we do not know what voters do when they do not have 
a candidate preference. Therefore, in the second chapter an experiment on the effects of 
variations in flexible list systems on preference votes will be presented. In this chapter I look 
at how the option to cast a list vote and the option to cast multiple preference votes 
influence the use of preference voting. 
In chapter 3 I look at the demand side of preference voting: the voter. In this chapter 
I focus on the question which voters cast a preference vote. Since studying preference voting 
is a relatively new field, an established set of explanations does not yet exist (Van Holsteyn 
& Andeweg, 2012, p. 172). However, André et al. (2012, 2013) provide a very useful 
framework for the analysis of which voters cast a preference vote. They distinguish three 
models that could explain preference voting. The first model is the resource model. The 
underlying idea of this model is that voters who have more resources, in terms of for 
example education or political knowledge, are more likely to cast a preference vote. The 
second model is the proximity model. This model is based on the idea that voters who had 
(direct or indirect) contact with a candidate are more likely to cast a preference vote. 
Finally, the identity model assumes that voters of underrepresented groups are more likely 
to cast a preference vote. In the third chapter I discuss these different sets of explanations in 
more detail. Furthermore, I will test these explanations in a different context, namely at the 
national level. While the models of André et al seem very promising in helping to explain 
preference voting, they are mainly tested at the local level elections in Belgium. Seeing that 
they would also have explanatory power at the national level and in different countries 
would increase their value. In addition, I add one explanation for preference voting. There 
is a tendency in the literature on voting behaviour to primarily look at positive motivations 
for a vote (Catt, 1996), in other words: it is assumed that a vote is cast to support the party 
or candidate for which the vote was cast. In chapter 3 I show that this is not always the case. 
Sometimes negative motivations could also play a role in casting a preference vote. More 
specifically I argue that some voters cast a vote for a candidate, not as a support for that 
candidate but because they do not want to support another candidate. 
The third and last aspect that influences preference voting is discussed in chapter 4: 
the supply side. In this chapter I focus on the question of what determines the electoral 
success of candidates. Different studies have paid attention to this question (see for example 
Karvonen, 2011b; Maddens et al., 2006, 2007, 2010; Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012; 
Wauters et al., 2010), especially the study of Van Erkel (2017) delves into this topic in great 
detail. He studies different factors that influence the electoral success of candidates, ranging 
from individual characteristics of the candidate, media and campaign factors and factors 
relating to the party such as the ballot position of the candidate. My main contribution to 
the literature on preference voting is that I consider the role of ideological differences 
between candidates of the same party and analyse whether they influence the electoral 
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success of candidates. 
These three chapters should give an answer to the first part of the main research 
question (what are the causes of preference voting). Chapter 5 deals with the second part of 
the main research question (what are the consequences of preference voting). Within the 
field of preference voting this area has received the least attention. There are only a few 
studies which look at the impact of preference voting on the political career of candidates 
(André, Depauw, Shugart, et al., 2017; Crisp et al., 2013; Folke et al., 2016). These studies 
suggest that there is an effect of preference voting on list position for the next election or on 
promotions to better political functions. In chapter 5 I argue that preference votes can have 
an influence in three different areas. First, I will discuss the most direct effect: whether 
preference votes actually help candidates to become elected. The other two effects are less 
direct, and cover two questions. First, whether the legislative behaviour of a candidate 
elected through preference votes is different from a candidate who is elected solely on the 
basis of the strength of his or her party? And second, what are the consequences of 
preference votes for the political career of a candidate? These questions are important, in 
the first place because so far it has not been clear whether preference votes have an effect 
beyond the outcome of the election. Moreover, if the findings indeed show that preference 
votes have an effect on the political career and/or legislative behaviour of individual 
candidates, this would give preference voting more weight beyond ‘simply’ who gets elected. 
In addition, this would underline the relevance of research on preference voting. 
The advantage of this approach is that it combines many relevant aspects of 
preference voting, both in terms of causes and consequences. While some studies on 
preference votes combined two of the aspects discussed above (e.g. Van Erkel, 2017; Van 
Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012), most studies focus on only one of the aspects. Bringing 
together these four aspects in the conclusion of this dissertation will be an important 
contribution of this study, because it gives the opportunity to connect these aspects and 
therefore give a more complete overview of the phenomenon of preference voting. 
One important limitation of this study has to be mentioned. While I study both 
voters and candidates, it was not possible to link the two directly. For the Netherlands, 
which is one of my cases (see section 1.4), the data needed for that purpose is not available. 
While data is available to study which voters cast a preference vote and official records show 
the number of preference votes candidates receive, there is no data that provides the 
information to connect them. In other words, election studies in the Netherlands do not 
include the question 'for which candidate did you vote?’ This is a limitation, because linking 
the two would give additional insight in the phenomenon. However, studying the two 
separately also provides new and valuable insights. 
1.4 Case selection 
Second-order personalization will be studied in two countries: Belgium and the 
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Netherlands3. According to Andeweg and Van Holsteyn (2011, p. 23) the Netherlands is “an 
ideal case to study second order personalization as only votes for candidates other than the 
candidate leading the list (…) are regarded as preference votes”. Furthermore, the electoral 
system of the Netherlands is a flexible list system; the order in which candidates are ranked 
by the political parties also has an influence on which candidates are elected. Out of all 
systems where preference voting is allowed, a flexible list system is therefore a least-likely 
case for the manifestation of second-order personalization. There are incentives for a 
candidate to pursue a personal reputation, but these are very low since it is normally the 
party that influences which candidates are elected. Findings for systems that use a flexible 
list system are likely to be applicable to electoral systems where the incentive for intraparty 
competition are stronger.  
Belgium is also often seen as an ideal case to study preference voting (see for example 
Van Erkel, 2017). The Belgian electoral system has an important advantage compared to the 
Netherlands for studying second-order electoral personalization. While in the Netherlands 
voters can only cast a vote for a candidate, in Belgium voters also have the opportunity to 
cast a party vote. In a sense, this makes a candidate vote in Belgium more valuable. In the 
Netherlands a vote for a candidate might also be a party vote. The Netherlands and Belgium 
therefore provide excellent case studies. This is especially the case when both countries are 
studied, because when it comes to preference voting the countries differ on important 
aspects relating to the electoral system. At the same time both countries have very similar 
political systems, allowing studying some of the consequences of these different aspects of 
the electoral system. I will turn to these differences relating to preference voting later on, 
but I will first reflect on the similarities of the two countries. 
Belgium and the Netherlands share a history together: the current Belgian state 
emerged in 1830 when it separated from the Netherlands and in 1839 the terms of 
agreement were accepted by the Netherlands (Deschouwer, 2009, pp. 16–19). The political 
systems of Belgium and the Netherlands have many similarities. Both have a multi-party 
system with parties from the same party families present: Christian democrats, socialists, 
greens, liberals and right-wing populists. In addition, Belgium also has a regionalist party 
family (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009, pp. 56–66; Deschouwer, 2009, p. 92). These parties 
compete with each other in electoral systems that are based on the principle of proportional 
representation (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009, p. 95; Deschouwer, 2009, p. 106) and that can be 
classified as a flexible list system. Both the Netherlands and Belgium have a bicameral 
system, with a lower house (in the Netherlands called the Tweede Kamer and in Belgium 
                                                                
3 I study second-order personalization at the national level. This does not mean that second-order personalization 
is only relevant at the national level (André et al., 2013; Hessing, 1985). However, the dynamics of second-order 
personalization at the local and national level are likely to be very different. An example of this is shown by 
Thijssen et al. (2017), who show that some explanations for preference voting, especially related to the proximity 
model, have a slightly different influence on local than on national elections. Therefore, the study of second-order 
personalization at the local level would deserve a study on its own. 
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called the Chambre des représentants / Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers) that consists of 
150 members. In both countries no single party comes close to an absolute majority of seats, 
resulting in coalition governments consisting of multiple parties, which often take office 
after a long formation process. 
There are also important differences between Belgium and the Netherlands. The 
most striking difference is the fact that Belgium is a federal state. The Belgian federal state is 
quite a complex one, with a mix of regions and language communities. The federation is a 
result of compromises and is “a rather special and unusual” one (Deschouwer, 2009, p. 42 
see pp. 41-72 for more about this issue). Furthermore, there are differences related to the 
electoral systems of both countries. In Belgium, voting is compulsory (Deschouwer, 2009, p. 
110), while in the Netherlands compulsory voting was abolished in 1970 (Andeweg & Irwin, 
2009, p. 104). Another important difference is that in the Netherlands the country can be 
considered as a single electoral district for the distribution of seats. There are districts, but 
they perform an administrative function (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009, p. 96). However, in 
Belgium there are 11 districts (Deschouwer, 2009, p. 107). When it comes to preference 
voting there are also differences between Belgium and the Netherlands. There are two 
important differences in this regard: the list vote and the option to cast multiple preference 
votes. In the Netherlands voters are obliged to vote for a single candidate, while in Belgium 
voters may choose between casting a list vote or one or multiple preference vote(s). In the 
following two sections the Belgian and Dutch electoral system will be discussed in more 
detail. 
1.4.1 The Belgian electoral system 
The electoral system of Belgium is based on proportional representation. For the elections 
of the 150 members of the Chamber of Representatives the country is divided into 11 
districts (kieskringen). These districts have a district magnitude ranging from 4 to 244. At the 
district level a 5 per cent threshold exists. Within the districts seats are distributed using the 
D’Hondt method (De Winter, 2005, pp. 420–421). Voting in Belgium is compulsory, 
although there is no strict enforcement of this rule. 
Belgian voters have two options when casting a vote: they can cast a list vote or a 
preference vote. With a list vote a voter endorses the order in which the candidates are 
ranked on the party list. With a preference vote they can support one or several candidate(s) 
from a party. Belgian voters can cast preference votes for multiple candidates, as long as all 
candidates for which they cast a vote belong to the same party (De Winter, 2005, p. 421). 
For the distribution of seats between parties casting a list vote or a preference vote has no 
effect: they all count as a single vote for a party. However, the difference has an effect on 
how seats are allocated to candidates. 
                                                                
4 In the period analysed in this dissertation (2003-2014), the number of districts remained constant. However, in 
2014 the districts Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde and Leuven were abolished, and two new districts (Brussel-Hoofdstad 
and Vlaams-Brabant) were created.  
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Political parties present lists with two types of candidates: effective candidates and 
successor candidates. Only the effective candidates can be elected directly. The list of 
successor candidates is used if an elected candidate gives up his or her seat in parliament. 
The list with effective candidates has a maximum length of the number of candidates that 
can be elected in the district in which the list is presented. The list with successor candidates 
has a maximum length of half of the district size, with a minimum of six candidates. In 
addition to the length of the list, the electoral law also prescribes that each list of candidates 
should contain an equal number of male and female candidates (or that the maximum 
difference may be 1, in case of an uneven number of candidates). In addition, the first two 
candidates on a list may not have the same gender5. 
As an example of how seats are distributed within a party the election result of the PS 
in the district of Luik (Liège) (for the elections of 2014) are shown (see table 1.1). In the 
upper part the number of votes for the party is presented, broken down into the type of vote 
that was cast. In the second part the number of preference votes for all (effective) candidates 
are shown. The total number of votes cast for this party is 187,897 and the party won 5 
seats. This means that a candidate needs 187,897 / 6 (= number of seats + 1) = 31,317 votes 
in order to get elected. 
Half of the ballots that confirm the list order (of the effective candidates) are available to 
transfer to the candidates who did not reach the threshold6. There were 65,357 ballots with 
only a list vote and 9,367 ballots with only preference votes for successor candidates (i.e. by 
not voting for one of the effective candidates, they confirm the ranking of effective 
candidates): a total of 74,724 ballots. Thus, there are 37,362 votes available to transfer to 
effective candidates. These votes are transferred to candidates who need extra votes in order 
to reach the threshold, based on their list position. Since the first candidate already received 
enough votes, the first candidate on the list who benefits from the votes to be transferred is 
Julie Fernandez Fernandez. She received 15,959 preference votes; 15,358 short to reach the 
threshold (see column I). Thus, 15,358 votes are added to her votes, bringing her total 
number of votes to exactly the threshold (column II). 22,004 votes remain available (see 
column III) to transfer to other candidates. These votes will be transferred in the same way, 
until they are exhausted. The figures in column II show the number of votes for each 
candidate after adding the votes available for transfer. Based on these votes candidates are 
elected in the order of the number of preference votes (including the added list votes) they 
received. If two candidates have an equal number of votes, the list position is decisive7.
                                                                
5 This rule was introduced in 2003, but only became fully effective in 2006. In 2003, as a transition rule it was stated 
that the first three candidates on the list should not be of the same gender. 
6 Before 2003 all votes that confirm the list order were available for distribution to the top candidates. In order to 
give voters more influence over which candidates are elected, this was changed in 2003 to half the votes that 
confirm the list order.  
7 The order in which the successor candidates are ranked is not discussed here. The method resembles the way the 
effective candidates are ranked, but is not explicitly discussed here because the successor candidates are not 
included in the analyses in this book. 
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Table 1.1 Example of distribution of seats within a party (Belgium) 
- 
Ballots with only a list vote 65,357  
Ballots with only preference votes for effective candidates 88,821  
Ballots with both preference votes for effective and successor candidates 24,352  
Ballots with only preference votes for successor candidates 9,367 + 
Total number of votes for party 187,897  
- 
Pos. Candidate Votes I II III IV 
1 DEMEYER Willy 45,590 0 45,590 37,362 1 
2 FERNANDEZ FERNANDEZ Julie 15,959 15,358 31,317 22,004 2 
3 MATHOT Alain 20,523 10,794 31,317 11,210 3 
4 FREDERIC André 11,242 11,210 22,452 0 5 
5 LACROIX Christophe 15,628 0 15,628 0  
6 DUBOIS Nathalie 8,096 0 8,096 0  
7 SIMON Gil 7,546 0 7,546 0  
8 FAGNANT Carine 5,783 0 5,783 0  
9 CROCHET Pierre 5,734 0 5,734 0  
10 OMARI MWAYUMA Marie-Jeanne 5,166 0 5,166 0  
11 GOBLET Cécilia 5,747 0 5,747 0  
12 DELLEUZE Catherine 5,377 0 5,377 0  
13 JARFI Hind 5,504 0 5,504 0  
14 HAPPART Grégory 6,760 0 6,760 0  
15 DAERDEN Frédéric 30,484 0 30,484 0 4 
I Number of list votes transferred to candidate in order to reach threshold. 
II Number of votes after adding list votes. 
III Number of list votes available to transfer to candidates lower on the list. 
IV Order in which candidates are elected. 
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1.4.2 The Dutch electoral system 
The Dutch electoral system is also based on the idea of proportional representation. In fact, 
the electoral system in the Netherlands can be considered as one of the most proportional 
electoral systems in the world. 
Voters in the Netherlands can vote for a specific candidate, not for a party as such. 
According to Andeweg (2005, p. 494): “voters who have a preference for a party but not for 
any particular candidate usually cast their vote for the first candidate on the list, the so-
called ‘list-puller’ (lijsttrekker). (…) All votes for other candidates lower on the list are 
known as preference votes (voorkeurstemmen), as they indicate a preference for a particular 
candidate over all other candidates on the list”. However, as we shall see, votes for a 
candidate are primarily treated as votes for the party of that candidate. 
The country is divided into 20 electoral districts (kieskringen)8. Political parties can 
present lists of candidates in each district. These lists may have a maximum of 50 
candidates, or 80 if the party received more than 15 seats in the previous election9 (Jacobs, 
2018). Parties do not have to participate in each district: they can also present a list in only 
one or a few districts. In addition, a party can present different lists in different districts, but 
parties can also decide to present the same list in all districts. This has a few implications. 
Some parties may choose to put some ‘regional’ candidates on a list in a specific district. A 
party that participates in all districts and is able to put 30 candidates on all district lists, may 
for example choose to present the same top 25 candidates in all districts, but put different 
candidates on positions 26 to 30 in each district. This gives the party the advantage to 
present more candidates nationwide than the maximum would be if in all districts the exact 
same list would be presented, since the party can now present 25 + 5 * 20 = 125 candidates. 
In addition, a party may also vary the order in which they present their candidates in all 
districts. 
Effectively, the country is treated as a single district when it comes to the distribution 
of seats to parties. The districts therefore primarily serve administrative purposes. To 
determine the number of seats for each party, first the total number of votes for all parties 
are counted. The total number of votes for a party are counted by adding up the votes for all 
candidates from a specific party. All party district lists are considered to be a single party. 
However, parties are allowed to combine all district lists at the national level. In that case all 
votes at the district level are combined into a national vote, and all district lists are 
considered to be a single party10. All parties that compete in more than one district make use 
of this option, since it increases the chance of winning more seats. 
                                                                
8 Before 2010 there were 19 districts. 
9 Before the election of 2010 the maximum number of candidates on a list was 30, or twice the number of seats 
obtained in the previous election with a maximum of 80 candidates for parties that received more than 15 seats in 
the previous election (Andeweg, 2005, p. 496). 
10 Parties that present the exact same list in all districts are automatically considered to be a single national party by 
the electoral law. 
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Based on the total number of (valid) votes at the national level, the electoral quota is 
calculated: the number of votes cast, divided by the number of seats of the Second Chamber 
(150). Since the only legal threshold to enter parliament is this electoral quota, a party that 
receives at least 0.67 per cent (100 per cent / 150 seats) of the votes, is guaranteed a seat. If a 
party crossed the threshold, the party receives a seat for each time it (fully) obtained the 
electoral quota. In practice, this will never lead to the full allocation of all 150 seats. The 
seats that remain after this process are allocated according to the D’Hondt system 
(Andeweg, 2005, p. 948)11. 
The distribution of seats within a party is done based on the order in which 
candidates appear on the list12. Only if a candidate exceeds the individual threshold he or 
she is elected regardless of his or her list position. In 1998 the threshold for an individual 
candidate to be elected out of list order was lowered to 25 per cent of the electoral quota. 
Before the elections of 1998 this threshold was 50 per cent of the electoral quota (Andeweg, 
2005, p. 494). In practice, this means that a candidate needs somewhere around 15,000 to 
17,000 votes to be elected on the basis of preference votes. 
1.4.3 Period of analysis 
For the Netherlands the study covers the period between 1998 and 2017, in which a total of 
7 national parliamentary elections13 were held. For Belgium the period of analysis runs from 
2003 until 2014, in which a total of 4 national elections were held14. The reason to choose 
these periods is that for both countries the electoral rules with regard to preference voting 
are stable for this period. As discussed in the previous sections, in the Netherlands, since 
1998 the threshold for individual candidates to be elected with preference votes is 25 per 
cent of the threshold for parties (the individual threshold was 50 per cent before 1998) 
(Renwick & Pilet, 2016, p. 136). In Belgium since the elections of 2003 the weight of the list 
vote is reduced: only half of the list votes are assigned to the (top) candidates on the list, 
instead of all (Renwick & Pilet, 2016, p. 139). In both countries these changes result in a 
higher chance for candidates to be elected out of list order (i.e. to be elected based on their 
own electoral performance, instead of based on the success of the party). 
                                                                
11 Until the elections of 2017 parties were allowed to participate in the elections as an alliance. For the distribution 
of seats the parties of an alliance were considered to be one party. Since the remainder seats are distributed 
according to the D’Hondt system, which favors larger parties, this increased the chances of an alliance for 
obtaining a ‘remainder seat’. 
12 Formally, seats are distributed to party district lists. This means that a party receives a number of seats in each 
district and top ranked candidates in that districts are elected. If a candidate is elected in multiple districts, the 
candidate is elected in the district in which he or she received most votes. If in another district the candidate would 
also be considered elected, his or her seat would go to the next candidate on the list. 
13 Unless stated otherwise, the reader may assume that if elections are discussed in this book, election refers to the 
elections for the Tweede Kamer (with regard to the Netherlands) or the Chambre des représentants / Kamer van 
Volksvertegenwoordigers (with regard to Belgium). 
14 Appendix A.2 (page 156) contains some additional information about the period of analysis for both countries. 
The appendix shows all elections and all legislative periods that are included in the analyses in the coming chapters. 
  
 
2 The constraints: the effects of a list vote and 
the number of votes15 16 
2.1  Introduction 
In 2006 the Burgerforum kiesstelsel (Electoral System Civic Forum) was set up in the 
Netherlands, with the goal of advising the government on what the best electoral system 
would be for the Netherlands, according to the civic forum. The civic forum was composed 
of 143 citizens, partly chosen by lottery. After being informed about different types of 
electoral systems, the forum came up with two recommendations. The first one was to 
introduce a list vote. Voters should have the option to cast either a list vote or a vote for a 
candidate. In addition, the Forum recommended that preference votes should be given 
more influence by abolishing the threshold for individual candidates. This would have given 
voters more influence on which candidates would be elected. However, these proposals were 
rejected by the government (Fournier et al., 2011, pp. 8–9). What the effects of these 
proposed changes would have been is difficult to say, but it is likely that they would have 
had an influence on the intraparty competition. 
However, it is difficult to determine the exact influence, because not much research 
is conducted on the effects of electoral system change on intraparty competition. While the 
question of how electoral rules influence electoral behaviour has been of central interest to 
political scientists (Blais & Carty, 1991; Clark & Golder, 2006; Cox, 1997; Duverger, 1951; 
Singer & Stephenson, 2009), most of these studies examine how different electoral systems 
influence election results in terms of vote distribution across parties. In a 1985 review of the 
studies on electoral systems, Lijphart (1985, p. 7) concluded that the intraparty dimension 
had thus far been neglected in academia. There is a change visible, however. Nowadays, not 
only the interparty dimension is studied, but the intraparty dimension starts to receive 
attention as well. For example, Carey and Shugart classify different electoral formulas and 
explain how they might affect the vote-seeking behaviour of candidates (1995). At the same 
time, electoral rules also affect voters, as they constrain voters in their options, and are 
therefore one of the factors affecting preference votes. In this chapter the effects of these 
constraints are discussed. 
In both Belgium and the Netherlands levels of preference voting are much higher 
nowadays than they were in previous decades (see also chapter 1), a trend that can also be 
seen elsewhere (Karvonen, 2010). But while preference voting increased, Karvonen (2010) 
did not find conclusive evidence for a trend towards more candidate-centred electoral 
systems. However, in an extensive and more recent study on electoral reforms Renwick and 
                                                                
15 This chapter is based on Nagtzaam & Van Erkel (2017). 
16 The research presented in this chapter was supported by Research Foundation Flanders [Grant Number 
G026513N]. 
16 
The constraints: the effects of a list vote and the number of votes 
Introduction 
 
 
Pilet (2016) came to a different conclusion. They observe a trend towards more candidate-
centred electoral systems, probably because they used a ‘more fine-grained classification of 
the intra-party dimension’ (Renwick & Pilet, 2016, p. 267). According to Renwick and Pilet 
this trend started in the 1990s. They especially observe an increased weight of preference 
votes in the allocation of seats within parties (2016, p. 267). Examples of electoral systems 
changing in a more personalized direction are Bulgaria, where a closed list system was 
replaced by an open list system with preference voting in 2011, and Belgium, where rules 
were introduced in 2002 that increased the weight given to preference votes. In the 
Netherlands the relative weight of preference votes was increased as well. Since the general 
elections of 1998 a candidate only needs 25 per cent of the threshold for parties in order to 
get elected out of list order, opposed to 50 per cent the candidate needed before.  
In this chapter, I will not look at the influence of an electoral system as such, but I 
will analyse the variations of one type of electoral system: flexible list systems (Carey & 
Shugart, 1995). Flexible list proportional representation systems are amongst the most 
commonly used electoral systems in Europe. Yet, the system and its effects are understudied 
(André, Depauw, Shugart, et al., 2017). In flexible list systems both preference votes cast by 
the voters and the rank ordering of candidates by the party determine which candidates are 
elected. Therefore, the system should be distinguished from closed lists, where only the 
party rank ordering determines which candidates are elected, and from open lists, where 
only preference votes determine the elected candidates (Shugart, 2005). 
There is considerable variation between the various countries where flexible list 
systems are used with regard to how open or restrictive the system is. Probably the most 
important distinction is whether casting a preference vote is optional or not. In some 
countries, such as Austria, Belgium, Latvia, Luxemburg, and Sweden, voters can choose 
whether they vote for a candidate or whether they cast a so called list vote, i.e. a vote for the 
party list as a whole. In other countries, such Estonia and the Netherlands, voters cannot 
cast a list vote and preference voting is therefore obligatory. Shugart (2005, p. 43) calls this 
latter subtype of the flexible list system a latent list: while the list itself has the most 
influence on how seats are distributed, the voter does not have the option to cast a vote 
solely for the list. A second difference relates to the number of preference votes that voters 
may cast (Karvonen, 2011a)17. In some countries voters have the option to cast multiple 
preference votes. In other countries voters are restricted to voting for a single candidate. 
The option to cast a list vote (or the constraint of not having the option to cast a list vote) 
                                                                
17 A distinction can also be made on the basis of the relative weight of preference votes, i.e. how easy it is for a 
candidate to be elected out of list-order. Wauters et al. (2012) concluded that an increase of the relative weight of 
preference votes in Belgian local elections had only in some urban municipalities a minor effect. In other 
municipalities the reform had no effect, arguably because personalization, i.e. casting a preference vote, had 
reached some sort of ceiling. In these municipalities the increase of the relative weight of preference votes did not 
result in an increase of casting preference votes. We decided to focus only on the list vote and number of 
preference votes in our experiment. By including the weight of preference votes, the number of manipulations in 
the experiment would increase, with the risk of the experiment becoming overly complicated. 
The constraints: the effects of a list vote and the number of votes 
Studying the effects of electoral rules 
17 
 
and the number of preference votes that a voter can cast are the two central themes in this 
chapter. The goal of this chapter is to contribute to the understanding of preferential list 
systems of which ‘little is currently known’ (Shugart, 2005, p. 43). 
2.2 Studying the effects of electoral rules 
Most studies on the effects of electoral systems compare election results between different 
systems with different electoral rules. This approach is problematic, however, because many 
factors might be involved that were not taken into account in the analyses. In response to 
this problem, a recent strand of literature has emerged that conducts experiments that study 
how voters react to changes in the electoral system (Blais et al., 2012; Blumenau et al., 2017; 
Laslier et al., 2015; Van der Straeten et al., 2013). The present study fits this trend, by 
conducting an experiment to investigate the impact of electoral rules on voting behaviour. 
The advantage of conducting experiments for such questions is that two homogenous 
groups in the same context can be asked how they would vote under a specific rule. When 
each group is asked to vote under a different rule, we can see the effects of each rule by 
comparing the two groups. 
The experiment presented in this chapter is conducted in two countries: Belgium 
and the Netherlands. Conducting the same experiment in two different contexts has a great 
advantage. The advantage of conducting a similar experiment in two countries is that if 
similar results are found this strengthens the conclusions. Likewise, different results would 
show that the effect institutions exert on voting behaviour is likely to be influenced by the 
specific context. In either way, conducting an (almost) identical experiment in two 
countries gives us more information than conducting the experiment in only one country. 
The two countries in which the experiment is conducted are very different from each 
other when it comes to the list vote and the number of preference votes a voter may cast. 
The electoral system of Belgium allows voters to cast either a list vote, or one or multiple 
preference votes. Belgian voters who support the party and have no preference for 
individual candidates or agree with the party on the order of candidates may cast a list vote. 
Voters who have a preference for one or more individual candidate(s) may cast multiple 
preference votes as long as these candidates belong to the same party (De Winter, 2005). 
Dutch voters are forced to vote for a single candidate (Andeweg, 2005). Therefore, it can be 
argued that in this experiment the Dutch case is most interesting. Dutch voters – compared 
to Belgian voters – are more restricted in showing their actual preference, and the 
experiment allows us to investigate what happens when these constraints are lifted. An extra 
benefit is that this gives an indication of how ‘preferential’ a preference vote is. Previous 
studies have argued that due to the nature of the Dutch system, where voters are forced to 
cast a single preference vote, the vote for the list-puller (i.e. the first candidate on the list) 
does not really reflect the preference for an individual candidate, but simply a choice for the 
party. Therefore, in general only votes for candidates from the second position onwards are 
18 
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considered to be actual preference votes in the Netherlands (Andeweg, 2005). This 
distinction is quite strict and might not always reflect the exact motivations of the voters. 
Van Holsteyn and Andeweg (2010) for example show that approximately one quarter of the 
voters who voted for a list-puller in the Dutch general elections of 2003 and 2006 actually 
stated to have a preference for that particular candidate18. If the candidate would have been 
lower on the list, or even on a different party list, these voters would have still voted for that 
candidate. So, for these voters their vote is seen as a ‘party vote’ and not as a preference 
vote, but this does not reflect what the voter intended. However, it seems that for a majority 
of voters the vote for a list-puller could be regarded as a true party vote. With an experiment 
it is possible to explore to what extent this is indeed the case by investigating how the 
introduction of a list vote affects the votes for list-pullers and for other candidates19. 
Furthermore, the experiment allows for an exploration of what happens if a voter prefers 
multiple candidates, but is only allowed to cast a vote for a single candidate. 
The advantage of conducting an experiment in two countries is that it allows testing 
the hypotheses in two different contexts. Of course, it should be stressed that one still has to 
be careful when comparing the results of the experiments in both countries (this will be 
discussed in more detail below). Therefore, when discussing the results, the focus will be 
first and foremost on the effects within a country. 
Conducting the experiment in two contexts and comparing their results, brings forth 
one limitation of the experimental design, namely that electoral system effects become real 
via a learning process. When introduced to new rules, respondents may stick to their voting 
habits and behaviour in the beginning, and only adopt and adapt to the new rules over 
time20. This may result in an underestimation of the treatment effects. Comparing the 
results of two countries that currently have opposing electoral rules regarding the number 
of votes and the option of a list vote, might provide an (tentative) insight into the extent of 
this underestimation. 
2.3 Electoral rules and the influence on preference voting 
Using an experiment to investigate the effects of electoral rules on the election outcome is in 
line with a recent trend. Blumenau et al. (2017), for example, study the differences between 
open and closed list electoral systems on party choice. They demonstrate that some voters 
                                                                
18 In the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies of 2010 and 2012 respondents were also asked for their reason to 
vote for the list-puller. The distribution of voters who cast a vote for the list-puller as support for the list-puller and 
the voters who did so as support for the party was stable. The percentages for the number of votes for list-pullers as 
support for the party are: 77% (2003), 77% (2006), 75% (2010) and 79% (2012) (source DPES 2002/2003, DPES 
2006, DPES 2010 and DPES 2012). 
19 Throughout this dissertation ‘other candidates’ should be read as ‘other candidates than the list-puller’. 
20 Next to this learning effect a change in the electoral rules might also have an effect on the behaviour of parties 
and candidates. They will also adapt to the new rules, which in turn might also affect the behaviour of the voters. 
These effects are not taken into account in this chapter. 
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who voted for a niche party in a closed list system, switch to a mainstream party under an 
open list system. More specifically, some Eurosceptic voters voted for UKIP under the 
closed list rules and switched their vote to a Eurosceptic candidate of the Conservative party 
under the open list rules. This move applies to approximately 6 per cent of the electorate. 
Other experiments were conducted as part of the ‘making electoral democracy work’ project 
(Blais, 2010). These experiments were conducted as quasi-experiments during real election 
campaigns, inviting people to vote under different electoral systems. The general conclusion 
of these experiments is that a substantial number of voters vote differently in different 
systems, showing that voters are responsive to changes in electoral rules (Blais et al., 2012; 
Laslier et al., 2015; Van der Straeten et al., 2013). Similar results can be expected in the 
experiment with regard to preference voting in the Belgium and the Netherlands. In 
particular, for the Dutch case, where some respondents get new opportunities to express 
their political preference, the expectation is that when these new rules are available, some 
Dutch voters will use the option to cast a list vote and others will choose to cast multiple 
preference votes. 
2.3.1 The effect of a list vote 
While it is interesting to see whether and to what extent voters actually make use of these 
new rules, the primary goal of this chapter is to study how these rules affect the type of 
preference votes that are cast. As stated earlier, in the Netherlands only votes for candidates 
on the second place on the list or lower are regarded as preference votes, because the choice 
for the first candidate is assumed to be a choice for the party (Andeweg, 2005, p. 494)21. 
Therefore, it is plausible that a substantial number of these voters would have cast a list vote 
if that option would have been available to them. It is less likely that voters who voted for 
other candidates, i.e. candidates from the second position on the party list onwards, switch 
to a list vote. In general these votes are considered as an expression of a real preference for 
an individual candidate and as a more sophisticated type of voting behaviour (Marsh, 
1985): casting a vote for a specific candidate who is not the list-puller requires additional 
information about the candidates. The assumption is that these voters made a conscious 
choice for a specific candidate within a party, so there is no reason to expect that a 
substantial number of them would switch to a list vote if that option would be available. 
Overall, we can expect that in a situation where Dutch voters have the option to cast a list 
vote, this would reduce the number of votes cast for the list-puller, but not so much for 
other candidates. The latter is seen as an actual preference vote, whereas the former is often 
a reflection of support for the party. 
Can different outcomes be expected if the situation is reversed: i.e. if the option to 
cast a list vote disappears in the Belgian case? Voters who usually cast such a list vote - and 
                                                                
21 In the present experiment, all votes for individual candidates are considered to be preference votes, to 
distinguish them from list votes. Thus, in this chapter a vote for the list-puller in the Dutch context is always seen 
as a preference vote as well. 
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thereby accept the order of the list - need to change their behaviour if the option to cast a 
list vote disappears. It is most likely that especially the list-puller will profit from this. André 
et al. show that voters with less political interest and sophistication are more likely to cast 
list votes, because party labels ‘act as brand names from which rationally ignorant and risk-
averse voters can readily infer information about the issue positions and policy 
commitment of all candidates a party endorsed’ (2012, p. 296). When these less 
sophisticated voters can no longer use the easy option of a list vote, they have to find an 
alternative solution. The most likely heuristic for these voters would be to rely on the ballot 
list position: they will cast a vote for the list-puller instead of another candidate. This bias 
toward the first option on a list can be interpreted as a primacy effect (see Brockington, 
2003; Miller & Krosnick, 1998; Van Erkel & Thijssen, 2016). Consequently, the expectation 
is that once voters can no longer cast a list vote, it is primarily the list-puller who profits, 
although in that case this vote does not reflect a real preference for the list-puller but a 
preference for the party. Giving voters more or less options of course has an effect on the 
other options. If an option is added, the other options are likely chosen less often. If an 
option is removed, the other options are chosen more often. However, in this study the 
main interest is to which options these votes go to. The expectations are summarized in the 
following two hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 2.1: Voters who do not have the option to cast a list vote are more 
likely to vote for the list-puller than voters who do have the option to cast a 
list vote. 
Hypothesis 2.2: Voters who do not have the option to cast a list vote are not 
more likely to vote for other candidates than voters who do have the option 
to cast a list vote. 
2.3.2 A single preference vote versus multiple preference votes 
A major difference between the Belgian and Dutch system is the number of preference votes 
citizens can cast. It seems obvious to expect that the lower a candidate is placed on the list, 
the more he or she benefits if voters have the option to cast multiple preference votes. List-
pullers will hardly be affected by the number of preference votes that may be cast. 
In Belgium many voters combine a vote for the list-puller with a vote for another 
candidate, often a more local candidate (Wauters et al., 2004). If these voters would be 
forced to vote for only one candidate, one can expect that more voters drop the vote for the 
other candidate(s). First, previous studies have shown that candidates at the top of the list 
receive more preference votes (Marcinkiewicz, 2014; Miller & Krosnick, 1998). Given this 
tendency to vote for higher placed candidates, it is more likely that voters drop the 
preference for a lower placed candidate when they are forced to vote for a single candidate. 
Second, a bandwagon-effect could occur if citizens who can cast only one preference vote 
vote for the candidate who is expected to receive more votes. This could be because they 
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think that their vote is wasted if they vote for a lower placed candidate, who is not likely to 
get enough votes to get elected. When voters get the opportunity to cast more preference 
votes, this will benefit lower ranked candidates, because voters who usually vote for the list-
puller may decide to also cast a vote for another candidate to whom they wish to give 
additional support. Of course some voters will drop the vote for the list-puller, or higher 
placed candidate, because they have a really strong preference for the lower placed 
candidate. But considering the electorate as a whole, the expectation is that lower placed 
candidates will have a greater disadvantage than higher placed candidates when the voters’ 
choice is constrained to only one candidate. The general effect described above might be a 
position effect or a candidate quality effect. However, it is not the goal of this study to 
analyse what exactly drives the (possible) mechanism. The first step is finding out whether 
there is a clear pattern visible. If such a pattern would be visible, the next step would be to 
find the exact causes for this pattern. 
The question is whether it is reasonable to expect something different for the group 
of voters who also have the option the cast a list vote than for the group of voters who do 
not have this option. The option to cast a list vote will lead to a lower number of preference 
votes, but it is not likely that a different pattern with regard to the type of preference votes 
that are cast can be observed for these two groups. This leads to the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 2.3: Voters who can cast multiple preference votes are more likely 
to vote for other candidates than voters who can only cast a single preference 
vote. 
Hypothesis 2.4: Voters who can cast multiple preference votes are not more 
likely to vote for the list-puller than voters who can only cast a single 
preference vote. 
2.4 Methods and data 
2.4.1 General outline of the experiment 
In order to test these hypotheses an experiment was conducted22 simultaneously in Belgium 
(Flanders) and the Netherlands using a between-groups design. The disadvantage of a 
between-group design is that it is not possible to say how a specific voter changes his or her 
behaviour if other rules become available (or disappear). However, asking the same 
respondent to vote twice under different rules might have the disadvantage that the second 
vote is influenced either by the first, or that the respondent is more inclined to change his or 
                                                                
22 Before conducting the experiment of which the results are presented here, a pilot study was conducted under 
first year bachelor students Political Science at Leiden University. This pilot study was set up in the same way as the 
experiment described in this section. Based on this pilot some changes were made. The most important one was 
that in the pilot party lists were used from the previous general election, resulting in variations in the length of lists 
per party. In the actual experiment fictional lists (with real candidates) were created with the same number of 
candidates on each list (this issue is discussed further in section 2.4.2). 
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her behaviour. Therefore, asking each respondent only once how they would vote under a 
given set of rules seems most appropriate. Thus, to say something about the effect of the 
electoral rules, different groups should be compared. 
Since the effects of two institutional rules (stimuli) are tested, it was necessary to 
have four groups to which respondents are randomly assigned in each country (see table 
2.1). Respondents in group 1 have the option to either cast a list vote or to cast a preference 
vote for a single candidate. Group 2 reflects the Belgian system: respondents can cast a list 
vote or cast a preference vote for one or multiple candidates, as long as these candidates 
belong to the same party. Respondents in group 3 can vote according to Dutch rules: they 
are forced to cast a vote for a single candidate. Finally, respondents in group 4 do not have 
the option to cast a list vote, but they can cast multiple preference votes. 
 
Table 2.1 Experimental groups (both in Belgium and the Netherlands) 
 
Number of preference votes 
One Multiple 
O
p
ti
o
n
 t
o
 c
as
t 
a 
li
st
 v
o
te
 
Yes Group 1 
Group 2 
(Belgian system) 
No 
Group 3 
(Dutch system) 
Group 4 
 
As part of the data collection, two almost identical surveys to conduct the 
experiment were created, one for Dutch and one for Belgian respondents23. Both surveys 
were distributed by Survey Sampling International (SSI). This guaranteed that respondents 
in both countries received an identical survey with regard to layout, etc. SSI has its own 
panels from which respondents were selected. These panels consist of people who registered 
themselves24. The aim was to have 750 respondents for each country to participate in the 
experiment. As only voters for large and medium parties are taken into account (see below) 
a filter question was used to determine which respondents could participate in the 
experiment, by asking respondents for which party they would vote. Eventually, 785 
respondents in the Netherlands and 788 in Belgium participated in the experiment. 
In the context of an experiment the prerequisite of having a representative sample is 
less important than in a ‘normal’ survey, as long as respondents are randomly assigned to a 
                                                                
23 The main difference between the surveys was that in the Netherlands Dutch parties and candidates were used, 
while in Belgium Flemish parties and candidates were used. Furthermore there was some variation in the 
explanation of the rules (see also appendix B.2). 
24 For more information about SSI, see: https://www.surveysampling.com. 
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treatment group. Nevertheless, in order to increase the external validity of the experiment 
the aim was to have representative samples. Therefore, representative quotas on key socio-
demographic characteristics (gender, age, region and educational level) were used. These 
quotas were applied to each characteristic individually, and not combined. For this study 
the quota on educational level is particularly important with regard to external validity, as 
previous studies show that political interest and knowledge are important predictors of 
casting a preference votes (André et al., 2012). Education is strongly related to political 
knowledge (e.g. Rasmussen, 2016) and is a good proxy. 
The survey consisted of four parts. In the first part respondents were asked for which 
party they would vote if national elections were held that day. This question served as a filter 
to decide whether respondents would participate in the experiment or not: only 
respondents who said they would vote for a party were included. In addition, respondents 
for the smallest parties were excluded (see appendix B.1); it would have been too difficult to 
design a list of candidates for these parties that would have enough candidates that could be 
recognized by the voters. Second, respondents received an explanation of the electoral rules 
under which they could vote, based on the group to which they were randomly assigned25 
(see appendix B.2). After respondents had read these instructions, they proceeded to the 
third and main part of the survey: a ballot paper. The ballot paper they received depended 
on the group they were assigned to and their party choice (see section 2.4.2 for more 
information about the ballot papers). Finally, the fourth section contained some additional, 
more general questions. 
The way the experiment is designed has a potential problem. Voters were only given 
limited information on how their votes influence the (hypothetical) seat distribution, while 
we know from the literature on strategic voting this could influence the decision voters take 
(Blais et al., 2012). However, the choice to give respondents no detailed information on 
what the rules meant and what their (potential) purpose is was deliberate. Giving more 
detailed information could have a negative effect, i.e. to prime voters in a particular 
direction and thereby artificially increase the use of specific options. Moreover, voters in a 
real polling booth also only receive a ballot paper; the rules are not explained to them. 
Consequently, it is possible that voters based their behaviour in the experiment on the 
knowledge of their own electoral system. Dutch voters and Belgian voters thus could have 
something different in mind while participating in the experiment. This is especially true for 
the introduction of the list vote in the Netherlands, since participants were only told that 
                                                                
25 The time respondents spent on this page was registered. There was no manipulation check included in the 
survey, but the time respondents spent on (specific) parts of the experiment could be used to say something about 
whether the manipulation was understood by respondents. Appendix B.6 contains an analysis of these time data, 
which resulted in two important conclusions: 1) voters who used the option to cast a list vote or the option to cast 
multiple preference votes on average spent more time on the page with the explanations of voting rules than voters 
who did not use any of these additional options and 2) based on a comparison between Belgium and the 
Netherlands there is no reason to expect that this had a (large) influence on the experiment. The estimations of the 
effects reported are conservative at most.  
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with a list vote they ‘support the party list as a whole’. 
However, the lack of detailed information and subsequent bias towards information 
from their own political system are not too problematic. In the analysis the main focus will 
be on the results within both countries separately. In that part of the analysis the potential 
problem identified above is not a real problem, because it can be assumed that since voters 
are used to the same rules in real life there is no difference between the experimental groups 
in their average level of knowledge off the electoral system. With regard to the list vote for 
Dutch voters, it is not possible to know for certain what voters had in mind. In the 
conclusion of this chapter this aspect of the experiment design will be discussed. 
In order to test the hypotheses, first four bivariate analyses will be presented. Using cross-
tabulation tables the relationship between the electoral rules and voting for either the list-
puller or other candidates will be investigated. In addition, two logistic regression analyses 
for each country are conducted with respectively voting for the list-puller and voting for 
other candidates as dependent variables. The dependent variables for both the bivariate and 
multivariate analyses are coded based on the type of vote that was cast by the respondent 
(see table 2.2). In the logistic regression models, several independent variables are included, 
first and foremost the two treatments: the option to cast a list vote and the option to cast 
multiple preference votes. Control variables are added for factors that the literature has 
identified as key predictors for preference voting; political interest, education and being a 
party member (André et al., 2012). One might also expect that the type of (preference) vote 
may be a result of the evaluation of the list-puller. Voters who give the list-puller of their 
party bad evaluations might be more likely to vote for other candidates, than voters who 
give the list-puller better evaluations. Therefore the model also controls for this evaluation. 
Respondents were asked their affection for both the party they voted for and its leader on an 
11-point scale (feeling thermometer). Two dummy variables are included in the regression 
models: one where list-puller evaluations were lower than party evaluations and one where 
list-puller evaluations were higher than party evaluations. Thus, the reference category is 
voters who evaluated the party and its list-puller at the same level. 
 
Table 2.2 Coding of dependent variables 
Type of vote Dependent variable 
 Voted for list-puller Voted for other 
candidate 
List vote No (=0) No (=0) 
List-puller Yes (=1) No (=0) 
List-puller and other candidate(s) Yes (=1) Yes (=1) 
Other candidate(s) No (=0) Yes (=1) 
2.4.2 Ballots and party lists 
Each ballot paper included 20 candidates of the chosen party and, for the relevant 
experimental groups, also allowed voters to cast a list vote26. Lists of candidates were 
                                                                
26 In appendix B.3 examples of these ballot papers are given. 
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designed with real politicians instead of fictional candidates. Although fictional candidates 
have the advantage that the researcher exerts more control over the experiment, it would 
nevertheless be problematic for the design of this study. Fictional candidates are not known 
by respondents and are probably more likely to drive respondents in the direction of casting 
a list vote or a vote for the first candidate, since they are unlikely to have a preference for 
candidates they do not know. The choice for real candidates ensures that, next to the party 
leader, each ballot paper presents a number of candidates who are known by respondents. 
To increase comparability between Belgium and the Netherlands, and between 
political parties within each country, first a general draft list was designed that could be 
applied to each party, using criteria that were held constant across political parties and the 
two countries. Therefore, differences between political parties with regard to the overall 
quality and familiarity of the candidates on the ballot list would not be too large. For 
example, for all parties the sixth place was occupied by an incumbent MP. To design this 
draft list a standardized mixture of a few characteristics was used: incumbency, gender, 
ethnicity and region. Not only are these characteristics taken into account by real-life 
selectors (Gallagher, 1988; Put & Maddens, 2013), they are also predictors for the success of 
a candidate in terms of preference votes (e.g. Maddens et al., 2007; Van Holsteyn & 
Andeweg, 2012). Subsequently, using this general draft list, a list of candidates was created 
for each party with actual politicians from that party. Two draft lists were designed: one for 
the larger (government) parties and one for the smaller parties included in the experiment. 
This made it possible to put a larger number of familiar candidates on the list of the larger 
parties. If a single list would have been made that would apply to all parties, this would 
restrict, for example, the number of members of parliament who could be included on the 
list since some smaller parties only have a few members of parliament. 
The lists were different from what Belgian voters are used to, because respondents 
normally vote in a district in which each party presents a district-specific list. However, 
since the lists were standard to all Belgian respondents, irrespective of their district, the 
same ballot with candidates from all districts was presented. This was done to guarantee 
comparability of the experiments by avoiding that the lists presented in the Netherlands 
were “stronger” than in Belgium. The draft lists and identification of parties as large/small 
are given in appendix B.4. The specific lists of candidates for all parties are given in 
appendix B.5. 
2.5 Results 
Respondents were randomly assigned to one of the experimental groups. Table 2.3 shows 
the distribution of the participants in the experiment across experimental groups and party 
choice for Belgium. In Belgium 1,163 respondents started the survey. Excluded from all 
analyses were 375 (32.2%) respondents who said they would vote for the PVDA27 (n=46) or 
                                                                
27 Appendix A.1 contains a list with the used party abbreviations and the full names of the parties. 
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another party (n=16), would cast a blank vote (n=59), would not vote (n=57), would not 
say or did not know what to vote (n=161) or did not answer all the relevant questions for 
the experiment (n=36). 
Table 2.4 shows the distribution for the Dutch participants. In the Netherlands 1,247 
respondents started the survey. From those respondents 462 (37.0%) did not participate in 
the experiment because they would vote for a party that was not included in the experiment 
(n=137), would cast a blank vote (n=15), would not vote (n=121), would not say or did not 
know what to vote (n=169) or did not answer all questions relevant for the experiment 
(n=20). These respondents are excluded from all analyses. The chi-square and p-value 
indicate that in both countries voters from different parties are distributed equally between 
the experimental groups. 
 
Table 2.3 Participants in Belgian experiment 
Group 
 
Party 
1. List vote 
or single 
pref. vote 
2. List vote 
or multiple 
pref. vote 
3. Single 
pref. vote 
4. Multiple 
pref. vote 
Total 
CD&V 16% 12% 17% 16% 15% 
N-VA 31% 34% 33% 30% 32% 
Open VLD 9% 13% 13% 11% 12% 
sp.a 16% 15% 15% 18% 16% 
Groen 12% 14% 8% 10% 11% 
Vlaams Belang 16% 12% 13% 15% 14% 
Total (N) 192 203 195 198 788 
2  (15) = 9.597, p = .844 
Source: Own dataset. 
 
Table 2.4 Participants in Dutch experiment 
Group 
 
Party 
1. List vote 
or single 
pref. vote 
2. List vote 
or multiple 
pref. vote 
3. Single 
pref. vote 
4. Multiple 
pref. vote 
Total 
VVD 12% 11% 13% 16% 13% 
PvdA 11% 17% 15% 7% 12% 
PVV 24% 22% 25% 27% 25% 
CDA 12% 12% 7% 11% 11% 
SP 19% 14% 17% 19% 17% 
D66 13% 10% 13% 9% 11% 
GroenLinks 4% 7% 5% 6% 6% 
ChristenUnie 6% 6% 4% 5% 5% 
Total (N) 197 195 183 210 785 
2 (21) = 22.230, p = .386 
Source: Own dataset. 
 
Before comparing the experimental groups, it should be noted that respondents who 
voted under the system they are used to, vote very much in line with the actual electoral 
results. In group 2 (list vote or multiple preference vote), which represents the Belgian 
electoral system, 35 per cent of the Belgian respondents cast a list vote (see figure 2.1). This 
is not very different from actual election results, which normally fluctuate around 40 per
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cent. In group 3 (single preference vote) 33 per cent of the Dutch respondents cast a vote for 
another candidate than the list-puller (see figure 2.2); this is also in line with the real 
outcome, although slightly higher than in real elections, probably as a result of the way the 
party lists were designed. Familiar candidates tend to be overrepresented on these lists and 
even more concentrated at the top of the list. Thus, it is not surprising that a slightly higher 
amount of voters cast a vote for another candidate in the experiment than can be observed 
in real-life elections. 
The first thing to be noticed when comparing between groups is that voters respond 
to new rules. In the Netherlands approximately 20 per cent of the respondents in group 1 
(list vote or single preference vote) and 2 (list vote or multiple preference votes) - who in 
real life do not have the option of a list vote - cast a list vote. The same is true for the option 
to cast multiple preference votes. In the Netherlands 15 per cent of the Dutch respondents 
did cast a preference vote for multiple candidates. Thus, a substantial part of Dutch voters 
made use of the new options, showing that the electoral rules matters. 
However, Dutch voters made less use of the option to cast a list vote and were more 
likely to stick to a single preference vote compared to Belgian voters, of whom 
approximately 40 per cent did cast a list vote or used the option to cast multiple preference 
votes. Additionally, when we look at how many preference votes were cast by the 
respondents in group 2 (list vote or multiple preference votes) and 4 (multiple preference 
votes) it is clear that, with the exception of the respondents who cast 20 preference votes (1 
in the Netherlands and 4 in Belgium), the maximum number of preference votes that were 
cast was lower in the Netherlands as well. The maximum number of votes on one ballot in 
the Netherlands was five, while in Belgium this was 17. Even when this outlier is discarded, 
the number of preferences votes in Belgium on a single ballot is still higher than in the 
Netherlands: nine. This is confirmed by looking at the averages. In Belgium, respondents 
who cast a preference vote in groups 2 or 4 (in which casting multiple preference votes was 
allowed) on average voted for 2.7 candidates28, in the Netherlands this was 1.3. 
Having shown that electoral rules influence voting behaviour, it is time to turn to the 
hypotheses. Table 2.5 and table 2.6 show the effect the list vote has on voting for respectively 
the list-puller and other candidates. The expectation is that having a list vote negatively 
affects voting for the list-puller (H2.1), but does not affect voting for other candidates 
(H2.2). There is indeed a statistically significant and medium effect of the list vote on voting 
for the list-puller. In Belgium 64 per cent of the respondents who did not have the option to 
cast a list vote, voted for the list-puller. Only 40 per cent out of the respondents who had the 
option to cast a list vote, voted for the list-puller. In the Netherlands, 70 per cent of the 
voters without the option to cast a list vote and 57 per cent of the voters with the option to 
cast a list vote cast a vote for the list-puller. 
                                                                
28 The average number of preference votes for the 2007 federal elections in Belgium (in Flanders) was 2.63 
(Wauters & Weekers, 2008, p. 64), 2.75 in 2010 and 2.55 in 2014 (own calculations), indicating that the results of 
the experiment are similar to actual election results. 
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Table 2.5 Effect of list vote on votes for the list-puller 
 Belgium 
2 (1) = 45.905, p < .001 ; 𝜑 = .241 
 The Netherlands 
2 (1) = 15.083, p < .001 ; 𝜑 = .139 
 List vote  List vote 
 No Yes Total  No Yes Total 
Not voted for list-
puller 
36% 60% 48% 
 
30% 43% 36% 
Voted for list-puller 64% 40% 52% 
 
70% 57% 64% 
Total (N) 393 395 788 
 
393 392 785 
Source: Own dataset. 
 
Table 2.6 Effect of list vote on votes for other candidates 
 Belgium 
2 (1) = 40.534, p < .001 ; 𝜑 = .227 
 The Netherlands 
2 (1) = 7.506, p = .006 ; 𝜑 = .098 
 List vote  List vote 
 No Yes Total  No Yes Total 
Not voted for other 
candidate 
44% 66% 55% 
 
64% 73% 68% 
Voted for other 
candidate 
56% 34% 45% 
 
36% 27% 32% 
Total (N) 393 395 788 
 
393 392 785 
Source: Own dataset. 
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Table 2.7 Effect of available number of preference votes on votes for list-puller 
 Belgium 
2 (1) = 1.788, p = .181 ; 𝜑 = .048 
 The Netherlands 
2 (1) = 4.046, p = .044 ; 𝜑 = .072 
 Preference votes  Preference votes 
 Single Multiple Total  Single Multiple Total 
Not voted for list-
puller 
51% 46% 48% 
 
40% 33% 36% 
Voted for list-puller 49% 54% 52% 
 
60% 67% 64% 
Total (N) 387 401 788 
 
380 405 785 
Source: Own dataset. 
 
Table 2.8 Effect of available number of preference votes on votes for other candidates 
 Belgium 
2 (1) = 71.089, p < .001 ; 𝜑 = .300 
 The Netherlands 
2 (1) = 0.864, p = .353 ; 𝜑 = .033 
 Preference votes  Preference votes 
 Single Multiple Total  Single Multiple Total 
Not voted for other 
candidate 
70% 40% 55% 
 
70% 67% 68% 
Voted for other 
candidate 
30% 60% 45% 
 
30% 33% 32% 
Total (N) 387 401 788 
 
380 405 785 
Source: Own dataset. 
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Surprisingly, there is also a statistically significant, although somewhat smaller, effect 
of the list vote on voting for other candidates. In Belgium, from the group of voters without 
a list vote 56 per cent cast a vote for another candidate. In the group of voters who had the 
option to cast a list vote, this percentage was only 34. In the Netherlands, in the group of 
voters who had the option to cast a list vote, 27 per cent did vote for another candidate; nine 
percentage points below the percentage of voters who cast a vote for another candidate in 
the group without a list vote. These results refute the idea that all votes for other candidates 
are more sophisticated and more ‘preferential’ in nature than votes for the list-puller in 
situations where a list vote is not possible. In this study, we see that the list-puller and other 
candidates are almost equally affected by the introduction (or abolition) of a list vote29.  
With regard to the option to cast multiple preference votes, the expectation is that 
having multiple preference votes will benefit other candidates (H2.3). For Belgium the 
results are in line with the hypothesis, but the results for the Netherlands are not in line with 
the hypothesis (see table 2.8). In Belgium, there is a statistically significant effect of the 
option to cast multiple preference votes on voting for other candidates. In the group of 
respondents without the option to cast multiple preference votes, only 30 per cent cast a 
vote for another candidate. However, in the group with respondents who had the option to 
cast multiple preference votes 60 per cent of the respondents cast a vote for another 
candidate. In the Netherlands this effect was absent. The difference between voting for other 
candidates in the group without multiple preference votes and in the group with multiple 
preference votes was only 3 percentage points, a difference that is not statistically significant. 
When it comes to voting for list-pullers, the expectation is that the option of multiple 
preference votes has no effect on the number of votes cast for the list-puller (H2.4). In 
Belgium, there was no statistically significant effect of the number of preference votes 
available on votes for the list-puller. In the Netherlands the relationship between both 
variables was statistically significant. However, the effect was very small (see table 2.7)30. 
The effects of the list vote and the option to cast multiple preference votes are also 
tested using logistic regression models, which allow for the inclusion of additional variables 
that could influence whether voters cast a vote for a list-puller or another candidate. For 
each country one model predicting voting for the list-puller (table 2.9) and one model 
predicting voting for other candidates (table 2.10) will be presented. These models contain
                                                                
29 In table 2.6 and table 2.7, the other manipulation (i.e. the number of preference votes), is not taken into account. 
In appendix B.7 (page 170, table b.4 and table b.5) this distinction is taken into account. With one exception, the 
same conclusions can be drawn. Only for Dutch voters who had the option to vote for a single candidate, the effect 
of the list vote on voting for other candidates was not significant. However, the effect was in the same direction, so 
there is no reason to change the overall conclusion. 
30 In appendix B.7 (page 170, table b.6 and table b.7) the effects of the number of preference votes are also shown 
when the other manipulation (i.e. the list vote) is taken into account. The only difference is that for the 
Netherlands the effect of the number of votes on voting for the list-puller is not significant when we distinguish 
between those who had the option to cast a list vote and those who did not have the option to cast a list vote, which 
is in line with the hypothesis. 
The constraints: the effects of a list vote and the number of votes 
Results 
33 
 
Table 2.9 Voting for the list-puller 
 Belgium The Netherlands 
(Constant) 0.474 1.220*** 
 (0.259) (0.317) 
Option to cast a list vote -1.184*** -0.462* 
 (0.173) (0.190) 
Option to cast multiple preference votes 0.367* 0.115 
 (0.170) (0.190) 
Political interest (Ref. = not interested)   
 Somewhat interested 0.244 -0.046 
 (0.192) (0.237) 
 Highly interested 0.308 0.593 
 (0.270) (0.373) 
Party member 0.286 -0.233 
 (0.254) (0.366) 
Evaluation difference (Ref. = No difference)   
 List-puller < party -1.644*** -1.028*** 
 (0.238) (0.237) 
 List-puller > party 0.790*** 0.433 
 (0.195) (0.232) 
Education (Ref. = low)   
 Middle 0.008 -0.293 
 (0.216) (0.247) 
 High -0.225 -1.133*** 
 (0.232) (0.249) 
-2LL 832.293 650.020 
Cox and Snell’s R2 0.194 0.114 
Nagelkerke R2 0.259 0.154 
N 713 530 
Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: Own dataset.  
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Table 2.10 Voting for other candidates 
 Belgium The Netherlands 
(Constant) -0.771** -1.182*** 
 (0.265) (0.318) 
Option to cast a list vote -1.125*** -0.541** 
 (0.172) (0.190) 
Option to cast multiple preference votes 1.387*** 0.336 
 (0.173) (0.191) 
Political interest (Ref. = not interested)   
 Somewhat interested 0.362 0.304 
 (0.195) (0.240) 
 Highly interested 0.506 0.035 
 (0.270) (0.375) 
Party member 0.334 0.336 
 (0.249) (0.360) 
Evaluation difference (Ref. = No difference)   
 List-puller < party 0.698** 0.890*** 
 (0.217) (0.233) 
 List-puller > party -0.418* -0.295 
 (0.197) (0.232) 
Education (Ref. = low)   
 Middle -0.043 0.236 
 (0.219) (0.246) 
 High 0.086 0.658** 
 (0.229) (0.247) 
-2LL 836.876 651.344 
Cox and Snell’s R2 0.182 0.077 
Nagelkerke R2 0.244 0.106 
N 713 530 
Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: Own dataset. 
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two variables that state whether a respondent had the option to cast a list vote and whether 
the respondent had the option to cast multiple preference votes. In addition, a number of 
control variables are included. These models confirm most findings of the bivariate 
analyses. With regard to the list vote the logistic regression models show the same pattern as 
the bivariate analyses: the option to cast a list vote equally affects votes for the list-puller as 
well as other candidates. Some differences can be noticed when it comes to the effect of 
multiple preference votes on voting for the list-puller. While the bivariate analysis showed 
no effect of multiple preference votes on votes for the list-puller in Belgium, the logistic 
regression model (see table 2.9) shows that list-pullers also benefit when voters may cast 
multiple preference votes, contradicting hypothesis 2.4. For the Netherlands we conclude 
that the results confirm the hypothesis: there is no significant effect of having multiple 
preference votes on voting for the list-puller. The logistic regression models confirm that 
having the option to cast multiple preference votes benefits other candidates in Belgium, 
but not in the Netherlands (table 2.10). The difference between Belgium and the 
Netherlands persists when combining the cases in one model with an interaction term 
between the Netherlands and multiple list votes (see appendix B.8). So overall, the findings 
with regard to the effect of multiple preference votes are mixed. The nature of these 
differences will be discussed in the next section. 
Most of the control variables that were included in the models were not significant. 
However, the variables with the comparison of the party and party leader evaluations are 
significant, both in Belgium and the Netherlands. Voters who gave the list-puller a higher 
(i.e. more favourable) evaluation than the party are more likely to cast a vote for the list-
puller and voters who evaluated the list-puller lower than the party are more likely to cast a 
vote for another candidate. The evaluation of the list-puller might have something to do 
with the surprising findings with regard to the list vote also affecting voting for other 
candidates31. 
2.6 Discussion and conclusion 
This chapter aimed at studying the extent to which electoral rules influence electoral 
behaviour with regard to preference voting. An experiment was conducted in order to 
answer this question. The focus of this experiment was not only on preference voting as 
such, but also on the distribution of preference votes across candidates.  
The main finding is that electoral rules shape voting behaviour. Belgian voters were 
already used to the options of a list vote and multiple preference votes. Consequently, in the 
experimental groups for which these options were available many respondents also used 
them. For Dutch voters these options were new and about 20 per cent of the Dutch 
respondents made use of new options when they became available to them. A second 
important finding of this study is that the results show that - primarily for the Netherlands - 
                                                                
31 The next chapter, which deals with the question which voters cast a preference vote, will discuss this issue. 
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the idea behind the distinction between a vote for the list-puller as a party vote and a vote 
for another candidate as a preference vote may be too strict and as such incorrect. The 
expectation was that in systems where a list vote is not possible many voters cast a vote for 
the first candidate because this is the most ‘simple’ option when one lacks information 
about the candidates. Thus, once an even simpler option becomes available in the form of a 
list vote it seems logical to expect that voters go for the list vote instead. For voters who cast 
a vote for another candidate no change was expected as this is considered to be a more 
sophisticated type of voting behaviour (Marsh, 1985), reflecting a ‘real’ preference. This 
expectation did not hold. Both the list-pullers and other candidates lose votes once the 
option to cast a list vote becomes available. Why voters who cast a more sophisticated vote 
in one situation switch to a ‘simpler’ type of vote in another situation is puzzling and raises 
the question whether a ‘preference vote’ for a list-puller and a preference vote for another 
candidate are as different from each other as is, especially in the Netherlands, often 
assumed. The hard distinction that is often made between a party vote and a preference 
vote, might be even more flawed than we already observed. It is not only the case that a 
‘party vote’ could also be a preference vote (for the list-puller) (see Van Holsteyn & 
Andeweg, 2010), but a ‘preference vote’ (for another candidate) might also be a party vote. 
Finally, the results show that the benefits for lower ranked candidates as a result of the 
option to cast multiple preference votes only holds for Belgium. 
As argued before, it is difficult to compare the results of the experiment of Belgium 
and the Netherlands, but it is nevertheless interesting to look at the similarities and 
differences. This could help to gain insight into avenues for further research. The third and 
fourth hypotheses, stating that other candidates benefit from the option of multiple 
preference votes and list-pullers do not, only receives support in Belgium. Additionally, 
while a substantial number of Dutch respondents make use of the option to cast a list vote 
or multiple preference votes, this percentage is by no means as high as the percentage of 
Belgian respondents using these options. 
That observed differences are in line with research on electoral change. Moser and 
Scheiner (2012, p. 236) for example argue that effects of electoral system change are not 
always the same in all cases. They find that the political context of a country conditions the 
effect electoral rules have. The experience with democracy and the development of the party 
system especially determine how voters adapt to new electoral rules. With regard to the 
Dutch and Belgian case, it is only possible to speculate about the nature of these differences. 
Perhaps the Netherlands has stronger leaders on average, due to the single national district, 
giving voters less incentive to cast a list vote or to vote for candidates with a lower ballot list 
position. However, this is unlikely as in the experiment the Belgian lists were made as strong 
as the Dutch lists by including party leaders. The fact that the number of list votes is still 
higher for voters of the N-VA, which has a strong leader in Bart De Wever, goes against this 
explanation. 
A more likely explanation is that differences can be attributed to voting habits. 
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Belgian respondents were familiar with the options to cast a list vote or multiple preference 
votes. For Dutch voters these rules were new, and consequently respondents may have stuck 
to their usual behaviour. This indicates that changes in the electoral system do not 
immediately result in changes of voting behaviour: voters need time to learn how to use the 
new rules. This interpretation corresponds with actual election results in Belgium. The 
option to cast multiple preference votes was introduced in 1995, but the option was hardly 
used in the elections of 1995 and 1999. In 2003 and 2007, however, the average number of 
votes per ‘preference ballot’32 increased (Wauters & Weekers, 2008). In 2010 this number 
increased again, before dropping slightly in 2014. In general an increasing use of multiple 
preference votes was visible. In addition, it seems to resemble the notion of habitual voting 
(Dinas, 2018): that voting in one election increases the chances of voting in the next 
election. Voting, according to this idea, is habit-forming. This contrasts the idea that voting 
is a consideration in terms of costs and benefits. If habits indeed seem to have an influence 
on the turnout, they might also have an influence on the act of voting itself. Casting a list 
vote, or a specific type of preference vote, might then also become a habit. 
In this chapter the focus was solely on the voter, but if electoral rules would change, 
it is likely that parties and candidates would also change their behaviour. On top of that, 
Norris (2004) argues that electoral rules influence voters directly, but that voters are also 
influenced by the reaction of for example parties and candidates to those electoral rules. 
Parties will adapt their strategies on the basis of the electoral rules. If the ballot structure 
changes, parties will also change their strategies in order to achieve their goals. Within the 
context of this experiment it is not possible to make any statements about this issue, but is 
highly likely that such a mechanism would have additional influence on the effects of the 
introduction of new rules. 
Further research, for example by studying first time voters, should shed more light 
on whether voting habits indeed can account for the differences. However, if this is the case 
it implies that the experimental method that is used to estimate effects of electoral rules, 
actually underestimates the effects found in this experiment. 
The findings presented in this chapter have two important implications. First, the 
results suggest that preference votes might be less preferential with regard to a specific 
candidate than is often assumed. For systems without list votes it is often argued that 
whereas votes for list-pullers might not really be preferential, votes for other candidates are 
based on conscious decisions and are truly preferential. However, the findings of the 
analysis in this chapter cast doubt on this common assumption: both voters who cast a vote 
for the list-puller and voters who cast a vote for other candidates opted for a list vote when 
presented with this possibility. 
The possibility that, for some voters, a list vote still contains a preference for a 
candidate cannot be fully excluded. It could be that they prefer candidates at the top of the
                                                                
32 A term used to distinguish cast ballots with preference votes from cast ballots with a list vote. 
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list and think that a list vote will help those candidates get elected. However, considering the 
effect sizes that are found it is unlikely that all voters who cast a list vote instead of a 
preferential vote think so strategically. Moreover, many voters may not be aware that by 
casting a list vote one technically supports the candidates at top positions. Particularly in the 
Dutch case, where voters are not used to these (new) rules and where not all implications of 
these rules were explained in the description, voters might not have been aware of the 
practicalities of the list vote. If this is true, the estimate of the percentage of voters who 
switch their vote might even be conservative. This could indicate that at least for a group of 
voters their preference vote might be less preferential than has often been assumed. What 
this discussion above all shows, is that further research is necessary to get a better 
understanding of the meaning of a preference vote and a better insight in the degree of 
preference in a so-called preference vote. The next chapter attempts to deal with this issue. 
However, further research should also focus on other cases to see if we can find similar 
results. First, it might be interesting to see whether there is a difference in effects between 
open and flexible list systems which allow voters to cast a party vote. It might be that the 
openness of the list is an additional constraint to casting a negatively motivated preference 
vote, next to the list vote. In addition, systems that combine compulsory candidate voting 
with a (more) open list system, such as Estonia and Finland, would be interesting cases. 
What would voters do in such systems if they have no, or only negative candidate 
preferences?  
Second, even when being modest in comparing the results of the experiment in 
Belgium and the Netherlands, the fact remains that different results in both countries were 
found. These differences might be the result of voting habits. If this is true, it means that the 
effects that are found are an underestimation. In real life, and in particular over time, the 
results may be stronger. 
  
 
3 The demand side: motivations for preference 
votes 
3.1 Introduction 
In the introduction of this book I argued that there are three factors that have an influence 
on preference voting. In this chapter I look at the second factor: the demand side. Or in 
other words: the voters who cast (or do not cast) a preference vote. The central question in 
this chapter is therefore which voters cast a preference vote.  
Since preference voting in proportional representation systems is a relatively new 
field of study, expectations about who cast a preference vote sometimes contradict each 
other and no established set of explanations exists (Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012, p. 172). 
Different authors have tried to distinguish different sets of explanations. Katz (1985) argues 
that there are three explanations for preference voting: traditionalism, sophistication and 
mobilization. On the one hand preference voting might be associated with traditional 
culture and clientelism, causing those with a low level of political sophistication to cast 
preference votes. In this case preference votes are cast in exchange for rewards. On the other 
hand, the reverse may be true when preference votes are seen as a more sophisticated vote 
than the list vote. In this case voters with higher levels of political interest and knowledge 
would be more likely to cast a preference vote. Their goal is not an immediate reward, but 
to have a greater influence on policies than they would have if they would only vote for a 
preferred party. This would be especially useful if the party allows intra-party differences 
and competition. In addition to these two expectations, Katz argues that a third mechanism 
is also possible: different sub groups within a party try to mobilize as many voters as 
possible to support their group by casting a preference vote for candidates belonging to the 
sub group. Katz finds evidence for all three explanations in the Italian context, suggesting 
that different types of preference votes and voters exist. 
Another set of explanations can be found in the study of André et al. (2013). They 
distinguish three models to explain why voters cast a preference vote: a resource model, an 
identity model and a proximity model33. Some of these models overlap with the models 
proposed by Katz (see table 3.1). The resource model assumes that voters are more likely to 
cast a preference vote if they have more resources, for example political knowledge, to come 
to an informed choice about voting for a specific candidate within a party. Therefore this 
model resembles the sophistication model from Katz. The second model that André et al. 
use to explain preference voting is the identity model. This model assumes that a voter is 
                                                                
33 In an earlier study on preference votes from André et al., the identity model was not included: in that version an 
instrumental model was included as the third model. The assumption was that voters are more likely to cast a 
preference vote, as the chances increase that their preference vote would actually influence which candidates are 
elected (André et al., 2012). This model does not fit the context of this chapter; in the previous chapter institutional 
constraints were discussed. Although this specific constraint was not discussed (see also footnote 17 on page 16). 
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more likely to cast a preference vote for a candidate who shares certain social characteristics, 
and that the chances of casting a preference vote especially increase when the voter belongs 
to an underrepresented group. The final model from André et al. is the proximity model, 
which assumes that a voter is more likely to cast a preference vote if there is more proximity 
between voters and candidates. This model resembles the mobilization type of preference 
vote in the typology of Katz. However, there is a difference. In the typology of Katz it is a 
group of candidates who try to mobilize voters to cast a vote for candidates belonging to 
their group, which makes it a top-down model. The model of André et al. is more bottom-
up: the voters are looking for candidates who share certain social characteristics. 
Since the sophistication and resource model resemble each other, and the 
mobilization and proximity model resemble each other (see table 3.1), we can distinguish 
four models. In the next section I will discuss these models in further detail and I present 
the hypotheses that will be tested in this chapter. 
 
Table 3.1 Overview of the models for preference voting of Katz and André et al. 
  Katz 
  Traditionalism Sophistication Mobilization 
André et al. 
Resource  X  
Identity    
Proximity   X 
X = Model of Katz and André et al. resemble each other. 
3.2 Expectations34 
3.2.1 The resource model 
The resource model, which resembles Katz’s sophistication explanation, builds on Marsh’s 
(1985) idea that a preference vote should be seen as a more sophisticated type of vote. While 
party labels can ‘act as brand names from which rationally ignorant and risk-averse voters 
can readily infer information about the issue positions and policy commitment of all 
candidates a party endorsed’ (André et al., 2012, p. 296), such party labels do not help when 
a voter has to distinguish between candidates from the same party. Voting for a specific 
candidate35 therefore requires more knowledge. In order to cast a preference vote a voter 
needs to have information about the candidates from which he or she can choose. This 
implies that the voter needs to have resources available to make the right choice. Therefore, 
it can be expected that voters who have higher education levels or who are more politically 
interested or involved are more likely to cast a preference vote. Indeed, political interest has 
a positive effect on the chances of casting a preference vote (André et al., 2012, 2013; Van 
Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012). Education has a positive effect in the Netherlands (Van 
                                                                
34 In order to not end up with a long list of hypotheses, hypotheses within a certain category will be grouped. In 
table 3.2 (on page 88) an overview of the hypotheses is given, together with the (specific) variables which are used 
to test these hypotheses. 
35 Or, when voting for a candidate is mandatory: voting for another candidate than ‘simply’ the first one on the list. 
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Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012), but in Belgium higher educational levels alone seem to be 
insufficient to make a difference. In Belgium, specific political knowledge or interest is thus 
necessary (André et al., 2012, 2013). 
 
Hypothesis 3.1: If a voter has more resources available he or she is more likely 
to cast a preference vote than a voter with fewer resources. 
3.2.2 The identity model 
The identity model assumes that voters are more likely to cast a vote for candidates who 
belong to the same social group. In particular members of social groups that are 
traditionally underrepresented in parliament are more likely to cast a preference vote for a 
member of their own social group (André et al., 2013). Sharing a sociodemographic 
characteristic can serve as a heuristic for voters to cast such a preference vote for that 
candidate. Cutler (2002) shows that voters are more likely to cast a vote for a candidate if 
the sociodemographic distance36 between the voter and candidate is smaller. Similar results 
are found by McDermott (2009), who shows that voters in US elections for the House of 
Representatives are more likely to cast a vote for candidates having the same group 
associations, although the effects of these group associations have become weaker over time. 
Second, casting a preference vote might be a strategic consideration for underrepresented 
groups to promote their interest and gain better descriptive representation (Mansbridge, 
1999). Groups that are more likely to cast a preference vote are women, ethnic minorities 
and the younger and older age categories (André et al., 2013). 
Van Holsteyn and Andeweg (2012) found that in the Netherlands women are slightly 
more likely to cast a preference vote (28%) than men (24%) in the parliamentary elections 
between 1998-2006. In studies on Belgium, the effects of gender are not significant (André 
et al., 2012, 2013). There are not many studies that have addressed the effect of membership 
of an ethnic minority group on preference voting. André et al. (2013) include a predictor 
‘non-European origin’ in their models, but in Belgium this predictor has no significant 
influence on whether voters cast a preference vote or not. However, when distinguishing 
between different types of preference votes, having a non-European origin is significant: 
there is a significant and positive relationship between this group and preference voting for 
other candidates than the list-puller. Conclusions about the effect of age are contradictive: 
Van Holsteyn and Andeweg (2012) find a negative relationship, André et al. (2012) a 
positive relationship. 
In addition, one might expect that voters from certain regions are more likely to cast 
a preference vote, because they feel underrepresented. In the Netherlands, for example, in 
some provinces one might be more inclined to cast a preference vote because one feels that 
the regional interest is not represented enough in ‘The Hague’. Dutch MPs from 'peripheral' 
                                                                
36 A term used by Cutler (2002: 469) to describe ‘the degree of similarity between two persons - in this case, a voter 
and a candidate’. 
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provinces are more inclined to represent the interest of their own region, contact regional 
organizations and contact the government on regional interest than their colleagues from 
the Randstad37 (Thomassen & Andeweg, 2004). This may be a reason for voters in there 
provinces to cast a preference vote, to increase the chances that their interests are 
represented38. 
 
Hypothesis 3.2: A voter belonging to an underrepresented social group in 
parliament will be more likely to cast a preference vote than a voter from a 
social group that is overrepresented in parliament. 
3.2.3 The proximity model 
The proximity model assumes that a voter is more likely to cast a preference vote if the voter 
feels connected to the candidate. For example, party members would be more likely to cast a 
preference vote, because they could use a preference vote to support their preferred faction 
within the party (André et al., 2012). However, Marsh (1985, p. 372) argues that ‘party 
attachment provides for more trust in a party and a greater willingness to permit [the party] 
to determine who is elected. On this interpretation, list voting is a sign of confidence in a 
party’. Still, according to André et al. (2012) party membership has a strong influence on 
the chances of casting a preference vote. In the Dutch case, however, Van Holsteyn and 
Andeweg (2012) found no evidence that party membership has an influence on preference 
voting, nor did they find an effect for party identification. This is in contrast with findings 
for Finland where a negative effect was found (Karvonen, 2011b). 
Members of interest groups are also more likely to cast a preference vote to support 
those candidates who advocate their particular concerns. The study by André et al. (2012) is 
the only study in which this relationship between casting a preference vote and interest 
group membership is tested. They found that interest group membership had a positive 
influence on the chances of casting a preference vote. 
Another explanation for preference votes has to do with the relationship between 
urbanisation and the use of preference votes. This is different from the regional background 
of voters mentioned previously. For regional background one expects that voters living at a 
greater distance from the political centre, from either rural or urban regions, are more likely 
to cast a preference vote. However, both in the centre and in the periphery one would 
expect that voters from rural areas are more likely to cast a preference vote, because they 
tend to have stronger connections with candidates from their region (André et al., 2012). In 
1985 Marsh had to conclude that there was a lack of cross-national clarity with regard to the 
urban-rural dimension. In some countries preference voting seemed to be an urban 
phenomenon while in others it was rural (1985, pp. 369–370). More recent work shows no 
                                                                
37 Defined as the provinces of Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland and Utrecht (see Thomassen & Andeweg, 2004). 
38 The relevance of regional background of voters and candidates will be discussed at length in the next chapter (see 
section 4.4.2). 
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conclusive evidence either. Van Holsteyn and Andeweg (2012) found no linear relationship 
between urbanization and casting a preference vote at national elections in The 
Netherlands. 
The general idea behind the proximity model is that voters who feel closer to a 
(group of) candidate(s) are more likely to cast a preference vote. 
 
Hypothesis 3.3: Voters who feel closer to a particular (group of) candidate(s) 
are more likely to cast a preference vote than voters who do not feel close to a 
particular (group of) candidate(s). 
3.2.4 Negative motivations: the effect of the first candidate on the list 
So far, the explanations in the literature mainly focus on positive effects of both candidates 
and voters. Voters have certain resources available that enable them to make an informed 
decision to cast a preference vote, or voters are attracted by a character trait or other 
characteristic of the candidate they vote for. The preference vote therefore has a positive 
character; voters are pulled towards a candidate. However, a vote does not necessarily have 
to be a sign of support, although this is what is normally assumed in studies on voting 
behaviour (Catt, 1996). There is therefore little attention for possible negative motivations 
which (could) play a role in voting behaviour. There is one area in which negative 
motivations receive attention, namely when it comes to economic voting. The idea is that 
voters either reward or punish the government based on the economic situation (Duch & 
Stevenson, 2008).  
In this section I consider a negative motivation for preference voting, based on an 
evaluation of the first candidate on the list. According to King (2002, pp. 4–6), leaders of 
political parties can either have a direct or an indirect effect on voters. If leaders have an 
indirect effect, they influence how voters evaluate the political party, which in turn 
influences the chances of voting for that party. A direct effect occurs when the leader 
evaluations directly influence the chances of voting for the party of the leader. 
According to some authors, a direct effect of leaders of political parties can be 
observed in the Netherlands. Anker (1992, chapter 5) for example discusses push and pull 
effects of party leaders for the electoral fortune of their parties in the Dutch parliamentary 
elections of 1986 and 1989. By comparing the actual vote with the normal vote39 he shows 
that when voters evaluate party leaders negatively or as unsympathetic, they are ‘pushed’ 
away from that party. In other words, out of those voters who evaluate a leader as 
unsympathetic, fewer voters actually cast a vote for the party of that leader than would be 
expected on the basis of the normal vote. On the other hand, when voters have more 
positive feelings towards the party leader, the reversed is visible. A larger number of voters 
actually vote for a party if they have high sympathy scores for the leader than would be 
                                                                
39 The normal vote can be seen as a hypothetical situation in which election specific effects are filtered out. The 
normal vote thus represents a baseline election result. 
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expected on the basis of the normal vote: they are ‘pulled’ towards the party via the party 
leader. Similar results can be found in the work of Rosema (2004, 2006), who shows that 
voters are more likely to cast an insincere vote40 when the leader of the voter’s most 
positively evaluated party is negatively evaluated. In addition, if leaders of other parties than 
the most preferred party, are evaluated more positively compared to the leader of the most 
preferred party, the chance of an insincere vote increases41. 
What these studies show is that the evaluation of a party leader influences the 
electoral decision of a voter. Based on the work of Hirschman (1970) it is possible to see 
three strategies for voters who evaluate the leader of their preferred party negatively: exit, 
voice or loyalty. Voters could still vote for the list-puller despite the negative evaluation 
(stay loyal) or they could vote for another party (exit). The exit strategy fits the interparty 
competition. However, the last strategy (voice) may be a strategy that fits the intraparty 
competition. In this case a push effect for the list-puller could lead to an increase in the 
number of votes for other candidates. In the Netherlands, this would mean an increase in 
preference votes. Voters with negative feelings towards the list-puller, instead of voting for 
another party, would vote for another candidate within the party. 
The voting behaviour for the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) in 2002 and 2003 might be 
an illustration of this effect. In 2002 the PvdA list was headed by Ad Melkert. Two months 
before the national elections local elections were held. On the election night of the local 
elections a debate was organized with the parties’ national leaders to. Melkert - according to 
public opinion - acted as a ‘poor loser’ (Van Holsteyn & Irwin, 2003, p. 46) after a large 
victory of newcomer Fortuyn in the city of Rotterdam. Melkert could not get rid of this 
image, remained one of the most unpopular leaders42 and after a crushing defeat in the 
national elections of 2002 (the PvdA lost half of its seats) he resigned on election night 
(Irwin & Van Holsteyn, 2004; Van Holsteyn & Irwin, 2003). The PvdA did not only lose 
many seats, many voters for the party cast a preference vote: 44.1 per cent. This was much 
more than the overall percentage of preference votes: 27.1.  
Melkert was succeeded by Wouter Bos, who won an internal leadership election. Bos 
was seen as a ‘new, young, dynamic and ‘charismatic’ leader’ (Van Holsteyn & Irwin, 2004, 
p. 158) and ‘emerged as the new star in Dutch politics and thereafter dominated the 
campaign’ (Irwin & Van Holsteyn, 2004, p. 555). Under his leadership the party quickly 
recovered and, only eight months after the 2002 election when new (early) elections were 
                                                                
40 Rosema defines a sincere vote as a vote for the party that is evaluated most positively by the voter (2006, p. 473). 
An insincere vote is a vote for another party than the one that is evaluated most positively. 
41 Van Wijnen (2000) also shows that candidate evaluations have an (increasing) impact on party voting, although 
his research was criticized for omitting important variables (i.e. the relationship between the evaluation of the party 
and the evaluation of the leader of a party) (Aarts, 2001). When party evaluations are taken into account, there is 
no increasing impact of evaluations of party leaders. 
42 Even before the elections, there were discussions within the party about replacing Melkert after the elections. 
There were even suggestions to withdraw Melkert and to put forward Wim Kok (at that time the prime minister) 
for another term as prime minister, in case the PvdA would win the elections (Koole, 2009). 
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held, the PvdA became the second largest party. In addition, only 17.1 per cent of the voters 
of the PvdA cast a preference vote. Whether this example is an exceptional case, or whether 
evaluations of the list-pullers have a more general influence on preference voting will be 
tested with the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3.4: If a voter, prior to the elections, gives lower evaluations to the 
first candidate (list-puller) on the list, he or she is more likely to cast a vote 
for another candidate, i.e. a preference vote. 
 
However, this expectation suggests that a voter does not have any other options than voting 
for another candidate if he or she does not want to vote for the first candidate on the list. Of 
course, this is not the case for each electoral system. In Belgium voters have the option to 
cast a list vote. Thus, if a Belgian voter has a negative feeling towards the first candidate on 
the list, but no specific preference for another candidate on that list, the voter has another 
option: to cast a list vote. Therefore, I expect that in addition to hypothesis 3.4: 
 
Hypothesis 3.5: Hypothesis 3.4 only holds if the electoral system forces a 
voter to vote for a candidate, and not if the electoral system allows the voter 
to cast a list vote. 
 
Table 3.2 Overview of expectations for the demand side 
Model Categories H Expectation 
Resources Education 3.1 + 
 Political interest 3.1 + 
 Internal efficacy 3.1 + 
 Political knowledge 3.1 + 
Traditionally underrepresented 
group 
Age 3.2 + 
Women 3.2 + 
Region 3.2 + 
Non-western origin 3.2 + 
Feeling closer towards a certain 
group of candidates 
Urbanization 3.3 + 
Member political party 3.3 + 
Negative motivations Negative evaluation first 
candidate on the list 
3.4/.3.5 + (NL) 
~ (BE) 
Note: + positive effect on preference voting; ~ no effect on preference voting. 
3.3 Methods and data 
3.3.1 Methods and data for the Netherlands 
The data for the analysis of the Dutch case come from the Dutch Parliamentary Election 
Studies (DPES)43. Different datasets were combined into one dataset for the analyses in this 
chapter. The starting point was the DPES integrated file 1970-2006 (Todosijevic et al., 
                                                                
43 For more information see: http://www.dpes.nl/. 
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2010), to which cases from the DPES 2010 and DPES 2012 were added44. In the 1970-2006 
integrated file, not all variables from the original studies were included. However, some of 
the excluded variables were relevant for this study. Therefore, these variables were included 
again in the dataset for the years 1998, 2002, 2003 and 2006 for the analysis in this chapter. 
These variables were taken from the DPES 1998, DPES 2002/3 and DPES 2006. 
With the constructed dataset two analyses were conducted. First, tot test hypothesis 
3.4, I study the motivations respondents had for casting a preference vote for the election 
years 2002 until 2012. From the DPES of 2002 onwards respondents receive a question 
about their most important reason for casting a preference vote. One of the answer options 
is ‘other reason’ and if people gave that answer they were asked to describe their motivation 
in their own words. For these motivations two things are coded: 1) if that motivation 
contains a (negative) evaluation of the list-puller and 2) whether a reason is given to vote 
for the specific candidate he or she chose instead. Studies have shown that studying open 
answers might result in valuable results (see for example André et al., 2015; Van Holsteyn, 
1994). 
In the 1998 DPES the reason for casting a preference vote was asked in a slightly 
different way. In 1998 voters were asked if they voted for another candidate 1) because it 
was the first woman on the list, 2) the candidate was a well-known person or 3) for another 
reason. These reasons from the third category were coded in different categories, including 
categories that include a (negative) evaluation of the list-puller of the party. The results for 
the 1998 election will therefore be discussed separately. 
Next, a logistic regression analysis was conducted. The dependent variable for this 
logistic regression analysis is whether a voter cast a preference vote (coded 1) or not (coded 
0). Table 3.3 shows the percentage of respondents who said they cast a preference vote, 
compared with the actual percentage of preference votes. In general, the reported preference 
votes resemble the actual preference votes rather well. While there is a slight 
overrepresentation of voters who said they did cast a preference vote, the reported 
preference votes follow the trend of the actual preference votes. 
A number of independent variables are included to test the hypotheses. These 
variables are education, political interest, whether the respondent thinks he or she is 
qualified for politics, political knowledge, age, gender, region, ethnicity, urbanisation and 
party membership (see table 3.2). Whether the respondent thinks he or she is qualified for 
politics is used to test the effect of internal political efficacy. In most waves of the DPES this 
variable is a scale made up of different questions. However, the qualified for politics 
question is the only question that was asked in all DPES between 1998 and 2012. In order to 
make the variable comparable between all studies, this is the only question used in the 
analysis. Furthermore, as control variables dummies are included for parties and election
                                                                
44 While in other parts of this dissertation the Dutch elections of 2017 are included in the analysis, at the time of 
writing this chapter the DPES 2017 was not yet available and therefore this election is not included in the analysis 
in this chapter. 
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Table 3.3 Reported and actual preference votes (the Netherlands) 
Year Reported preference votes Actual preference votes 
1998 23.5% 20.5% 
2002 32.0% 27.1% 
2003 25.6% 18.5% 
2006 24.1% 22.8% 
2010 15.9% 15.9% 
2012 19.4% 19.0% 
Total 23.0% 20.6% 
Source: DPES 1970-2006 integrated file; DPES 2010; DPES 2012 (reported preference 
votes, unweighted); own calculations based on official election results (actual preference 
votes) 
 
years. For parties a dummy is included indicating whether the party is a traditional or new 
party; research for Belgium has shown that voters for traditional parties cast more 
preference votes (Wauters et al., 2016)45 46. In addition the number of candidates on the list 
of the party of choice is included. Research has shown that an increase in the number of 
candidates from which a voter can choose leads to a decrease in the likelihood of casting a 
preference votes, arguably since the larger the choice set the harder the decision for which 
candidate to vote (André & Depauw, 2017)47. With the exception of age and the number of 
candidates on a list, for all these variables dummies for the different categories are included. 
In appendix C.2 descriptive statistics for these variables are given. This appendix also shows 
the different answering categories for all variables for which dummies were created and 
which categories were used as reference category. 
To test hypothesis 3.4 measurements of the evaluation of the list-puller are included. 
Based on the evaluations of parties and political leaders given by the respondents two 
variables were created to test the effect of leadership evaluations on preference voting. The 
variables ‘sympathy score for party’ and ‘sympathy score for leader’ contain the evaluations 
of the party and of the leader from the political party for which the respondent voted 
respectively. In appendix C.1 an overview is given for the parties included in the analysis, 
and the name of the list-puller. In the DPES from 2006 and 2012 the evaluation scores were 
asked in the wave after the elections. To make sure that the evaluation scores are not 
influenced by the behaviour of the respondents we are interested in (casting a preference 
vote or not), these two elections are excluded from this analysis. The first variable that is 
included in the analysis to test the leadership evaluation hypothesis (H3.4) is the evaluation 
score of the list-puller of the party a respondent voted for. A second variable was created 
containing the difference between the evaluation score of the list-puller and of the party for 
                                                                
45 PvdA, VVD, CDA, D66, SGP, GPV and RPF are considered to be traditional parties. GroenLinks, SP, 
ChristenUnie, LPF, PVV and Partij voor de Dieren are considered to be new parties. 
46 Other party effects will be discussed in the next chapter. 
47 André and Depauw (2017) use the number of candidates of all parties for which a voter can vote, but since the 
starting point of this dissertation is that a candidate choice comes after party choice, I only count the number of 
candidates on the list of the party for which a respondent voted. 
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which the respondent voted. If this variable takes a positive value this means that a 
respondent gives the leader of a party a better evaluation than the party itself. A negative 
value means that the respondent gave the list-puller a lower evaluation than the party. In 
the case that the respondent has evaluated the list-puller and the party the same this variable 
takes the value 0. 
The distributions of these evaluation scores are shown in figure 3.1. The 
distributions of the scores for the party and list-puller are negatively skewed. This is not 
surprising, since the scores are for the party for which the respondent voted. Still, we see 
that both the evaluation score of the party and the list-puller cover the entire range (from 
very unsympathetic (0) to very sympathetic (10))48. The party for which a respondent voted 
on average receives an evaluation score of 7.5 (SD 1.58). The list-puller of the party for 
which a respondent voted receives on average an evaluation score of 7.4 (SD 1.67). While 
we know that the evaluation of a party and the evaluation of its leader are highly correlated 
(see for example Aarts, 2001), some voters gave different scores to a party and the leader. 
The average difference between the evaluation score of the party and the list-puller is -0.12 
(SD 1.44); of the respondents 41 per cent gave the party and the list-puller of that party for 
which he or she voted the same score. 
 
Figure 3.1 Distribution evaluation scores list-puller, party and difference 
 
                                                                
48 Up to and including the 2003 study, respondents were asked to evaluate parties and leaders on a scale ranging 
from 0 until 100. These scores were recoded to a 0-10 scale (see for further information and coding scheme 
Todosijevic et al., 2010, pp. 98–112). 
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3.3.2 Methods and data for Belgium 
For Belgium motivations for a vote for a specific candidate of respondents in the PartiRep 
2014 election study will be analysed (Deschouwer et al., 2015; PARTIREP, 2014). In this 
study respondents were asked for which candidates they voted if they did not cast a list vote. 
In the Belgian federal elections of 2014, 57 per cent of the voters did cast (at least one) 
preference vote. In the PartiRep Election Study slightly fewer respondents said they did cast 
a preference vote: 50 per cent. Belgian voters may cast multiple candidate votes. If 
respondents did cast more than one preference vote, they were asked to motivate the vote 
for their most preferred candidate. Again, for these motivations two things are coded: 1) 
whether that motivation contains a (negative) evaluation of the candidate at the top of the 
list and 2) whether a reason is given for the candidate who is chosen instead. It is important 
to notice that in the Belgian system not all voters have the option to cast a vote for the party 
leader, since they can only participate in one district49. However, it is not necessarily the 
effect of the electoral leader we are interested in, but the effect of the first candidate on the 
list. Therefore, the motivations will be studied to see if negative evaluations are given with 
respect to the first candidate on the list of the party the respondent could vote for. 
Subsequently, a logistic regression model was conducted to test which voters are 
more likely to cast a preference vote. Unfortunately, the PartiRep election study contains no 
questions about evaluations for leaders of political parties. Therefore, it is not possible to 
also test hypothesis 3.4 and 3.5 using a logistic regression model based on the PartiRep 
data50. However, it is possible to test the first three hypotheses. 
The dependent variable refers to whether a respondent did cast a preference vote. 
Note that a preference vote in Belgium is different than in the Netherlands. Since voters in 
Belgium have the option to cast a list vote all votes on a candidate are considered as 
preference votes. Whether a respondent did cast one or multiple preference votes does not 
make a difference for our purpose. Thus, the dependent variable measures whether a 
respondent did cast a vote for at least one candidate. 
Several independent variables are included: education, political interest, political 
knowledge, age, gender and party membership (see also table 3.2)51. In addition also for 
Belgium the number of candidates on the party list and whether the respondent did cast a 
vote for a traditional or newer party is included52. In appendix C.2 the answer categories for 
the different variables are shown; some descriptive statistics are included as well. 
The absence of evaluation scores for list-pullers / political leaders in the PartiRep 
2014 election study is unfortunate, but not fatal for the analysis of this chapter. The dataset 
                                                                
49 In general, the party chairman is considered the electoral leader (see also Wauters et al., 2016, p. 7). 
50 In other election studies for Belgium which are known / available to me, no evaluation scores for political leaders 
are available either. 
51 Since I use excising election studies in this chapter for Belgium and the Netherlands, it was not possible to create 
two identical models for Belgium and the Netherlands. This may be considered to be a shortcoming, but it is more 
useful to have slightly different models than two identical models with fewer variables. 
52 Coded as traditional parties are: CD&V, open VLD, sp.a, PS, MR and cdH. 
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is very valuable in the sense that motivations for preference votes are well documented, 
which makes it possible to test the fourth and fifth hypotheses of this chapter. Moreover, 
based on the data collected for the experiment described in the previous chapter it is 
possible to conduct a logistic regression analysis which resembles the one conducted for the 
Netherlands. However, since this experiment was conducted only in Flanders and was not 
designed to be a comprehensive study on real election behaviour, we have to be careful in 
drawing conclusions from the analysis. 
A logistic regression analysis was performed using all respondents from the first and 
second group of the experiment; i.e. those respondents who had the option to cast a list 
vote. The dependent variable for this analysis is whether a voter did cast a preference vote. 
The independent variables which are included are: education, political interest, whether the 
respondents thinks he or she is qualified for politics, age, gender, party membership, 
whether the respondent did cast a vote for an traditional party, the evaluation score for the 
list-puller and the difference between the evaluation score for the list-puller and the party. 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Preference voting in the Netherlands 
In the Dutch elections held between 1998 and 2012 on average approximately 20 per cent of 
the voters cast a preference vote. Preference voting in the Netherlands peaked in 2002, when 
27.1 per cent of the voters cast a preference vote (see also section 1.2)53. Table 3.4 shows the 
reasons respondents of the DPES gave for casting such a preference vote. The most 
important reason to cast a preference vote is that the candidate is a woman. For each 
election approximately one third of the preference votes are cast because the candidate 
voted for is a woman. The fact that a candidate comes from the same region is for many 
voters another important reason to cast a preference vote54. In the election study of 1998 the 
question consisted of fewer categories, and this may explain why in 1998 the percentage of 
voters who said their reason was that they knew the candidate personally was much higher. 
Since the question in the study of 1998 only had two predefined answers (see section 3.3.1) 
and ‘did know the candidate personally’ was one of them, the higher percentage might be 
explained by more methodological reasons. For a quarter of voters the qualities or the 
interest the candidate represented was an important reason to cast a preference vote. All 
these reasons suggest a ‘pull’ mechanism: the candidate for whom the preference vote is cast 
is in one way or another interesting and attractive for the voter. 
It is interesting to see how these reasons for casting a preference vote relate to the
                                                                
53 In the 2017 election, which is not included in the analysis in this chapter, this ‘record’ was almost broken, when 
27.0 per cent of the voters cast a preference vote. 
54 Whether this is true for all voters, or for a (geographically) specific part of the electorate will be discussed later in 
this chapter, when the results of the logistic regression analysis are presented. Moreover, the issue of regional 
candidates will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, see section 4.4.2. 
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Table 3.4 Reasons for casting a preference vote 
Reason 19981 2002 2003 2006 2010 2012 
It is a woman 31% 33% 41% 30% 35% 37% 
It is a man  3% 2%    
Someone I know personally 23% 3% 7% 4% 5% 4% 
Someone who represents certain interests 6% 8% 7% 12% 5% 8% 
Someone from this neighbourhood/region2 10% 7% 12% 9% 14% 19% 
It is a good candidate 18% 25% 17% 22% 11% 8% 
He/she is from an ethnic minority   1%    
Negative about first candidate 11%      
Other reason 5% 20% 15% 23% 30% 24% 
Total (N) 353 476 307 519 315 270 
1 In 1998 some respondents gave multiple reasons, therefore the percentages do not add up to 100. 
2 This category combines answers with any reference to a specific area the candidate comes from. This 
can be the same neighbourhood, municipality, a wider region or province. 
Source: DPES 1970-2006 integrated file; DPES 1998; DPES 2010; DPES 2012. 
 
 
Table 3.5 Gender and casting a preference vote because the candidate is a woman 
 Gender 
Reason for preference vote Male Female Total 
Other reason 87.7% 60.7% 72.6% 
It is a woman 12.3% 39.3% 27.4% 
Total (N) 1197 1511 2708 
2 (1) = 245.533, p < .001; 𝜑 = .301 
 
 
Table 3.6 Gender and casting a preference vote because the candidate is a man 
 Gender 
Reason for preference vote Male Female Total 
Other reason 98.2% 96.5% 97.2% 
It is a man 1.8% 3.5% 2.8% 
Total (N) 331 452 783 
2 (1) = 2.087, p < .149; 𝜑 = .052 
Period: 2002-2003. 
 
 
Table 3.7 Region and casting a preference votes because someone is from this region 
 Region 
Reason for preference vote North East West South Total 
Other reason 82.3% 91.0% 96.6% 83.9% 90.8% 
Someone from this neighbourhood 17.7% 9.0% 3.4% 16.1% 9.2% 
Total (N) 361 565 1199 583 2708 
2 (3) = 112.513, p < .001; 𝜑 = .204 
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variables presented in the hypotheses in this chapter, to get an idea of how plausible the 
hypotheses are. Because of data limitations, it is not possible to relate all the answer options 
to one of the variables, but three reasons can be linked to the variables. First, it is possible to 
check whether there is a relationship between gender and the reason ‘It is a woman’ (table 
3.5). Almost 40 per cent of female voters (who cast a preference vote), said they cast a 
preference vote for a candidate because that candidate was a woman. For male voters, this 
percentage was much lower (12 per cent). This relationship is statistically significant, and 
represents a medium effect. In table 3.6 the relationship between gender and casting a 
preference vote because the candidate is a man is shown. The table shows that there is no 
statistically significant relationship between both variables. These two findings support the 
idea behind hypothesis 3.2, as women are underrepresented in politics and 
underrepresented groups are, according to the hypothesis, more likely to cast a preference 
vote. 
We now look at the relationship between the region and stating ‘someone from this 
neighbourhood’ as the reason for casting a preference vote (see table 3.7). We would expect 
that, based on the logic behind H3.3, voters from the western region are less likely to cast a 
preference vote based on this reason than voters from the other regions. This is indeed what 
the table shows, since out of the respondents from the west only 4.4 did report this reason, 
while in the north, west and south this reason was given by respectively 17.7, 9.0 and 16.1 
per cent of the voters who cast a preference vote. This is a statistically significant, but 
relatively small effect. 
A substantial number of respondents said they had other reasons to cast a preference 
vote, ranging from 5 per cent in 1998 to 30 in 2010 (see table 3.4). The reasons these voters 
gave were coded and analysed. For each motivation two things were coded: whether the 
motivation for the preference vote included a negative evaluation of the list-puller, and 
whether or not the voter gave a reason for voting for a specific other candidate instead.  
In table 3.8 the results of the analysis of the motivations are reported, which shows 
that a substantial number of voters had negative reasons to cast a preference vote in each 
election, ranging from 4.2 per cent of the voters who cast a preference vote in 2003 to 9.4 
per cent in 2010. For some voters the reason was simply that they disliked the list-puller or 
did not think the list-puller was a good candidate. Others said that the list-puller already 
received enough votes, so they voted for another candidate. The majority of these voters 
only gave the reason they did not vote for the list-puller. Some voters who explicitly 
mentioned they did not want to vote for the list-puller also gave a reason why they voted for 
the other candidate. However, this group was much smaller. Of those voters who did cast a 
preference vote motivated by negative evaluations of the list-puller, approximately one out 
of every five respondents gave a reason why they did cast a vote for the other candidate. 
The estimate of the percentage of negative preference votes is probably conservative, 
for several reasons. Since not all respondents answered the open part of the question, it 
might be that other respondents were also motivated by negative evaluations of the list-
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Table 3.8 The negative preference vote 
Year Against list-puller 
without motivation for 
other candidate 
Against list-puller with 
motivation for other 
candidate 
Total 
2002 4.8 1.4 6.2 
2003 3.9 0.3 4.2 
2006 4.9 1.1 6.0 
2010 6.8 2.5 9.4 
2012 7.0 0.7 7.7 
Total 5.3 1.3 6.6 
Source: DPES 1970-2006 integrated file; DPES 2010; DPES 2012 
 
puller, but gave their secondary reason for voting for another candidate in the first question. 
This interpretation is supported by what is found for 1998. In the 1998 DPES respondents 
only got two options in the multiple choice question, and as a result many more 
respondents answered the open question. For 11 per cent of the respondents who gave a 
reason for casting a preference vote the evaluation of the list-puller was the reason for 
casting a vote for another candidate (see table 3.4). This percentage is higher than any 
percentage in table 3.8, and fits the suggestion that the estimates in table 3.8 are rather 
conservative. The conclusion is that in the Netherlands, given the obligatory candidate vote, 
a small part of what is called a preference vote is in fact a vote against the list-puller or 
motivated by a negative evaluation of the list-puller, rather than a vote in favour of the 
other candidate. 
In table 3.9 the relationship between the evaluation of the list-puller and casting a 
preference vote is further explored. The table shows how respondents in the DPES evaluated 
the list-puller of the party they voted for on a scale ranging from 0 (very unsympathetic) to 
10 (very sympathetic) and whether they cast a vote for the list-puller or a preference vote. It 
shows, in line with previous results, that voters who gave the list-puller lower evaluations 
are more likely to cast a preference vote. Out of those who give their party’s list-puller an 
evaluation score below 7, more than 30 per cent cast a preference vote. This is much more 
than among voters who evaluate the list-puller with the maximum score. Within this group 
only 14 per cent cast a preference vote. 
The same analysis was conducted per party (results not shown here). In general, 
these separate analyses did not show different results. For the biggest parties (CDA, VVD, 
PvdA and D66) the results were similar and also highly significant. However, some 
 
Table 3.9 Evaluation score list-puller and casting a preference vote 
 Evaluation score 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total 
LP 56 75 70 65 62 68 68 76 80 84 86 77 
PV 44 26 30 35 38 32 32 25 20 16 14 23 
Total 
(N) 
18 47 53 80 175 500 883 1707 1994 1262 511 7230 
LP = Vote for list-puller; PV = Preference vote. 2 (10) = 168.020, p < .001 
Source: DPES 1970-2006 integrated file; DPES 2010; DPES 2012. 
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differences should be noted. For some parties the effect was visible, but not significant 
(GroenLinks, ChristenUnie). For four parties there did not seem to be a negative correlation 
between the evaluation of the list-puller and whether voters cast a preference vote: PVV, 
LPF, SP and SGP55. Three of these parties are seen as populist parties (PVV, LPF and SP) 
(Hakhverdian & Koop, 2007), often characterized as parties with strong leaders (e.g. 
Taggart, 2004, p. 276), which might explain the absence of any effect in these parties.  
In the remaining part of this section the results of the logistic regression models are 
discussed in order to see if the relationship between the evaluation of the list-puller and 
casting a preference vote remains intact when included in a model with other explanatory 
factors. Table 3.10 shows the result of the logistic regression model for the elections between 
1998 and 201056. Ideally, political knowledge, party membership and ethnicity would also be 
included in this model, but these variables are not included in all DPES. Three additional 
models are therefore presented in appendix C.3 which each include one additional variable: 
with political knowledge (Table C.3, page 178), with ethnicity (Table C.4, page 179) and 
with party membership (Table C.5, page 180). All tables contain one model without (model 
1) and one model with (model 2) the evaluation scores of the list-puller57. The 
interpretation of effect sizes based on a logistic regression table is not always 
straightforward. Therefore, for each independent variable the change in the predicted 
probability of casting a preference vote was calculated with the effects package for R (Fox, 
2003) when that independent variable would take its minimum value and its maximum 
value, while keeping all other variables at their mean (for interval-ratio variables) or modus 
(for dummy variables).  
 Hypothesis 3.1 states that voters who have more resources available are more likely 
to cast a preference vote. Variables measuring the levels of education, political interest, 
internal efficacy and political knowledge are therefore included, and a positive effect for all 
these variables is expected. This expectation is empirically supported. Voters with higher 
levels of education are more likely to cast a preference vote. I estimate that those with the 
highest level of education have approximately an 11 percentage points higher predicted 
probability of casting a preference vote than those with the lowest level of education. 
Political interest also has a significant effect in the model presented in table 3.10. For voters 
with the highest level of political interest the predicted probability of casting a preference 
vote increases with 8 percentage points, compared to those with the lowest levels of political
                                                                
55 These differences could also have a methodological reason, since there are fewer observations for these smaller 
parties. While 22 combinations are possible, many cells for these parties have no observations and a low expected 
count, which is problematic. Therefore, the analysis was also redone by making a dummy of the evaluation scores 
(with an evaluation score of 6 as cut-off point). This did not make a difference in the results. 
56 The elections of 2006 and 2012 are not included, see also section 3.3.1. 
57 In this section primarily the results of the models in table 3.10 will be discussed, complemented by the results of 
the three specific variables in the models from the appendix. The effects of the variables in the appendix also 
presented in table 3.10 will only be mentioned if there are notable differences between the model presented in this 
chapter and in the appendix. If not, the reader may assume there are no differences. 
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Table 3.10 Preference voting in the Netherlands 
 Model 1 Model 2 
(Constant) -1.742*** (0.300) -1.304*** (0.342) 
Education (Ref. = Elementary)     
 (Lower) Vocational 0.220 (0.172) 0.234 (0.177) 
 Secondary 0.275 (0.168) 0.323 (0.172) 
 Middle level vocational, higher level 
 secondary 
0.571*** (0.162) 0.614*** (0.166) 
 Higher level vocational, University 0.650*** (0.156) 0.695*** (0.161) 
Political interest (Ref. = 0 (Low))     
 1 -0.081 (0.186) -0.016  
 2 0.133 (0.190) 0.195 (0.194) 
 3 0.287 (0.193) 0.374 (0.198) 
 4 (High) 0.429* (0.205) 0.568** (0.211) 
Qualified for politics (Ref. = fully disagree)     
 Disagree 0.145 (0.084) 0.177* (0.086) 
 Agree 0.258** (0.097) 0.289  
 Fully agree 0.598** (0.173) 0.630*** (0.175) 
Age -0.010*** (0.002) -0.008*** (0.002) 
Woman 0.386*** (0.067) 0.378*** (0.068) 
Living outside Randstad 0.130 (0.074) 0.139  
Urbanization (Ref. = Very strongly urban)     
 Strongly urban -0.301** (0.105) -0.323** (0.107) 
 Mildly urban -0.303** (0.113) -0.326** (0.115) 
 Hardly urban -0.318** (0.115) -0.344** (0.116) 
 Not urban -0.190 (0.122) -0.213  
Candidates on list 0.010** (0.003) 0.010*** (0.003) 
Party old 0.135 (0.114) 0.070 (0.116) 
Evaluation score list-puller   -0.101*** (0.023) 
Evaluation score list-puller - evaluation score 
party 
  -0.213*** (0.027) 
-2LL 5986.856  5809.554  
Cox and Snell’s R2 0.049  0.079  
Nagelkerke R2 0.074  0.118  
N 5697  5697  
Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Standard errors in parentheses. Election dummies are included in 
model, but not presented here. The elections of 2006 and 2012 are excluded from the model.  
Source: DPES 1970-2006 integrated file; DPES 1998; DPES2002/03; DPES 2010;. 
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interest. However, in only one of the six models in the appendix the effect is also significant. 
Therefore, the support for the expectation that political interest has a positive influence on 
preference voting in the Netherlands is not very strong. The effect for internal efficacy, i.e. 
whether a voter considers him- or herself qualified for politics, is approximately of the same 
size as the effect of education. Those who fully agree that they are qualified for politics have 
a 12 per cent higher predicted probability of casting a preference vote than those who fully 
disagree with that statement. The effect of political knowledge is smaller, but the effect is 
statistically significant: those with the highest level of knowledge have an increased chance 
of 8 percentage points to cast a preference vote compared to those with the lowest level of 
knowledge. These are quite large effects, given the fact that approximately 20 per cent of the 
Dutch voters cast a preference vote. The resource hypothesis s therefore convincingly 
supported by the data. 
According to hypothesis 3.2 underrepresented groups are more likely to cast a 
preference vote. For age, we indeed find that younger voters are more likely to cast a 
preference vote. In addition we expect that women, voters coming from another part of the 
country than the Randstad and voters with a non-Dutch origin are more likely to cast a 
preference vote. The expectation from hypothesis 3.2 is supported for women. Women have 
a 7 per cent higher predicted probability than men to cast a preference vote. Not all 
expectations are supported. For those living outside the Randstad the chances of casting a 
preference votes increases with 2 percentage points. However, this finding is not statistically 
significant, although in most models the p-value is only slightly above the conventional .05 
level58. In addition, voters with a non-Dutch background are not significantly more likely to 
cast a preference vote. For those with a non-western background the coefficient in the 
model is even negative, suggesting that they are less likely to cast a preference vote. Yet, this 
finding is only based on only one edition of the DPES, and further research on the use of 
preference votes by ethnic minorities is necessary. Overall the hypothesis that traditionally 
underrepresented groups are more likely to cast a preference vote is empirically supported. 
We also expect that voters who had close ‘contact’ or at least are more familiar with 
candidates are more likely to cast a preference vote (hypothesis 3.3). Therefore, we expect 
that those living in rural areas are more likely to cast a preference vote because the chance 
that they come in contact with a candidate from their neighbourhood is higher. With regard 
to this impact or urbanisation we find something else than expected. It seems that voters 
living in the most urban and the most rural areas are more likely to cast a preference vote. 
Furthermore, we expect that party members have a higher chance of casting a preference 
vote, based on the assumption that they have more contacts within the party and are more 
likely to know a candidate. The probability that members of a political party cast a 
                                                                
58 It should be noted that a further exploration of which voters outside the Randstad are more likely to cast a 
preference vote (results not presented here) shows that, especially those in the North and South of the country are 
more likely to cast a preference votes. Voters in the east of the country are not significantly more likely to cast a 
preference vote than those living in the Randstad. 
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preference vote increases by 6 percentage points, compared to the probability of a voter who 
is not a member of a party. However, we should be careful with drawing this conclusion, 
since the coefficient is slightly above the .05 significance level in model 1 and the 
significance level is just below the .05 level in model 2 (see table c.5). The evidence for 
hypothesis 3.3 is therefore not very strong. 
The models contain two control variables, one for the number of candidates on the 
party list and one for separating established from newer parties. Since they are control 
variables we have to be cautious to causally interpret them, but the length of the list seems 
to have a very small positive effect on preference voting, contrary to what was expected. The 
expectation was that too much choice would let voters to abstain from casting a preference 
vote. Instead, the result seems to suggest that more choice leads to higher probabilities of 
casting a preference vote. However, the effect is not significant in all models and is only very 
small. With respect to party age, voters for traditional parties are indeed more likely to cast a 
preference vote (an increase of 4 per cent), but this effect is neither statistically significant 
nor consistent across all models. 
In each table a second model is presented as well which includes the affect or 
evaluation score a voter gave the list-puller of the party he or she voted for, and the 
difference between the evaluation score of the party and the list-puller. The inclusion of the 
two evaluation variables results in a significant improvement of the model (2 = 201.720, df 
= 2, p < .001)59. In addition, the inclusion of the evaluation scores hardly has an effect on 
the other variables included in the model. In all models the two evaluation variables are 
highly statistically significant, and for both variables the effect is also substantial. The effect 
of the evaluation score of the list-puller is also presented in figure 3.2. The figure shows the 
effect of the evaluation score of the list-puller on the probability to cast a preference vote, 
when all other variables remains at their mean or (for categorical variables) at their modal 
value. The difference between the evaluation of the list-puller and the party is kept constant 
at 0 in this figure, because that is the only score on the difference variable that allows the 
evaluation of the list-puller variable to take all possible values between 0 and 10. This figure 
shows quite a substantial effect. Other things being equal, there is a clear drop in the 
probability of casting a preference vote of almost 25 percentage points, moving from a very 
negative or unsympathetic to a very positive or sympathetic evaluation of the list-puller. 
In addition, the difference between the evaluation score of the list-puller and the 
party also has a significant and substantial effect. Using the 'divide by four rule' (see Gelman 
& Hill, 2007, p. 82), the maximum decline of the probability of casting a preference vote is 
4.5 per cent if the difference between the two evaluation scores increases with one point on 
the evaluation scale (meaning that the list-puller is evaluated relatively better). The effect of 
the difference between the evaluation scores is plotted in figure 3.3. The effect is shown for 
the range from -4 (the evaluation score of the list-puller is 4 points below the evaluation
                                                                
59 The models presented in the appendix also show a significant improvement. 
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Figure 3.2 Effect evaluation list-puller 
 
Note: the variable ‘difference evaluation party & list-puller’ was set to 0. 
 
Figure 3.3 Effect difference between evaluation list-puller and party 
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score of the party) until 4 (the evaluation score of the list-puller is 4 points above the 
evaluation score of the party). Within this range the probability of casting a preference vote 
drops with approximately 25 percentage points. Given these large effects, both figures 
confirm that the results presented in table 3.8 indeed may be conservative. I argued that the 
results presented there might be conservative, because maybe not all voters who cast a 
preference vote for another candidate because of a negative evaluation of the list-puller 
actually said this was their reason for casting a preference vote, given the question that was 
asked. Since the differences between the percentages presented in table 3.8 and in the 
regression models are so large, it seems likely that the negative preference vote is more 
common than can be seen in table 3.8. 
These two effects again show that the evaluation of the list-puller of a party impacts 
the probability of casting a preference vote (in line with hypothesis 3.4). This finding may 
not be extremely surprising, but it has important implications if a voter can only vote for a 
candidate, as is the case in the Netherlands. However, before discussing these and other 
implications, the results for Belgium will be presented. 
3.4.2 Preference voting in Belgium 
Of the respondents in the 2014 PartiRep election study 628 gave a motivation for their vote 
for a specific candidate. This was approximately one third of the respondents who 
participated in the study and half of the respondents who said they cast a vote in the federal 
elections. From these 628 respondents only 5 (0.2%) mentioned the first candidate on the 
list in their motivation to vote for another candidate60. These respondents said they would 
not vote for the first candidate because they did not like the first candidate on the list. Four 
of these respondents said they therefore randomly picked another candidate and one 
respondent gave an additional reason for the choice for the other candidate. Thus in 
Belgium the number of voters who cast a preference vote as a result of a negative evaluation 
of the candidate on top of the list is much lower than in the Netherlands. This does not 
mean that all preference votes in Belgium are pure, personalized preference votes. Table 
3.11 shows what was most important for respondents when they voted: the party or the 
candidate. For most respondents the party is much more important than the candidates, 
even if he or she voted for a candidate. In the next section these results are discussed, 
thereby reflecting on hypothesis 3.5. 
The results of the logistic regression model for Belgium, presented in table 3.12, 
show a different picture than the results for the Netherlands. With regard to the first 
hypothesis, on the basis of which we expect that higher education, better political 
knowledge and higher levels of political interest increase the chances of casting a preference
                                                                
60 If this percentage would have been higher, it would have been interesting to perform an additional analysis to see 
whether there was a difference between lists where the political leader headed the list or where other candidates 
headed the list. But since only 0.2 per cent of the respondents mentioned the list-puller in their motivation, it is not 
very interesting to make this distinction: such negative motivations clearly do not play a role in the Belgian system. 
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Table 3.11 Party vote versus candidate vote (Belgium) 
Candidate or party? List vote Preference vote Total 
0 - Only candidate(s) matter(s) 1.6% 8.5% 5.0% 
1 0.4% 2.2% 1.3% 
2 0.7% 3.1% 1.9% 
3 0.9% 4.5% 2.6% 
4 0.6% 4.0% 2.3% 
5 8.4% 16.6% 12.5% 
6 3.8% 6.7% 5.2% 
7 11.9% 12.8% 12.4% 
8 23.1% 19.0% 21.1% 
9 9.8% 7.7% 8.8% 
10 - Only the party matters 38.7% 14.9% 26.9% 
N 687 673 1360 
Source: PartiRep election study 2014 (PARTIREP, 2014). The question was (translated to English): 
What has been the most important factor in determining your vote: the candidate(s) or the party? You 
can answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means that only the candidate(s) was (were) important 
and 10 means that only the party was important. 
 
vote, the evidence is mixed. All variables have an effect in the expected direction, but they 
are not all significant. Education and political interest have a small and positive, but no 
significant effect. Political interest is significant: for each step on the scale from 0 to 10 the 
chances of casting a preference vote increases with approximately one per cent. 
For the second hypothesis fewer indicators are included compared to the model for 
the Netherlands. The PartiRep dataset did not contain information about a candidate’s 
origin (a further discussion of this issue will follow in the final section of this chapter). 
While according to the model women are more likely to cast a preference vote, this effect is 
not only smaller than in the Netherlands but also not significant. This might have to do 
with the Belgian regulations for gender equality. On each list an equal number of men and 
women should be presented (in case of an uneven number of candidates there may be a 
difference of one) and the top two places of the list should be occupied by one man and one 
woman. Despite these rules women are still underrepresented in parliament. So based on 
the logic behind the identity model we would still expect that women are more likely to cast 
a preference vote. In contrast to the Netherlands, older people in Belgium are more likely to 
cast a preference vote.  
The proximity model assumes that members of political parties are more likely to 
cast a preference vote, which is supported by the analysis. Party members are almost three 
times more likely to cast a preference vote than voters who are not a member of a political 
party. 
Finally, the two control variables show the same direction as in the Netherlands. The 
number of candidates has a positive effect on casting a preference vote, but is not 
significant. In line with what was expected, voting for a traditional party strongly increases 
the chances of casting a preference vote. 
In table 3.13 the results of the second logistic regression analysis are presented, based 
on data collected for the experiment in the previous chapter. What is interesting is that the
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Table 3.12 Preference voting in Belgium 
 Model 1 
(Constant) -2.092*** (0.042) 
Education (Ref. = Low)   
 Middle 0.356 (0.233) 
 High 0.471 (0.244) 
Political interest 0.047* (0.024) 
Political knowledge (Ref. = 0 - Low)   
 1 -0.126 (0.173) 
 2 0.044 (0.177) 
 3 0.141 (0.196) 
 4 - High 0.125 (0.264) 
Age 0.011** (0.004) 
Woman 0.200 (0.118) 
Party member 1.035*** (0.235) 
Candidates on list 0.012 (0.008) 
Party old 0.750*** (0.119) 
-2LL 1784.005  
Cox and Snell’s R2 .070  
Nagelkerke R2 .093  
N 1358  
Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: PartiRep election study 2014 (PARTIREP, 2014) 
 
Table 3.13 Preference voting in Belgium including evaluation scores 
 Model 1 Model 2 
(Constant) 0.233 0.357 0.078 0.703 
Education (Ref. = Low)     
 Middle -0.229 0.292 -0.230 0.295 
 High -0.368 0.319 -0.330 0.321 
Political interest (Ref. = Not interested)     
 Somewhat interested 0.067 0.283 0.068 0.287 
 Highly interested -0.254 0.392 -0.281 0.400 
Qualified for politics (Ref. = fully disagree)     
 Disagree 0.206 0.297 0.219 0.299 
 Agree 0.775** 0.342 0.798** 0.345 
 Fully agree 0.420 0.473 0.440 0.476 
Age 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Woman -0.054 0.239 -0.028 0.242 
Party member -0.157 0.346 -0.148 0.356 
Party old 0.287 0.241 0.284 0.243 
Evaluation score list-puller   0.017 0.084 
Evaluation score list-puller - evaluation score 
party 
  
0.138 0.100 
-2LL 440.050  436.014  
Cox and Snell’s R2 .038  .049  
Nagelkerke R2 .051  .067  
N 338  338  
Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Model improvement: 2 = 4.036, df = 2, p = .133. Source: Own dataset. 
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results show that the evaluation of the list-puller and the difference between the evaluation 
of the party and list-puller for which was voted do not have a significant influence61. While 
this test is very conservative, it is in line with the findings presented earlier in this chapter: a 
negative evaluation of the list-puller has less influence in a system where it is possible to cast 
a list vote. 
3.5 Discussion and conclusion 
This chapter set out with the aim of explaining which voters cast a preference vote. Table 
3.14 gives an overview of the expectations and the findings for Belgium and the Netherlands 
presented in this chapter. 
 
Table 3.14 Summary of findings for chapter 3 
Group Categories H Exp. Bel. Net. 
Resources Education 3.1 + ~ ++ 
 Political interest 3.1 + ++ + 
 Internal efficacy 3.1 +  ++ 
 Political knowledge 3.1 + ~ ++ 
Traditionally 
underrepresented 
group 
Age 3.2 + + - 
Women 3.2 +  ~ ++ 
Region 3.2 +  ~ 
Non-western 
country 
3.2 +  ~ 
Feeling closer towards a 
certain group of 
candidates 
Urbanization 3.3 +  M 
Party member 3.3 + ++ + 
Influence negative 
evaluation first 
candidate on the list 
- 3.4/.3.5 + (NL) 
~ (BE) 
~ ++ 
Note: ++ strong positive effect; + positive effect; ~ no effect; - negative effect 
 
Current literature on voting behaviour works from the assumption that voters cast a 
vote for a specific party or candidate because they evaluate that party or candidate 
positively; they are pulled towards that party or candidate. For preference voting one might 
therefore expect that voters with more resources are more likely to cast a preference vote, 
because they are better qualified to decide which candidate best fits their interest. 
Furthermore, voters from underrepresented groups are more likely to cast a preference vote. 
By casting a preference vote for a candidate with a similar background, these voters might 
try to improve the representation of their group in parliament. Finally, those voters who 
have more contact or are more familiar with candidates are also expected to be more likely 
                                                                
61 In the experiment the same lists were used for all respondents. This is different from the real-life situation in 
Belgium, where voters can only vote for a list within a district. In the experiment all respondents therefore could 
vote for the electoral leader, which is not true in real elections in Belgium. Therefore, the results based on this 
analysis should be seen as highly tentative. 
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to cast a preference vote. For the Netherlands, all these expectations are empirically 
supported (although not all as convincingly). For Belgium the evidence is somewhat mixed. 
While most of the hypotheses are supported in the current literature on preference voting in 
Belgium on the regional or municipal level, for the federal elections of 2014 this is not the 
case.  
Perhaps the most striking difference between the results for Belgium and the 
Netherlands is the role gender plays in both countries. In the Netherlands, gender is one of 
the stronger predictors of preference voting while in Belgium it has no effect. There seems 
to be one obvious explanation for this difference. In Belgium rules determine that there 
should be a balance between male and female voters on party lists. In the Netherlands such 
rules do not exist, resulting in unbalanced lists (for most parties). Although in Belgium 
these rules do not result in a perfectly gender balanced parliament, this might reduce the 
incentive for women to cast a vote for a female candidate. In the Netherlands, where most 
lists are dominated by male candidates, voters – and especially female voters - might have a 
higher incentive to cast a vote for female candidates. Of course, based on the regression 
models in this chapter it is not possible to say whether women actually cast a preference 
vote for female candidates, but other results presented in this chapter seem to suggest they 
do. Even so, it will be interesting to see whether this difference is reflected in the support for 
female candidates in Belgium and the Netherlands. This is discussed in the next chapter, 
which discusses the candidates.  
Two findings suggest further research is needed. First, with regard to the ethnic 
background of voters one important remark has to be made. In this chapter I was only able, 
based on existing survey research, to tentatively look at the influence of a voter’s ethnic 
background on preference voting. Therefore it is difficult to draw strong conclusions about 
the existence of an effect for this group of voters and to identify what the precise effect 
would be. The ethnic preference vote deserves more attention in electoral research. Second, 
the contradicting effects of age in Belgium and the Netherlands are difficult to explain. 
Further research should focus on this topic to conduct a more fine grained analysis of the 
effect age has on preference voting. 
While some differences exist, the analyses for both countries show that positive 
factors play a role in casting a preference vote. What this chapter also shows is that negative 
factors play an important role as well, which is an understudied aspect of voting behaviour 
(Catt, 1996). I specifically explored one negative factor: the evaluation of the list-puller. 
While research has shown that at the interparty level leaders could have a negative effect on 
the number of votes their party receives, I argue and show that, especially in a context in 
which the list vote is absent, list-pullers can also have an impact on the number of 
preference votes that are cast. 
In the Netherlands votes for the list-puller are often primarily seen as a party vote. 
Only votes for other candidates are called preference votes. The assumption is that votes for 
other candidates reflect a specific choice for that individual candidate. However, analysing 
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the motivations voters gave for casting a preference vote, we can conclude that a substantial 
part of voters cast a preference vote because they do not want to vote for the list-puller. 
These preference votes can be seen as a ‘negatively motivated preference vote’62 and are not 
a deliberate preference vote for the other candidate, but rather an anti-vote against the list-
puller. 
The extent to which the phenomenon of a negatively motivated preference vote 
exists is difficult to tell. By studying the motivations of Dutch voters I estimate that there is a 
lower limit somewhere between 6 and 10 per cent of the preference votes. But the logistic 
regression analyses showed that the effect of the evaluation of the list-puller is quite large, 
and therefore this percentage might by conservative. What is sure is that it complicates, in 
the Dutch case, the distinction between a party vote and a preference vote. The existing 
literature assumes that a vote for any other candidate than the party leader is necessarily not 
a pure party vote63. This is for example visible in the distinction Van Holsteyn and Andeweg 
(2010) make when they look at what comes first in the Dutch case: the party or the person. 
A vote for the list-puller in their operationalization can be: 1) a vote for the party (party 
above person), 2) a vote purely for the person (person above party) or 3) a vote for that 
person, within that party. For other candidates they only distinguish between the second 
and third option. This implies that a vote for another candidate than the list-puller from 
their perspective cannot be a pure party vote in the voter’s mind. The results of the 
experiment on voting behaviour presented in the previous chapter challenges this (one of 
the findings is that the option to cast a list vote equally affects voting for the list-puller and 
voting for other candidates) and this is again confirmed by the analyses in this chapter. 
This negatively motivated preference vote is absent in a situation where a voter can 
cast a list vote, such as in Belgium. In Belgium the negatively motivated preference vote is 
near to absent. When looking at the differences with regard to the electoral systems in 
Belgium and the Netherlands, it seems reasonable to expect that the option to cast a list vote 
is the cause of this difference. For Belgium, voters who do not have a specific preference for 
a candidate or who have a negative feeling towards the first candidate on the list and no 
other preferences, there is always the option to cast a list vote. Therefore, the distinction 
between a list vote on the one hand and a candidate vote on the other hand in Belgium is 
much clearer. It also more accurately grasps what a voter intends to ‘say’ with his or her 
vote. The fact that in the Netherlands there is one single district, while in Belgium there are 
                                                                
62 In an earlier publication Nagtzaam and van Erkel (2017) called these preference votes ‘preference votes without 
preference’. While for most of these votes it seems to be true that the voter does not have a specific preference for 
the candidate for which the vote was cast, the term negatively motivated preference vote seems more appropriate. 
It more accurately grasps of the reason behind the preference vote: a negative evaluation of the first candidate on 
the list. 
63 A pure party vote in this sense can be seen as a vote that, despite being cast for a candidate, has little to do with 
that individual candidate. The voter did not have a preference for that candidate, but only wanted to vote for the 
party of the candidate. That the voter voted for that candidate is only an effect of the fact that Dutch voters can 
only vote for a candidate and does not have the option to cast a list vote. 
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11 districts, could also have a potential influence on this result. After all, in Belgium not all 
voters have the option to cast a vote for the electoral leader of the party. Since these are the 
most visible candidates in election campaigns, it is also more likely that a voter has a 
(negative) opinion about that candidate. In the Netherlands all voters have the option to 
cast a vote for the leader of their preferred party. Thus, the Belgian districts could also be an 
explanation for the difference. However, this explanation is not very strong, since the effect 
did not appear on those lists where the electoral leader headed the list. It also seems unlikely 
that the fact that voting in Belgium is compulsory could explain this difference. It would 
even be more likely that the phenomenon occurs in a situation where voting is compulsory, 
since in such situations voters do not have the option to abstain if they do not want to vote 
for a specific candidate. Therefore, the conclusion should be that, although other differences 
between Belgium and the Netherlands exist, the list vote probably has a large influence on 
the extent to which negatively motivated preference votes exist. 
In the Netherlands the direct effect of ‘negatively motivated preference votes’ (i.e. 
whether a candidate gets elected or not) might be limited. Parties after all also have a large 
influence in determining which candidates are elected. However, in electoral systems that 
are fully open and in which voters only have the option to cast a preference vote (e.g. 
Finland), such effects might be stronger. In addition to for example a primacy effect (Van 
Erkel & Thijssen, 2016), this might further influence the impact of the list-order has on the 
outcome of the election. 
The results presented in this chapter have important implications. First, the results 
show that motivations for preference voting are not always (entirely) rational. This is in line 
with previous findings on preference voting (Van Erkel & Thijssen, 2016, p. 253). This has, 
as Van Erkel and Thijssen argue, important implications, since political parties use the 
electoral performance of individual candidates to decide whether to promote them to better 
list positions or other political functions (André, Depauw, Shugart, et al., 2017; Crisp et al., 
2013; Folke et al., 2016; see also chapter 5 of this dissertation). However, if not all preference 
votes are true preference votes, the electoral success of a candidate becomes a less precise 
indicator of the actual popularity of a candidate. Therefore this phenomenon might disturb 
the influence voters have beyond the direct effect of casting a preference vote, namely 
influencing the composition of the parliament. 
In addition, the results show that the debate on personalization is a very complex 
one. The current literature distinguishes between centralized personalization and 
decentralized personalization (Balmas et al., 2014). In the case of centralized personalization 
a leader of a political party or cabinet gains more power, while in the case of decentralized 
personalisation individual members other than the leader gain power. These are considered 
as two separate types of personalization, which are “more or less opposite processes” but 
nevertheless “can exist simultaneously”. The results in this chapter indeed show that both 
processes can be connected. In addition, the results relate to the concept of ‘negative 
personalization’ (Pruysers & Cross, 2016): a strategy adopted by parties to attack leaders of 
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other parties. While Pruysers and Cross relate this concept to the interparty competition, 
negative personalization might have an impact on intraparty competition as well. How all 
these concepts relate to each other remains open for debate. Further research on what the 
concept of personalization actually entails is therefore needed. 
The results presented in this chapter have implications for further research on 
preference voting64. For election studies in the Netherlands it would be advisable to at least 
include an answering category to the question about the reason for voters to cast a 
preference vote which includes the evaluation of the list-puller, to get a better 
understanding of the precise magnitude of the negatively motivated preference vote. It 
would be even better to extend the questions, if included, around the counterfactual 
thought experiment described by Van Holsteyn and Andeweg (2010) and to also leave 
voters the option to call a ‘preference vote’ a vote for the party (thus giving both voters for 
the list-pullers and voters for other candidates the same options to describe their vote). For 
Belgium it would be interesting to include questions on evaluation of list-pullers or at least 
political leaders, to further study whether the phenomenon of negatively motivated 
preference voting is truly absent in Belgium. 
                                                                
64 The conclusion (Chapter 0) contains a discussion with more practical implications of these findings for the 
Dutch electoral system. 
  
 
4 The supply side: what determines the 
popularity of candidates? 
4.1 Introduction 
If there is a demand side there should also be a supply side to meet this demand: in this case 
the candidates that are on the party lists and from which the voters can choose. According 
to Marsh (1985, p. 371) “candidates’ characteristics may be particularly salient where parties 
are composites of clearly defined subgroups. These may be ideological, and many derive 
from group identity – ethnic, religious, class, locality – or may be more personal: 
incumbents, for instance, may be perceived as potentially more effective deputies than their 
challengers”. 
There is a huge variation in the popularity of candidates in the Netherlands and 
Belgium. Even between those candidates who are elected large differences exist between the 
numbers of preference votes they receive. In the Netherlands, in each election a few 
candidates receive more than 100,000 votes, but at the same time some elected candidates 
only receive around 200 votes. The Dutch election of 2006 was an extreme election in this 
respect. While Rita Verdonk (2nd position VVD) received 620,555 preference votes, Tony 
van Dijck (8th position PVV) received 114 votes. The electoral threshold for an individual 
candidate to be elected on the basis of preference votes amounted to 16,398 votes. Thus, 
while Verdonk reached this number almost 38 times, Tony van Dijck did not reach one per 
cent of the individual threshold, but both candidates were elected to parliament. A 
comparison between the total number of votes of each elected candidate in Belgium does 
not tell the entire story, because of the size of the districts. However, it shows that 
differences in Belgium are also large. In 2014, for example, Bart de Wever was (in absolute 
terms) the most popular elected candidate with 314,650 votes. Benoit Hellings received 
3,725 votes and was (again in absolute terms) the least popular elected candidate. If we look 
at the number of votes, relative to the number of votes needed to be elected based on 
preference votes, Bart de Wever was still the most popular candidate. He received 8.4 times 
the number of votes needed to be elected directly. In relative terms, Marijke Dillen was the 
least popular candidate. She only received one fifth of the number of votes needed to be 
elected based on preference votes. 
Of course, these differences might not be relevant for all candidates. After all, both 
countries have a flexible list-system, in which parties still have a large influence on which 
candidates are elected and which candidates are not. Preference votes for a candidate are 
thus not always relevant, since candidates can also rely on the party. This is for example 
visible in the fact that in the Netherlands by no means all candidates take action to receive 
preference votes (Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012, pp. 177–178). In Belgium, most 
candidates only campaign for their party and not for themselves either. Approximately one 
fifth of the candidates run a more personalized campaign, in which they try to convince 
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voters to vote for them specially and not only try to make sure the voter cast a vote for the 
party (Van Erkel et al., 2017, pp. 393–394). Still, research has shown that preference votes 
have consequences beyond the scope of who gets elected. Parties for example reward 
popular candidates with better list positions in subsequent elections or promote them to 
better political functions (André, Depauw, Shugart, et al., 2017; Crisp et al., 2013; Folke et 
al., 2016; see also chapter 5 of this dissertation). Thus, there are two reasons why it is 
relevant to know which candidates are successful: it influences which candidates are elected 
and also influences later decisions of political parties. Therefore, this chapter looks at what 
factors determine the electoral success of candidates. 
4.2 Expectations65 
4.2.1 Socio-demographic factors 
As we saw in chapter 3, socio-demographic factors play a role when it comes to preference 
voting. These factors especially seem to benefit candidates from groups who are 
traditionally underrepresented. If citizens of these underrepresented groups vote for 
candidates from their own group, we would expect that women, candidates from ethnic 
minorities, candidates within a certain age category and candidates from specific regions are 
likely to receive more preference votes. However, the evidence is not conclusive. 
For example, there is no consensus whether gender has influence on the number of 
preference votes a candidate receives. While some studies in different contexts show that no 
voter bias against women exists (Black & Erickson, 2003; McElroy & Marsh, 2010; Wauters 
et al., 2010), Erzeel and Caluwaerts (2015) show that especially voters with low levels of 
political interest are still only voting for male candidates. Erzeel et al. (2017) argue that a 
“gender-based vote from the part of female voters (i.e. women opting to vote for women) is 
still limited”. Wauters et al. (2010) observed that in the 2003 Belgian federal elections 
women received fewer preference votes than men. The conclusion of their study was that 
“women do not obtain a lower number of preferential votes because they are women (no 
voter bias), but because they are less likely to occupy crucial positions on the list, wage a less 
expensive campaign and get less media coverage (systemic bias)” (Wauters et al., 2010, p. 
483). Controlling for the systemic bias resulted in no gender effect. This corresponds with 
McElroy and Marsh (2010, p. 824). They argue that “the role that candidate sex plays in 
voting behaviour is undoubtedly complex”, but that there is no evidence that women are 
‘discriminated’ against by voters. If they receive fewer votes, other factors can explain this. 
In absolute terms female candidates receive fewer votes than male candidates, but other 
factors can explain this, for example because male candidates have better list positions. 
Therefore, controlled for such factors, in Belgium female candidates still receive marginally 
more preference votes than male candidates (see for example Maddens et al., 2010). In the 
Netherlands the effect is larger, although this is to a large extent caused by the first female 
                                                                
65 A summary of the expectations can be found in table 4.1. 
The supply side: what determines the popularity of candidates? 
Expectations 
69 
 
candidate on the list (Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012). Gender-based voting in the 
Netherlands therefore seems more important than it is in Belgium. 
The effect of age is not linear (Maddens et al., 2007). Candidates tend to receive 
more preference votes when they are older, but beyond a certain age (around 60) the vote 
level drops to the level of the youngest candidates. In the Dutch national election of 2010, 
members of ethnic minorities receive on average 7,516 preference votes, compared to 2,064 
preference votes for those candidates not belonging to an ethnic minority (when votes for 
list-pullers are not included). However, the first figure is highly influenced by the average 
for the highest placed candidate from an ethnic minority on the list (which is 16,280) (Van 
Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012). The first set of hypotheses therefore is: 
 
Hypothesis 4.1: If a candidate belongs to a traditionally underrepresented 
social group in parliament he or she will receive more preference votes, than a 
candidate who belongs to a social group that is traditionally overrepresented 
in parliament. 
Hypothesis 4.2: The effect described in hypothesis 4.1 is stronger for the first 
candidate of a specific group, than it is for other candidates belonging to that 
group. 
 
Studies in the U.S. and United Kingdom also show that voters tend to vote for 
candidates who live closer to them (Arzheimer & Evans, 2012; Gimpel et al., 2008). 
Jankowski (2016) found that in the parliamentary elections of Hamburg candidates receive 
more votes in their own urban district, and that the effect is larger for the first candidate 
from a district on the list. Not much research has been done on the regional effect of the 
preference vote, but Van Holsteyn and Andeweg (2012) concluded that in the Dutch 
national elections of 2010 region did not seem to have a large influence. However, 30 years 
earlier Hessing (1985) concluded that most elected candidates in the Dutch elections of 
1982 received relatively most votes in their own district (kieskring).  
The findings for the Netherlands of Van Holsteyn and Andeweg and Hessing 
contradict each other. Of course, it could be that trends in preference voting simply 
changed in 30 years. However, in the previous chapter we saw that an important reason for 
Dutch voters to cast a preference vote is that the candidate is from the same region or that 
they know the candidate personally: together these two reasons were mentioned by 
approximately 20 per cent of the voters as their motivation for casting a preference vote (see 
table 3.4, page 51). Furthermore, if we look at the seven candidates who are elected out of 
list order in the three most recent Dutch parliamentary elections (of 2010, 2012 and 2017), 
we see that regional considerations seem to play an important role for most of these 
candidates’ preference votes. Figure 4.1 shows their share of preference votes in each 
municipality. Five candidates received most of their preference votes in their own place of 
residence (indicated on the map with a red border) and the surrounding municipalities. 
Especially Sabine Uitslag (2010), Pieter Omtzigt (2012), Maurits von Martels (2017), and
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Figure 4.1 Candidates elected out of list order and their vote share per municipality 
 
A) Pia Dijkstra, D66 (2010) B) Sabine Uitslag, CDA (2010) 
  
 
C) Pieter Omtzigt, CDA (2012) 
 
D) Isabelle Diks, GroenLinks (2017) 
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E) Maurits von Martels, CDA (2017) F) Lilianne Ploumen, PvdA (2017) 
  
 
G) Lisa Westerveld, GroenLinks (2017) 
 
 
 
Note: These maps show the preference votes a 
candidate received in each municipality, as a 
percentage of the total number of votes for their 
party in that municipality. The place of residence 
of the candidate (indicated on the ballot) is 
marked by a red border. 
 
In municipalities that are coloured grey the 
candidate received a lower percentage of 
preference votes than was necessary to be elected 
out of list order. In other words, if the candidate 
would have received the same percentage of 
preference votes in each municipality as in such a 
municipality, the candidate would not have 
reached the individual threshold to be elected out 
of list order. 
 
Sources: Kiesraad (2017a) for 2010 and 2012 
election results and Dataportaal van de 
Nederlandse overheid (2017) for 2017 election 
result; visualization borders municipality: © 
Kadaster and Centraal Bureau for de Statistiek 
(2013, 2015, 2016). For the visualization of the 
2017 election the Wijk- en buurtkaart 2016 was 
used. 
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Lisa Westerveld (2017) received most of their preference votes in a very specific part of the 
country. The fact that Van Holsteyn and Andeweg did not find an effect might have a 
methodological reason: regional distance between voters and candidates was 
operationalized as an interval-ratio variable measuring the distance between the 
municipality of the voter and the municipality of the candidate (2012, p. 180). Based on 
what is visible in figure 4.1 this might not be the ideal way to operationalize the variable. It 
seems there is a strong effect when the distance between voter and candidate is relatively 
short, but the effect is not linear. After a certain distance it stops, and after that point 
distance plays no role anymore. In this chapter a subsection will be devoted to the regional 
origin of Dutch candidates to test the hypothesis that: 
 
Hypothesis 4.3: Dutch candidates receive relatively more votes in their own 
district (kieskring) than they receive in other districts. 
4.2.2 Ballot position 
One of the strongest predictors of the number of preference votes a candidate receives is the 
ballot position of the candidate. Evidence for the effects of ballot position are 
overwhelming, although much of earlier research may have been influenced by not 
considering other explanations or is methodologically flawed by using wrong statistical 
models, or even no statistical model at all (Darcy & McAllister, 1990). Recent studies, which 
also take other factors into consideration, come to the same conclusion however: candidates 
towards the top of the list receive more votes (Blom-Hansen et al., 2016; Faas & Schoen, 
2006; Lutz, 2010; Miller & Krosnick, 1998; Ortega Villodres, 2003), even when lists of 
candidates are ordered alphabetically (Lijphart & López Pintor, 1988). Even in races with 
only two candidates, the ordering of the candidates matters to the advantage of the first 
listed candidate (Chen et al., 2014). In addition, also the list-pusher (i.e. the candidate on 
the last position on the list) receives more votes than candidates just above him or her on 
the list. However, the advantage for list-pushers is not as large as the advantage for 
candidates on the first positions on the list (Marcinkiewicz, 2014). Parties sometimes place 
well-known candidates, either from inside politics or outside politics on this last position, 
with the idea to attract voters. For example, in 2017 the PvdA had Jan Smeets (who is the 
founder of Pinkpop, a large music festival that is held every year in the Netherlands) on the 
last position of the list. In Belgium the last position on the list is often occupied by a 
politician who is active at another level and does not have the ambition to enter the 
Chamber of Representatives. For example in 2010 Rudy Demotte, as the Minister-President 
of Wallonia, was list-pusher for PS in the district of Hainaut. 
An important question is whether the ballot position is a pure primacy effect, or 
whether candidates towards the top of the list receive more votes because they are better 
qualified for office. Van Erkel and Thijssen (2016) show that the success of candidates at the 
top of the list can partly be explained by the political experience of those candidates and the 
fact that they receive more media attention. However, a primacy effect works to their 
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advantage, both because voters have a confirmation bias towards candidates on top of the 
list and because of a pure primacy effect: some voters vote for the first candidate on the list, 
simply because the candidates is the first one on the list (Van Erkel & Thijssen, 2016). 
 
Hypothesis 4.4: The more a candidate is positioned towards the top of the 
list, the more preference votes he or she will receive. 
Hypothesis 4.5: The last candidate on the list (the list-pusher) attracts more 
votes than might be expected based on the low list position he or she 
occupies. 
4.2.3 Political experience  
Whether voters actually prefer incumbents or whether incumbents receive more votes 
because of structural factors that are to their advantage is a matter of debate (see for 
example Brown, 2014), but there is no doubt that in many countries a positive correlation 
between incumbency and preference votes exists (Karvonen, 2011b; Maddens et al., 2007; 
Marsh, 1985; McElroy & Marsh, 2010; Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012). In addition, 
candidates with experience in other political functions performed at the local level, either 
directly before the election or earlier, attract more preference votes as well (Maddens et al., 
2007; Tavits, 2010). 
One way to explain the advantage incumbents and candidates with other political 
functions have with regard to the number of preference votes they receive, is the fact that 
they appear in the media more often. Maddens et al. (2006) and Van Aelst et al. (2006, 
2008) found a positive effect of media exposure on the number of preference votes. 
Politicians who appear in the main news bulletin on national television more than once 
during the campaign receive significantly more preference votes than candidates who do not 
(Van Aelst et al., 2006). The effect of being mentioned in newspapers seems to be especially 
significant for those candidates who do not appear on television. Candidates being 
mentioned in newspapers receive more preference votes than those candidates who are not 
being mentioned in newspapers (Van Aelst et al., 2006). 
 
Hypothesis 4.6: Candidates with more political experience receive more 
preference votes than candidates with less political experience. 
4.2.4 Ideological differences 
A possible additional factor that could influence the popularity of candidates is if there are 
ideological differences between candidates within the same party. We know from studies on 
interparty competition that ideology plays a role when voters decide for which party they 
vote. Could there also be an effect of ideology on the intraparty competition? Political 
parties are often seen as unitary actors (e.g. Downs, 1957) and MPs in Belgium and the 
Netherlands often vote according to party lines (Van Vonno, 2016). However, there are 
differences in how Dutch MPs of the same party place themselves on a left-right scale, and 
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these differences are larger when it comes to specific issues (Andeweg & Thomassen, 2011). 
For candidates in Flanders (Belgium) research has also shown that such differences between 
candidates from the same party exist (Van Erkel, 2017, p. 96). These differences are 
relatively small, however. This is no surprise, first of all because parties have an incentive to 
strive for party unity. Second, it would not make sense, especially in a multi-party system if 
a candidate from a left-wing party would have opinions that are extremely right. In such a 
situation it is more likely that the candidate would be a member of a right-wing party. 
 However, some variation might also have an advantage for parties, if the electoral 
systems allows for intraparty choice. Candidates with, relatively extreme positions within 
the party might attract voters from other parties. In an experiment on the effects of electoral 
systems Blumenau et al. (2017) for example found that, British voters under an open list 
system are likely to switch from niche parties to mainstream parties. Some Eurosceptic 
voters voted for UKIP under closed list rules and switched to a Eurosceptic candidate of the 
Conservative party under open list rules. 
Throughout this study the assumption is that voters first choose for which party to 
vote. Next, they make a choice for a specific candidate. If differences between candidates of 
the same party exist, this might give the voter an opportunity to express a preference for a 
certain direction (see also Blumenau et al., 2017). According to the directional theory of 
issue voting (Rabinowitz & Macdonald, 1989), voters do not vote for the party which is 
closest to them on the left-right scale (assuming a political space with a single dimension) 
but for the party which takes the most extreme position on their side of scale. This would 
suggest major support for extremist parties, an expectation that is not supported by 
empirical findings. Rabinowitz and Macdonald therefore include the ‘region of 
acceptability’ in their model. If a party would cross a certain boundary, it would be 
penalized by the voters. Voters thus vote for the most extreme party within the region of 
acceptability. In terms of the intraparty competition this region of acceptability is less 
important for voters: it is likely to assume that the acceptability is already regulated by the 
party. It is unlikely that a candidate who is unacceptable to a (large part of the) voter(s) of a 
party, is acceptable to the party itself. If voters want to push the party in a particular 
direction, the direction model would suggest that the voter votes for the candidate who 
takes the most extreme position in that direction within that party. 
There is some evidence that candidates who deviate from their party have some 
electoral success. ‘Rebellions’ in the UK may pay off, although the effect is weak, even in 
favourable conditions (Vivyan & Wagner, 2012). Results are mixed, however; as another 
study shows that voters take deviation by MPs as a sign of integrity and trustworthiness and 
they therefore have stronger preference for such candidates (Campbell et al., 2016). 
Findings for the US also show that voters partly base their voting decision on how members 
of Congress vote (Ansolabehere & Jones, 2010; Carson et al., 2010). 
It is not necessarily true that the effect of deviating from the party line is the same for 
all candidates. I expect that this effect especially applies to candidates more towards the end 
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of the list. They might be more inclined to deviate from the party line, in order to attract 
voters, since they depend more on the voter. Candidates towards the top of the list can rely 
more on the party to be elected and thus it is less important for them to distinguish 
themselves from co-partisans. At the same time, parties may also be more inclined to put 
candidates towards the top of the list who are more loyal to the party. Therefore, we expect 
that: 
 
Hypothesis 4.7: Candidates who deviate more from the party line will receive 
more preference votes than candidates who deviate less from the party line. 
Hypothesis 4.8: The more the candidate has a position towards the end on 
the list, the stronger the effect of deviating from the party line (hypothesis 
4.7). 
 
The only recent study that addressed the ideological positions of candidates in this 
context of intraparty competition found no effect of ideology on the electoral success of 
candidates in Belgium (Van Erkel, 2017, p. 104). Van Erkel studied the effect of ideology 
based on a candidate survey, in which candidates were asked their position on 30 ideological 
questions on six dimensions: economy, environment, Europe, migration, ethnics and 
federalism. While he found that variation existed on these dimensions between members of 
the same party, he found no effect of that variation on the preference votes candidates 
received. 
One of the explanations Van Erkel gives for his non-finding relates to the availability 
of the information voters need to distinguish the ideological positions of candidates. A first 
problem is that this information is hard to find, and, if available at all the second problem 
relates to the capability of voters to process the information. While Voting Advice 
Applications (VAAs) at the party level is a growing and popular phenomenon (Marschall & 
Garzia, 2014), for candidates the use of such VAAs is (still) limited (Dumont et al., 2014). A 
voter therefore should actively search for information about the policy positions of a 
candidate if the voter wishes to cast a vote for a candidate with a similar ideological 
position. As will be explained below I measure ideological positions of candidates in a 
different way, namely based on content analysis of speeches made by MPs in plenary 
sessions of parliament and of written questions submitted. In line with the availability of 
information argument, we might expect a different effect based on both these sources. I 
argue that it is more likely that candidates who distinguish themselves from co-partisans in 
the questions they ask attract more votes. First of all, because of the function these questions 
have. Walgrave and Van Aelst (2006) distinguish between substantial and symbolic political 
agendas. They argue that political agendas ‘can be placed on a continuum ranging from 
substantial to symbolic’ (2006, p. 95). Furthermore, media affects the questions that are 
submitted (Van Aelst & Vliegenthart, 2014). The questions MPs ask might have a more 
symbolic function, showing that they care about issues which are reported on in the media, 
while speeches made in plenary sessions might be more substantial in nature. In addition, 
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an MP might have more freedom while asking questions compared to when he or she is 
delivering a speech in parliament66. When delivering a speech in parliament the MP is at 
that time the spokesperson of the party and therefore might be more constrained by the 
party. Second, because of their symbolic functions it is more likely that the positions MPs 
take while asking questions is known to the voters. I therefore expect that: 
 
Hypothesis 4.9: Deviating from the party line has a stronger effect on 
preference votes when it is done through submitting questions, than it has 
during speeches in plenary sessions of parliament. 
4.2.5 Party effects 
Next to these explanations at the level of the candidate, there may be effects relating to the 
party. These might have an effect on the number of preference votes candidates receive, and 
should therefore be discussed in this chapter. A first factor that might influence the number 
of preference votes at the party level is whether the party is relatively new or not. Traditional 
parties in general have a larger pool of candidates who are familiar to the voter, they have 
more local politicians and (former) ministers (see Wauters et al., 2016, p. 5). Therefore, 
they are able to attract more preference votes, so we expect that: 
 
Hypothesis 4.10: Candidates from traditional parties are more likely to 
receive preference votes than candidates from newer parties. 
 
There is a specific group of parties for which we expect that candidates receive fewer 
preference votes: populist parties. These parties are often characterized as parties with 
strong ‘charismatic’ leaders and often lack a differentiated internal party structure 
(Kitschelt, 1995; Taggart, 2004). We can therefore expect that other candidates than the 
party leaders from these parties receive fewer preference votes, because of both the strong 
appeal of the leader67 and the fact that other candidates are relatively unknown to the voter. 
Since there is a weaker party structure (or no local party roots at all) for these parties, 
candidates have fewer options to become familiar to the voters of these parties. 
 
Hypothesis 4.11: Candidates from populist parties are less likely to receive 
preference votes than candidates from other parties. 
 
Some scholars argue that ideology has an influence on preference voting. Preferential 
voting is “slightly more common amongst the political right” (see also Karvonen, 2011b; 
                                                                
66 Although, some political parties have internal rules that state that members should ask their party for permission 
before submitting questions (Andeweg & Thomassen, 2011, p. 659). 
67 In the Netherlands the votes for the leader are not considered to be preference votes, while in Belgium they are. 
The effect therefore might be stronger in the Netherlands. However, in Belgium the leader of the party can still 
only be elected in one district, so in other districts we would also expect that the first candidate on the list of a 
populist party would receive fewer votes. 
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Marsh, 1985, p. 369). André, Depauw and Pilet (André, Depauw, & Pilet, 2017) also found 
that casting a preference vote is more common in right-wing parties. According to them, 
the reason for this is the fact that candidates from right-wing parties tend to run more 
personalized campaigns than candidates from the left (André, Depauw, & Pilet, 2017). 
Running a personalized campaign indeed seems to have an effect on the levels of preference 
voting. In the Netherlands in 2006 parliamentarians were asked whether they had 
undertaken activities during the election campaign in 2003 to get preference votes. 
According to this study 40 MPs had undertaken such activities and 70 had not (the list-
pullers were not included in the analysis). They received on average respectively 5,601 and 
3,958 votes, suggesting that a personalized campaign does make a difference (Van Holsteyn 
& Andeweg, 2012). Belgian research has also shown that individual campaign expenses have 
a robust and positive effect on preference votes (Maddens et al., 2006; Maddens & Put, 
2013; Van Erkel et al., 2017). 
 
Hypothesis 4.12: Candidates from right-wing parties are more likely to 
receive preference votes than candidates from left-wing parties. 
 
Finally, based on the findings in the previous chapter, we expect that in the 
Netherlands candidates from parties with less popular list-pullers receive more preference 
votes. Since in the Netherlands voters are forced to vote for a candidate, voters without a 
candidate preference tend to vote for the first candidate on the list. However, the previous 
chapter showed that for some voters without a positive candidate preference, a negative 
candidate preference exists: they have no strong preference for another candidate, but they 
do not want to vote for the list-puller. These voters switch to another candidate, for whom 
they have no real preference. Thus, we expect that: 
 
Hypothesis 4.13: In the Netherlands, candidates of parties with less popular 
list-pullers receive more preference votes than candidates of parties with more 
popular list-pullers. 
4.3 Methods and data 
To test the hypotheses presented in the previous section multilevel regression analyses were 
conducted. Since the used data are clustered at several levels, a single level regression model 
would be problematic. Not all observations are independent from each other, since they are 
clustered in parties, elections and (for Belgium) in districts. When a single level regression 
model is run with these data, it does not provide correct standard errors (Jones, 2009). A 
multilevel model, with random intercepts for these groups addresses this problem. 
For each country four different specifications of the multilevel model will be 
presented in the results section. The first model is the basic model, containing only 
independent variables at the candidate level. In the second model independent variables at
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Table 4.1 Summary of expectations for chapter 4 
Group Categories H Expectation 
Underrepresented social groups Women 4.1 + 
 Candidates with a non-
European background 
4.1 + 
First of a underrepresented social 
groups 
First woman 4.2 + 
First candidate with a 
non-European 
background 
4.2 + 
Geographical representation Dutch candidates in their 
own kieskring 
4.3 + 
List position More towards the top 4.4 + 
 Lowest position 4.5 + 
Political experience Incumbent MP 4.6 + 
 Minister 4.6 + 
 Junior minister 4.6 + 
Deviating from party line  4.7 + 
 Interaction with list 
position 
4.8 + 
 Stronger for question than 
for plenary sessions 
4.9 + 
Party effects Traditional parties 4.10 + 
 Populist parties 4.11 - 
 Right-wing parties 4.12 + 
 Parties with unpopular 
list-pullers 
4.13 + 
 
the party level are included as well. In addition, the third and fourth models contain 
variables that measure a candidate’s deviation from the party line. 
4.3.1 Candidates included in the analyses 
The analysis for the Dutch case is based on the parliamentary elections between 1998 and 
2017. For the most part of this period, the Netherlands was divided in 19 districts 
(kieskringen). Since 2012 the country has 20 districts68. These districts mainly have an 
administrative function, but this function is salient for the analysis in this chapter. 
Political parties can present a different list of candidates in each district (see also 
section 1.1.1). This has two important implications when we compare the preference votes 
of candidates at a national level. First, not all candidates participated in all districts. Some 
political parties present lists that contain different candidates at the end of the list in each 
district. For example, a party that is allowed to have a maximum of 30 candidates on the list 
in each district may choose to run with the same 25 names in the same order on the first 25 
positions in each district, but present a different number 26 to 30 in each district. They may 
want to put some regional candidates on the list in a district, or they may want to present 
more than 30 candidates in total. Second, a party may choose to present a list with the same 
                                                                
68 The 20th district, which was created in 2012, is formed by the three municipalities in the Caribbean Netherlands. 
The supply side: what determines the popularity of candidates? 
Methods and data 
79 
 
30 candidates in each district, but vary the order in each district. Therefore, a candidate 1) 
does not always appear on the ballot in all districts and 2) does not always appear on the 
ballot on the same position in each district. To make sure the results of the regression 
analyses are not biased by these differences in candidates, only the candidates who 
participated in all districts and were placed on the same position on each list are included in 
the analysis. 
If all parties would have presented identical lists in all districts in the elections 
between 1998 and 2017, the total number of candidates would have been 4,845. In reality, a 
total of 6,123 candidates participated in the elections. Of these candidates 3,725 (61 per 
cent) were placed on the same position and participated in all districts. In addition, the list-
pullers are excluded from the analysis. This results in a total of 3,623 candidates in the 
analysis. 
The analysis for Belgium is based on the federal elections between 2003 and 2014. 
Parties in Belgium present lists with effective candidates and successors. Effective candidates 
can be elected directly. On each list the maximum number of effective candidates equals the 
number of seats to be elected in a district. Successors cannot be elected directly; they replace 
effective candidates who do not take up their seat or leave parliament before the end of the 
legislative term. The list of successors has a maximum of half the number of seats available 
in a district. Since successors cannot be elected directly, only effective candidates will be 
included in the analysis. In the four elections between 2003 and 2014 in total 6,943 effective 
candidates participated. 
4.3.2 The dependent variable 
The dependent variable should be a measurement of a candidate’s electoral success. 
Therefore, preference votes are used to determine the electoral success. There are different 
ways in which this measurement can be operationalized. In this chapter I use the proportion 
of a candidate’s preference vote relative to the total votes cast for candidates within the 
candidate’s party at the level at which the seats are distributed to parties. Thus for the 
Netherlands this is in relation to the total votes for the party (since voting for a candidate is 
mandatory) at the national level, but for Belgium this is in relation to the number of votes 
cast for candidates (so excluding the list votes) within a district. Another option would have 
been to look at the proportion of votes in relation to total number of votes cast for 
candidates. However, in this dissertation the main focus is on the intraparty competition, 
since the assumption behind second-order personalization is that a voter first decides for 
which party he or she will vote. Only when the party choice is made, the voter makes a 
specific choice for a candidate within that party. Therefore it makes sense to look to a 
candidate’s popularity relative to the popularity of other candidates of the same party. The 
advantage of taking the relative number of votes, instead of the absolute number of votes, is 
that the relative number of votes do not depend on the size of the party or (in the Belgian 
case) the size of the district.  
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The distribution of the percentage of preference votes for each candidate is highly 
skewed; therefore a decimal log transformation of the percentage of preference votes is used 
as the dependent variable69. For the Netherlands this data comes from the official 
documents published by the Kiesraad, which contain the results of the election (Kiesraad, 
1998, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2010, 2012, 2017a). For Belgium this data comes from the official 
website of the Belgian government, containing the election results (Belgium.be, 2003, 2007, 
2010, 2014). 
In the Netherlands the average candidate received 0.64 per cent preference votes, 
ranging from 0.002 to 43.0 per cent. Table 4.2 shows for different levels of preference votes 
how many candidates reached that level. The table shows how skewed the distribution is: 
more than 40 per cent of the candidates received less than 0.1 per cent of the votes of a 
party. Only 12 per cent of the candidates received more than 1 per cent of the votes of his or 
her party70. This is important to keep in mind when the results of the multilevel model are 
discussed. 
 
Table 4.2 Percentage of preference votes for Dutch candidates 
Percentage 1998 2002 2003 2006 2010 2012 2017 Total 
0.00 up to 0.10 33.3 42.5 39.3 49.0 46.3 41.8 43.2 42.3 
0.10 up to 0.25 21.1 22.5 23.7 22.2 21.9 24.9 24.8 23.1 
0.25 up to 0.50 14.8 12.7 16.0 11.8 12.0 15.8 12.1 13.6 
0.50 up to 1.00 11.5 9.2 9.6 6.7 7.6 9.2 8.4 8.8 
1.00 up to 2.00 9.4 3.8 4.3 3.9 5.4 4.5 5.2 5.3 
2.00 up to 4.00 5.3 4.1 4.1 2.3 4.7 1.8 2.2 3.4 
4.00 up to 10.00 3.3 3.8 2.1 2.5 1.6 1.8 2.8 2.5 
10.00 and higher 1.2 1.4 0.9 1.6 0.5 0.2 1.3 0.9 
Total (N) 487 369 438 433 643 619 634 3,623 
Source: own dataset. Included are all candidates who participated in all districts from the same 
position in an election (list-pullers are excluded). 
 
In Belgium, on average a candidate receives 5.67 per cent of the preference votes of 
his or her party, within a range from 0.6 to 53.2 per cent. The distribution of preference 
votes is extremely skewed in Belgium as well (see table 4.3). Only 2.4 per cent of the 
                                                                
69 Using the decimal log has some advantages and disadvantages compared to using the natural log (see for 
example Gelman & Hill, 2007, pp. 60–61). I chose to use to decimal log for this dependent variable, to be 
consistent with the transformation I use for the dependent variable in the analyses presented in chapter 5 (on the 
effect of preference votes on the list position for the next election), a choice made based on the fact that it was used 
in previous research (André, Depauw, Shugart, et al., 2017). 
70 The fact that there seems to be a relative drop of the number of candidates with higher percentages of preference 
votes is mainly caused by the decline of candidates who do not participate in all districts. The absolute number of 
candidates who receive over 1 per cent of the vote stays roughly equal: in absolute terms the group of candidates 
with fewer preference votes increases. This is because the candidates who do not participate in all districts are low 
on the list. If fewer parties present lists in different districts with different candidates on the lower positions of the 
list, the number of candidates participating in all districts increases. And since the increase is caused by candidates 
lower at the list, who tend to receive fewer votes, the group of candidates participating in all districts and receiving 
few preference votes increases. 
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candidates received more than 25 per cent of the preference votes. The majority of 
candidates (70 per cent) did not receive more than 5 per cent. 
 
Table 4.3 Percentage of preference votes for Belgian candidates 
Percentage 2003 2007 2010 2014 Total 
0.00 up to 2.50 34.5 27.5 31.5 22.3 29.2 
2.50 up to 5.00 36.5 40.9 36.7 41.8 38.9 
5.00 up to 10.00 17.1 19.6 19.3 19.1 18.8 
10.00 up to 15.00 4.8 5.7 5.7 6.2 5.6 
15.00 up to 25.00 4.9 4.7 5.3 5.8 5.2 
25.00 and higher 2.1 1.5 1.4 4.8 2.4 
Total (N) 1880 1776 1688 1599 6943 
Source: own dataset. Included are all effective candidates. 
4.3.3 Independent variables 
Most of the relevant independent variables are readily available from the official election 
records for the Netherlands (Kiesraad, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2010, 2012, 2017a) and 
Belgium (Belgium.be, 2003, 2007, 2010, 2014). First of all, the gender of a candidate is 
obtained from these documents. In the Netherlands, for most candidates the gender is given 
on the ballot. However, not all parties publish the gender of the candidates on their list. 
Missing data was added as much as possible by hand coding the gender71. In addition, for 
female candidates it was coded whether they were the first woman on the list (coded as 1) or 
not (coded as 0). 
Second, the ethnicity of a candidate was coded based on the name of a candidate. For 
each candidate it was coded whether they had or at least seem to have a non-European 
ethnicity. Coding based on the name is not be the most optimal solution, although it has 
been done before (e.g. Thijssen, 2013; Van Erkel, 2017, p. 49; Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 
2012). For those candidates with a non-European background it was also coded whether 
they were the first non-European on the list (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0). 
Third, the list position of a candidate was obtained from the official election records. 
List position is operationalized in two different ways. For the Netherlands, in the second, 
third and fourth model list position is included relative to the number of elected members 
for that party. For example, if a party wins 10 seats in an election, the candidate on position 
10 has a list position of 1 in this operationalization and the candidate on position 1 has a list 
position of 0 in this operationalization. I set a maximum value of this variable at 1.5. So, in 
the previous example, the value for a candidate on position 20 as well as a candidate on 
position 30 would be 1.5. The advantage of this operationalization is that it is better suited 
to test the hypothesis that a deviation from the party line is more likely to have an influence 
                                                                
71 First, by checking whether the gender of the candidate was mentioned in another election. Second, by looking at 
the first name of a candidate which for candidates of most parties is also given on the ballot. If the first name was 
not given or if it was not a typical male or female name, the gender of a candidate was coded based on an internet 
search. For 32 candidates none of these ways were sufficient to code the gender. Therefore, these candidates are 
excluded from the analysis. 
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on lower placed candidates. This operationalization accounts for the fact that ‘lower placed’ 
is relative to party size. For example for a medium party a candidate on the 8th position 
might be a lower placed candidate, but for a large party this candidate might not be 
considered a lower placed candidate. 
In the other models, the decimal logarithm of the list position is used to test the 
effect of the list position of a candidate. This logarithmic transformation (at least partly) 
accounts for the different length of lists of parties and accounts for the non-linear effect list 
position has on preference voting. This operationalization is unfortunately not possible in 
the model with all candidates, since candidates from parties who did not win seats are also 
included (and therefore it is impossible to calculate the relative position towards candidates 
elected). For Belgium this operationalization would also not work, since within some parties 
in some districts only one candidate gets elected. In such a situation this operationalization 
would not result in a meaningful indicator of list position. 
Based on the list position a dummy variable was created to indicate whether the 
candidate was the list-pusher (i.e. the last candidate on the list), since previous research has 
shown that a ‘last position effect’ may occur (Marcinkiewicz, 2014). In addition to an effect 
based on the last position, this particular candidate might also attract more votes, because 
parties sometimes put well know persons either from inside or outside politics on the last 
position on the list. These candidates, often do not have the intention to become an MP, 
but they want to express their support for the party by being the list-pusher (see for example 
Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012, p. 181). 
For all candidates it was determined whether they had served as a minister, junior 
minister or MP in the legislative period directly prior to the election. For the Netherlands, 
data for these variables was obtained from the website Parlement & Politiek (Parlementair 
Documentatie Centrum, 2017b, 2017a). For Belgium, information about ministers and 
junior ministers was obtained from the Political Data Yearbook website (Political Data 
Yearbook, 2017; Rihoux et al., 2013). A list with members of parliament for each period was 
obtained from the website of the parliament (Belgische Kamer van 
Volksvertegenwoordigers, 2017a). If a candidate performed more than one of these 
functions, only one was coded as such. For example, a candidate who was an MP at the 
beginning of the previous term but became a minister when the government was formed 
was coded as minister and not as MP72. The last independent variable at the candidate level 
that is included is the deviation of a candidate from the average party score; this variable is 
discussed in section 4.3.4. 
In addition information at the level of the party was gathered. Based on the official 
documents with the election results the number of candidates on the list for each party was 
                                                                
72 In Belgium political functions at the local level play an important role in the electoral success of candidates (see 
Put & Maddens, 2015 for an extensive analysis). These functions are excluded from the analysis in this chapter to 
keep the included political functions similar in the Dutch and Belgian models.  
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coded73. Furthermore for each party it was coded whether the party was traditional or new, 
whether they were in government the previous legislative period, whether they were a 
populist party (classification of parties as populist was done based on the work of 
Hakhverdian & Koop, 2007; March & Mudde, 2005; Pauwels, 2014) and what their position 
on the left-right scale is. The position of the party on the left-right scale was taken from the 
Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) (see Bakker et al., 2015; Polk et al., 2017). This scale runs 
from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right). Finally, and only for the Netherlands, the 
average evaluation score for the list-puller by voters for the party was coded; the previous 
chapter showed that leadership evaluation has an influence on the likelihood of casting a 
preference vote in the Netherlands. Data for this variable was taken from the Dutch 
Parliamentary Election Studies; this evaluation score is measured on an 11-point scale (for 
more information about this variable, see section 3.3.1). Since it is not possible to code all 
these variables for all parties (for example, because no policy positions are given in the 
CHES for the smaller, non-elected parties), the second, third and fourth model (which 
include variables at the party level) are solely based on candidates coming from parties that 
obtained at least one seat in parliament. 
4.3.4 Estimating a candidate’s deviation from the party line 
Measuring policy positions of individual candidates is a difficult task. One way to measure 
their positions is by looking at voting behaviour in parliament. However, both in Belgium 
and the Netherlands MPs usually vote according to party lines (Van Vonno, 2016, pp. 63–
64). Thus, if we would try to measure a policy position of an individual MP, based on the 
voting behaviour of that MP, it is highly likely that we would find almost identical policy 
positions for all MPs from one party, since they all voted in a similar way. This analysis 
would not lead to variation in the policy positions for individual candidates belonging to 
the same party and therefore would not be useful for the purpose of this study. 
Another option to measure policy positions is via content analysis of speeches by 
MPs. Thanks to advances both in the (digital) availability of parliamentary documents and 
computer techniques to analyse text documents, options are available that make content 
analysis of large volumes of parliamentary speeches possible (Slapin & Proksch, 2014). 
Automated content analysis allows analyzing large text files to establish policy positions of 
individual members of parliament. There are two main approaches: Wordscores (Laver et al., 
2003) and Wordfish (Slapin & Proksch, 2008). In this study the Wordscores approach will 
be used. 
Wordscores is an a priori-method in the sense that “reference” texts are used to 
estimate the position of “virgin” texts. Based on the reference texts the positions on a 
dimension are known. In essence, the word patterns of these reference texts are compared 
to those of the virgin texts. Based on these word patterns the virgin texts are scored (for a 
                                                                
73 For the Netherlands, if a party presented lists of unequal length in different districts, the maximum number of 
candidates was coded. 
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detailed description of the method, see Laver et al., 2003). 
An important decision during this process is to decide which texts should be used as 
reference and virgin texts. What to use as virgin texts is clear: texts produced by MPs in 
parliament. Studies have shown that Wordscores can be used to measure policy positions 
based on speeches of MPs in parliament (Bäck et al., 2010; Bernauer & Bräuninger, 2009). 
The data for the text file for each individual MP was obtained from official websites 
(Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers, 2017b; Ministry of Home Affairs and 
Kingdom Relations, 2016). For Belgium the 51st (2003-2007) 52nd (2007-2010) and 53rd 
(2010-2014) legislative periods are analysed. For each Belgian MP all contributions to 
plenary sessions and all written questions submitted to ministers are included. For the 
Netherlands six legislative periods between 1998 and 2017 are analysed. For these legislative 
periods all speeches made in plenary sessions and all submitted written questions are 
included74. For each MP two text files per legislative period were created with all 
contributions of that MP in a given legislative period, one that contained speeches made in 
plenary sessions and one that contained the questions submitted. These texts files are used 
to estimate the positions of MPs in a specific legislative period in two different ways. This 
allows checking whether the behaviour differs across the two forms of participation, as is 
expected in H4.3. 
The choice for reference texts and how to score those texts is less clear-cut. An 
option would be to use party manifestos as reference texts. However, comparing manifestos 
with speeches in parliament complicates matters. For example, in manifestos a large range 
of issues are usually discussed, while speeches normally focus on a single topic. 
Furthermore, there is a difference between the ‘language’ of manifestos and speeches. Since 
Wordscores counts all words in a document, if the vocabulary of manifestos and speeches 
differ, Wordscores will not be able to estimate a policy position accurately (see Laver & 
Benoit, 2002 for further argumentation). It is therefore better to choose reference texts that 
are also produced in parliament by MPs, so the reference and virgin texts can actually be 
compared. One way of doing this is by using the texts of all MPs from one party and 
combine them into a single text, which could be used as the reference text for that party 
(Mickler, 2017b). This was done for this study: all text files created for the individual MPs of 
a party were combined into one file for each party in each legislative period, serving as 
reference texts. For the party (reference) texts two versions were made as well: one with 
contributions to plenary sessions and one with the written questions75. If members of 
parliament switched to another party (or started his or her own parliamentary group) 
between elections, only the contributions made as a member of the party for which the 
                                                                
74 The plenary sessions for the 51st legislative period in Belgium were not analyzed, due to the format of the 
documents containing the proceedings for this period. It was not possible to subtract the needed information from 
these documents in an automated manner. The written questions for this period are included in the analysis. 
75 For the Netherlands, some co-partisans submitted questions together. These questions were included in the own 
document of each MP, but were only included once in the document of the party. 
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candidate was elected are included. 
The scores given to these reference texts are the party positions on the general left-
right scale according to the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2015; Polk et al., 
2017)76. This scale runs from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right). The general left-right 
scale is chosen to score the reference texts, since these reference texts consist of texts dealing 
with a wide range of topics. Therefore, using the general left-right scale seems most 
appropriate. In Appendix D.1 the policy positions for the parties included in the analysis are 
given. 
Based on the outcome of the Wordscores analyses the value of the (absolute) 
difference between a candidate’s individual position and the average position of all 
candidates from his or her party will be calculated, serving as an indicator of a candidate’s 
deviation from the party line. Measuring a candidate’s deviation from the party line like this 
has one important consequence. It is only possible to do this for MPs, and not for other 
candidates. The models that contain the deviation from the party line are therefore 
restricted to candidates who also served as an MP in the previous legislative term. 
Advantages of the Wordscores method are that it increases reliability compared to 
hand coding; it is easier and more flexible to implement; the researcher does not necessarily 
have to (perfectly) speak the language of the analysed texts; and the Wordscores approach 
produces uncertainty measures for each policy position (Klemmensen et al., 2007, p. 748). 
One of the disadvantages of the method is that the validity of the produced scores for the 
virgin texts depends on the choice of reference texts and how they are scored (Klemmensen 
et al., 2007, p. 748). Choosing and scoring the reference texts is therefore crucial. With 
regard to this study this disadvantage is slightly less important, because I am not interested 
in the party and candidate positions per se, but only in the differences between members of 
the same party. 
A disadvantage of measuring a candidate's deviation from the party based on 
legislative behaviour is that, by definition, it is only possible to measure the deviation from 
incumbent candidates at the time of an election. Therefore, the number of candidates that 
can be included in the regression models that take into account the deviation variables 
(models three and four) is much lower than the actual candidates participating in the 
election. 
The Wordscores approach delivered promising results in the field of estimating 
policy positions based on party manifestos. However, whether they can also be used for 
estimating policy positions of individual legislators is still debatably. Mickler (2017a) for 
example shows that there is not much overlap between policy positions of MPs estimated by 
Wordscores and self-placement of MPs on a left-right scale. Some additional analyses were 
conducted to test the validity of the policy positions estimated by the method described in 
this section. These are presented in appendix D.2. This appendix contains a further 
                                                                
76 For more information about the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, see http://chesdata.eu/. 
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discussion of the decisions made for the analyses, shows the number of documents that 
were analysed and gives an overview of the estimated policy positions. 
In addition, descriptive statistics for all variables included in the model can be found 
in appendix D.3 (Table D.3). 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Preference votes for Dutch candidates 
In this section the results of the analysis of the Dutch case will be presented and discussed. 
The results of the multilevel regression models for the Netherlands are shown in table 4.4. 
The first model shows the result with only the predictors at the individual level included. 
This model is based on all candidates participating in all districts at the same position on the 
list in the parliamentary elections between 1998 and 2017. 
Since the model presented is based on the entire population, statistical significance is 
less important and we should mainly look at the magnitude of the effects. Note that the 
dependent variable is the log(10) transformation of the percentage of preference votes of a 
candidate. As the scale is less intuitive, the interpretation of the regression coefficients is 
harder. The effect size of each variable is discussed based on the difference between the 
predicted outcome if that variable would take its minimum value and its maximum value, 
while keeping all other variables at their mean (for interval-ratio variables) or modus (for 
dummy variables). In addition, the predicted outcome was transformed back to its original 
value (the percentage of votes, instead of the logarithmic transformation), which makes it 
easier to gauge the effect sizes. These values were calculated using the effects package for R 
(Fox, 2003). 
Female candidates receive more votes than male candidates, but this effect is small. 
Women near the top of the list receive approximately 1 per cent point more preference 
votes than male candidates at the same list position. Near the end of the list the effect is even 
smaller. For example, a woman at position 25 receives less than 0.1 percentage point more 
preference votes than male candidates at position 25. 
What matters much more is being the first woman on the list. For example, if a 
woman occupies the third position on the list and is the first woman, she receives 
approximately 4 percentage points more preference votes than male candidates on the third 
position. In addition, she also receives 4 percentage points more preference votes than a 
female candidate on the third position on a list where she is not the first woman on the list 
(in other words: the first or second position on that list is also occupied by a woman). If the 
first woman is lower on the list, the absolute effect decreases. However, the effect remains. 
These effects are similar in the other models as well.  
Having a non-European background does attract slightly more preference votes: 
depending on the list position the effect varies from 0.5 percentage point for candidates 
higher on the list to 0.1 percentage point for candidates lower on the list. In contrast to the
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Table 4.4 Preference votes for Dutch candidates 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
(Intercept) 0.778*** 1.393*** 1.862*** 1.678*** 
 (0.064)  (0.232) (0.431) (0.415) 
Woman 0.161*** 0.133*** 0.099* 0.121* 
 (0.013) (0.021) (0.047) (0.049) 
First woman on list 0.374*** 0.931*** 1.068*** 1.016*** 
 (0.046) (0.075) (0.125) (0.134) 
Non-European background 0.345*** 0.432*** 0.285* 0.364* 
 (0.032) (0.049) (0.135) (0.149) 
First non-European background -0.113* 0.016 0.140 0.032 
 (0.054) (0.083) (0.171) (0.184) 
List position -1.167*** -0.627*** -0.559*** -0.581*** 
 (0.021) (0.027) (0.096) (0.102) 
List-pusher 0.753*** 0.547***   
 (0.043) (0.09)   
Member of parliament t-1 0.128*** 0.221***   
 (0.019) (0.028)   
Minister t-1 0.476*** 0.773***   
 (0.059) (0.077)   
Junior minister t-1 0.082 0.242**   
 (0.059) (0.077)   
Deviation (Plenary sessions) t-1   2.774  
   (1.984)  
Deviation (Written questions) t-1    -0.285 
    (0.935) 
Deviation*list position   -4.408 -1.247 
   (2.818) (1.464) 
Traditional party  -0.123 -0.350 -0.430 
  (0.21) (0.321) (0.307) 
Populist party  -0.247 -0.494 -0.512 
  (0.217) (0.331) (0.316) 
Left Right scale  -0.064* -0.046 -0.045 
  (0.022) (0.037) (0.036) 
Evaluation score list-puller  -0.133*** -0.171*** -0.154*** 
  (0.017) (0.041) (0.04) 
Government party t-1  0.031 0.157* 0.149* 
  (0.026) (0.061) (0.063) 
Candidates on list  -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.004 
  (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
AIC 2831.2 2128.3 595.0 543.8 
BIC 2911.6 2233.4 664.2 611.4 
Log likelihood -1402.6 -1045.1 -280.5 -254.9 
Observations 3591 1869 433 394 
Groups (Parties/Elections) 44/7 8/6 8/5 8/5 
Variance: Party (intercept) 0.112 0.029 0.058 0.052 
Variance: Election (intercept) 0.005 0.010 0.013 0.003 
Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
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findings for gender, being the highest placed candidate with a non-European background 
does not have an additional effect. This effect is absent in the second, third and fourth 
model. In the first model there is a slightly negative effect. When looking at absolute 
numbers of preference votes and comparing the number of votes for the first candidate with 
a non-European background with other candidates with a non-European background, the 
first candidate with a non-European background on the list in the Netherlands receives 
more votes than other candidates with a non-European background. Since this effect does 
not show up in the regression models, this difference could likely be explained by the effect 
of the list position. The first candidate with a non-European background simply seems to 
receive more votes, because he or she has a better list position. 
List position has a strong influence on the percentage of preference votes a candidate 
receives. Candidates lower on the list receive fewer preference votes. It is mainly the first few 
candidates who have larger shares of preference votes. It is not until we reach the bottom of 
the list that we see a small effect again: the list-pusher receives slightly more votes. However, 
this effect is not very large. A list-pusher may expect two or three times the percentage of 
preference votes of other candidates near the end of the list. 
Political experience has a positive influence on the percentage of preference votes a 
candidate receives. All things equal, an incumbent candidate receives approximately two to 
three times as many preference votes as a candidate who was not an MP in the previous 
legislative period. For ministers this effect is larger. A minister who runs at the same list 
position as another candidate who was not a minister receives approximately four times as 
many preference votes. From the variables measuring political experience, having been a 
junior minister in the previous period has the smallest effect. For example, running for 
office at position 8 on the list, having experience of a junior minister only adds 0.1 
percentage points to a candidates expected percentage of preference votes. These effects are 
robust when party variables are added to the model (model 2). 
The third and fourth model include the effect deviation from the party line in the 
previous legislative period has on the percentage of preference votes a candidate receives77. 
It tests the hypotheses that candidates who deviate more strongly from the party line receive 
more preference votes in the next election and that this effect is stronger for candidates 
more towards the end of the list. Furthermore, the expectation was that the effects would be 
stronger if we look at the deviation from the party line of an MP based on the analysis of the 
written questions an MP submitted compared to speeches held in parliament. Most of these 
expectations are not met. First, while there is a positive effect of deviation from the party 
                                                                
77 Some independent variables at the candidate level are excluded in the third and fourth model. This is because the 
group of candidates included in these two models is fairly homogeneous. Since we are interested in the effect of 
behaviour in parliament in the previous period, we can only include candidates who were a member of parliament 
in this previous period. Therefore, some of the variables included in the first and second model cannot be included 
in the third and fourth, because they have no (member of parliament t-1 and list-pusher) or almost no (minister 
and junior minster) variation. 
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line in plenary sessions, there is almost no effect of deviation from the party line with 
respect to written questions. For MPs, independent of their list position, deviating from the 
party line while submitting written questions actually seems to result in fewer preference 
votes, although the effect is only 0.1 percentage points. However, there is an effect for MPs 
who deviate from the party in the plenary sessions, but this effect does not apply to all MPs. 
Contrary to what was expected, only MPs near the top of the list can benefit from deviating 
from the party line. For candidates at the bottom of the list, deviation from the average 
party score has no effect; for candidates near the top of the list, this has an effect of 0.7 
percentage points. However, this effect of 0.7 percentage points applies to the candidates 
who deviated most from their own party compared to those who did not deviate at all. So all 
in all, we have to conclude that deviating from the party line hardly has an impact on 
preference votes. 
The model also contains some party effects. The average evaluation of the list-puller 
also has a negative impact on the percentage of preference votes, in line with what we found 
in the previous chapter. All other things being equal, a popular list-puller might result in a 
loss of two-thirds of a candidate’s percentage of preference votes. The hypothesis that 
candidates from traditional parties receive more preference votes than candidates from 
newer parties has to be rejected: no evidence is found for this hypothesis. The magnitude in 
terms of percentage preference votes is almost zero, suggesting that there is no difference 
between levels of preference voting for candidates from traditional and newer parties. The 
effects for candidates from populist parties are stronger. Candidates from populist parties 
receive approximately only one-third of the percentage of preference votes that candidates 
in the same position for other parties receive, although these effects are not significant. 
Finally, candidates from parties more towards the right receive fewer preference votes than 
candidates from more left-wing parties, contrary to what was expected. 
In addition, two control variables were added: list-length and government party. The 
length of the list has a negative impact on the percentage of preference votes a candidate 
receives. For a candidate near the top of the list, a longer list leads to a maximum decrease 
of preference votes of 0.6 percentage points. Candidates from government parties receive 
slightly more votes: approximately 0.2 percentage points.  
4.4.2 Dutch candidates and where they receive their votes 
One hypothesis for the Dutch case is not tested yet. Hypothesis 4.3 states that candidates 
receive a higher percentage of votes in their own district than in other districts. Since the 
analysis in the previous section was based on the number of votes at the national level, it 
was not possible to test this hypothesis. Therefore, in this section I will conduct some 
additional analyses to test this hypothesis. 
In Dutch elections the place of residence of candidates is mentioned on the ballot. If 
voters wish to cast a vote for a candidate from their own region, this information is thus 
available. Table 4.5 is based on all candidates in the elections between 1998 and 2017 who 
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participated in at least two districts, including their 'home district', i.e. the district which 
includes their place of residence. Almost all candidates participated in their own district (97 
per cent), but not all of them participated in another district as well. We are interested in 
how candidates perform in their own district, relative to their performance at the national 
level. Therefore, only candidates who participate in their 'home district' and at least one 
other district than their 'home district' are included in this analysis. In the period between 
1998 and 2017 5,036 candidates satisfy both conditions. For each of these candidates the 
number of preference votes as a percentage of the total number of votes for their party in 
each district is calculated. Over the entire period for 81.5 per cent of the candidates this 
percentage was highest in their own district. For almost all candidates (98.0 per cent) the 
percentage of votes in their home district was above their nationwide percentage of votes. It 
therefore seems highly likely that the region the candidate comes from plays a role in where 
candidates receive their votes. At least a part of the electorate seems to look for a regional 
candidate to vote for. Candidates can therefore expect a considerable 'home bonus'. 
 
Table 4.5 Electoral performance Dutch candidates in home district  
Year Candidates Highest percentage in 
home district 
Percentage home 
district above average 
1998 793 81.1% 97.7% 
2002 664 80.3% 97.9% 
2003 591 72.8% 96.8% 
2006 617 75.0% 97.1% 
2010 642 85.7% 98.9% 
2012 833 86.0% 99.2% 
2017 896 85.8% 98.1% 
Total 5036 81.5% 98.0% 
Source: own dataset. Included are all candidates who participated in at least two district, including 
their ‘home district’ (excluding list-pullers). The district of Bonaire (in 2012 and 2017) is excluded 
from the analysis. 
 
Table 4.6 compares a candidate's performance in his or her own district and the 
performance in all other districts. For all candidates between 1998 and 2012, candidates on 
average received 2.2 percentage points more votes in their own district, compared to the 
votes in all other districts the candidate participated in. At first this might not look 
impressive. However, at the national level on average only 7 per cent of the candidates in the 
Netherlands receive 2.2 per cent or more of their party's votes. Moreover, the average 
candidate only receives 0.64 per cent of the votes of his or her party. The regional 'bonus' of 
a candidate is thus substantial for many candidates. In addition, the effect we observe for 
women is visible for the regional candidate as well. In a particular district, the bonus is 
much stronger for the first candidate on the list from that district. On average the first 
candidate from a specific district on the list receives approximately 4.5 per cent more 
preference votes than co-partisans from the same district. 
There is considerable variation in the home bonus between the various districts. The 
effect of the home bonus varies from 6.1 in the district of Middelburg to 0.8 in the district of
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Table 4.6 Average ‘home bonus’ per district 
District Bonus Candidates 
Middelburg 6.1 119 
Maastricht 5.1 230 
Leeuwarden 4.6 173 
Groningen 4.3 205 
Assen 4.2 124 
Rotterdam 3.1 241 
Lelystad 2.9 140 
Nijmegen 2.4 119 
Zwolle 2.4 247 
Amsterdam 2.1 512 
Den Helder 2.0 180 
Tilburg 1.9 228 
's-Hertogenbosch 1.8 278 
’s-Gravenhage 1.7 356 
Arnhem 1.5 365 
Haarlem 1.3 328 
Dordrecht 1.1 286 
Utrecht 1.0 471 
Leiden 0.8 434 
Average 2.2 5036 
Source: own dataset, based on all parliamentary elections in the period 1998-2017. Based on election 
results without the district of Bonaire. Included are all candidates who participated in at least two 
district, including their ‘home district’ (excluding list-pullers). 
 
Leiden. Partly, this effect is ‘mechanical’ in nature. If we assume that in all districts an equal 
proportion of voters would vote for a regional candidate, on average candidates in districts 
in which fewer candidates from that district are on the ballot would receive a higher 
percentage of votes. We indeed see a negative correlation between the number of candidates 
from a district and the average home bonus (r = -0.371, p = <0.001, N=133). This, however, 
does not fully explain the variation in the home bonus. The home bonus is highest in the 
five provinces furthest away from 'The Hague': the districts of Middelburg, Maastricht, 
Leeuwarden, Groningen and Assen. In the district of Maastricht almost 60 per cent of the 
preference votes are cast for regional candidates. In the Randstad only 20 per cent of the 
preference votes are cast for a regional candidate. The distinction between the Randstad and 
the rest of the country, which was already discussed in the previous chapter, is also visible 
here. Voters living outside the Randstad are more likely to cast a preference vote, especially 
those living in the north and south of the country. Based on the findings presented in this 
chapter, this suggests that voters outside the Randstad are more likely to cast a preference 
vote; they have a greater inclination to cast a vote for a regional candidate compared to 
voters living in the Randstad. 
 
4.4.3 Preference votes for Belgian candidates 
The regression models for Belgium are shown in table 4.7. In Belgium, the gender effects are 
different compared to the Netherlands. Female candidates receive slightly more preference 
votes than male candidates, if we look at a larger subset of candidates (in the first and
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Table 4.7 Preference votes for Belgian candidates 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
(Intercept) 1.122*** 1.310*** 1.399*** 1.418*** 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.078) (0.068) 
Woman 0.031*** 0.038*** -0.106* -0.092* 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.05) (0.038) 
First woman on list -0.011 -0.001 0.034 0.026 
 (0.008) (0.013) (0.056) (0.046) 
Non-European background 0.087*** 0.113*** -0.046 -0.047 
 (0.013) (0.019) (0.091) (0.076) 
First non-European background -0.066*** -0.100***   
 (0.017) (0.025)   
List position -0.620*** -0.620*** -0.623*** -0.560*** 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.063) (0.053) 
List-pusher 0.304*** 0.388***   
 (0.007) (0.012)   
Member of parliament t-1 0.139*** 0.134***   
 (0.009) (0.01)   
Minister t-1 0.370*** 0.377***   
 (0.021) (0.022)   
Junior minister t-1 0.266*** 0.276***   
 (0.045) (0.046)   
Deviation (Plenary sessions) t-1   -0.459  
   (0.567)  
Deviation (Written questions) t-1    0.066 
    (0.324) 
Deviation*list position   0.891 -0.359 
   (0.992) (0.557) 
Effective candidates on list  -0.015*** -0.009** -0.011*** 
  (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
Old party  -0.048* 0.026 0.050 
  (0.019) (0.082) (0.063) 
Government party t-1  -0.031*** -0.075 -0.101 
  (0.009) (0.075) (0.056) 
Populist party  0.014 0.016 -0.018 
  (0.037) (0.087) (0.069) 
Left Right scale  -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
  (0.004) (0.01) (0.009) 
AIC -6091.8 -2933.4 -54.7 -98.2 
BIC -5995.9 -2816.7 -4.1 -41.1 
Log likelihood 3059.9 1485.7 43.3 65.1 
Observations 6943 3430 174 262 
Groups (Parties/Districts/Elections) 105/13/4 11/13/4 10/13/2 11/13/3 
Variance: Party (intercept) 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Variance: District (intercept) 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Variance: Election (intercept) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Regression coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses. 
Source: Own dataset. 
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second model). In these models female candidates receive approximately 6 per cent more 
preference votes than male candidates from the same list position. For example, if a male 
candidate on the fifth position receives 5.4 per cent preference votes, a female candidate on 
the same position would receive 5.7 per cent preference votes. The percentages for male and 
female candidates drop more towards the end of the list, but the relative difference remains 
the same. In the third and fourth model, however, this effect changes, and women tend to 
receive 15 per cent fewer preference votes than male candidates. These two models are only 
based on candidates who were a member of parliament in the previous election. These 
candidates normally occupy positions towards the top of the list. The positive effect for 
woman seems to be for female candidates towards the end of the list in particular, and less 
for women at the top of the list. An even bigger difference with the Netherlands is the effect 
of being the first woman on the list. In the Netherlands this has a strong positive effect, but 
in Belgium this effect is much smaller. In the first two models the effect is negligible; the 
third and fourth model show an effect of approximately 0.7 percentage points preference 
votes for female candidates running at the second position on the list, compared to male 
candidates running at the second position on the list78. The fact that there is a much smaller 
‘first woman effect’ in Belgium can be explained by a difference in gender rules between 
both countries. In the Netherlands there are no rules stipulating a specific distribution of 
female and male candidates. In Belgium these rules exist. Since 2002 the difference between 
the number of male and female candidates on a list may not be greater than one. Therefore, 
on lists with an even number of candidates there are an equal number of male and female 
candidates. Furthermore, the first two candidates on the list may not have the same 
gender79. This may explain the difference between vote shares for male and female 
candidates between Belgium and the Netherlands. 
Having a non-European background leads to slightly more votes in Belgium, if we 
look at the first and second model. A male candidate running at the fifth position with a 
non-European background would receive 1.1 percentage points more preference votes than 
a male candidate with a European background running at the fifth position. However, the 
effect disappears if we look at the third and fourth model. This again suggests that 
candidates with a non-European background lower on the list have an advantage, but 
candidates at the top of the list do not have this advantage. This is also what is shown by the 
‘first non-European background’ indicator, which shows a negative effect of approximately 
one percentage point. 
In Belgium too, list position is a strong predictor of a candidate’s share of preference 
votes. The model predicts that candidates towards the top of the list receive approximately 
                                                                
78 If we look at the actual election results, on average the 390 women on the second position receive 8.9 per cent 
preference votes. The 159 male candidates on the second position receive on average 8.3 per cent preference votes. 
However, there is almost no difference in the average percentage of preference votes for male and female 
candidates on top of the list (22.0 versus 22.1 percentage). 
79 As a transition rule, in the elections of 2003 not all first three candidates were allowed to be of the same gender. 
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15 per cent preference votes, whereas candidates at the bottom of the list receive only 2 per 
cent preference votes. Next to this negative effect of position a ‘last position effect’ exists as 
well. The last candidate on the list receives two to three times the number of preference 
votes that other candidates towards the end of the list receive.  
Three variables are included in the model to test whether political experience has an 
effect on the percentage of preference votes a Belgian candidate receives. Just like in the 
Netherlands, candidates who served as an MP, minister or junior minister in the previous 
legislative period may count on additional preference votes. For example an incumbent 
candidate running at the third position receives two percentage points more preference 
votes than a candidate without experience as an MP who runs at the third position. For 
ministers this effect is 8 percentage points and for junior ministers 5 percentage points. This 
last result is in contrast with the findings for the Netherlands, where a junior minister does 
not receive much more preference votes compared to other candidates.  
Model three and four include the effect of deviating from the average party score, 
based respectively on speeches in plenary sessions and written questions80. The expectation 
is that in general candidates who deviate more from the party line receive more preference 
votes, and that this effect is stronger for candidates lower on the list. In addition, the 
expectation is that this effect is stronger for the indicator based on written questions. Based 
on the speeches MPs made in plenary sessions, for candidates towards the top of the list the 
effect of deviating is negative. The effect is also limited: only candidates who deviate most 
from the average party score receive more than 2 percentage points fewer preference votes, 
compared to candidates who are on the average party score. For candidates towards the end 
of the list the effect is positive, which is in line with the hypothesis. However, the electoral 
gains are limited: not more than approximately 0.5 percentage points for the candidates 
who deviate most. Based on the written questions MPs submitted the effect is reversed: 
there is a small positive effect for candidates near the top of the list, but this effect is not 
more than 0.7 percentage points for the candidates who deviate most. For candidates lower 
on the list the effect is negative, candidates who deviate most receive approximately 0.5 
percentage points fewer preference votes than candidates close to the average party score. 
The implications of these findings will be discussed in the conclusion of this chapter.  
Next to these indicators at the candidate level, the model includes indicators at the 
party level. First, the number of effective candidates on the party list has a negative effect on 
the percentage of preference votes a candidate receives. This is not a surprising finding: it is 
                                                                
80 Some variables are excluded from the third and fourth model, because they have no variation, see also footnote 
77, page 54. In addition to the variables mentioned in that footnote, the variable ‘First non-European background’ 
is excluded for Belgium as well. Because of the districts in Belgium, from each list only a few candidates are elected. 
Most elected candidates with a non-European background are therefore the first candidate with a non-European 
background on a list. This has an effect on the correlation between both background variables in the third and 
fourth model, since only candidates who were a member of parliament in the previous period are included. Since 
the correlation between both variables is extremely high in this subset of candidates, only the variable measuring a 
candidate’s background is included in the third and fourth model. 
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rather logical that for lists with larger numbers of candidates, on average a candidate 
receives fewer preference votes in relative terms. The model predicts that candidates of 
parties with longer lists (24 candidates) receive on average only half of the votes of 
candidates who run at the same position on smaller lists (around 5 candidates). The 
inclusion of this variable in the second, third and fourth model is therefore also an 
important explanation for the difference in the variance of the intercepts for the different 
groups (as shown towards the bottom of table 4.7). In the first model there is some variance 
between the intercepts for different parties and the intercepts for different districts. The 
intercept (and thus the number of preference votes) is higher for smaller districts and for 
parties that do not present lists with the maximum number of candidates. In the second, 
third and fourth model the variation between these intercepts disappears to a large extent, 
because the variation in these models is explained by the number of effective candidates on 
a list. 
The other party indicators have a different impact in the model for Belgium 
compared to the model for the Netherlands. In the Dutch model the percentages of all 
candidates in one party do not add up to 100 per cent, since votes for the first candidate are 
not considered as preference votes. Therefore, in the Dutch models these other party 
variables did actually say something about which parties attract more preference votes 
(instead of more votes for the list-puller). For Belgium this is not the case, since all votes for 
a candidate are seen as a preference vote. Therefore in these models these variables do not 
say that much about which types of parties attract preference votes. If a specific party would 
attract more preference votes, but these would be distributed equally amongst the 
candidates of that party, these effects would not be visible in the regression models81. An 
effect would only show up when comparing the second with the third and the fourth model, 
if the distribution of votes between candidates on top of the list and at the bottom of the list 
would differ much. However, this difference does not seem to exist. 
In table 4.8 the variables on the party level are included in a model predicting the 
percentage of preference votes cast for a party, relative to the total number of votes cast for 
that party. The results show that traditional parties attract approximately 20 percentage 
points more preference votes than newer parties. For populist parties fewer preference votes 
are cast, but the difference is only 3.7 percentage points. Government parties receive slightly 
fewer preference votes than opposition parties, but this difference is very small (below 1 
percentage point). Parties located more towards the right of the left-right scale receive fewer 
preference votes, but the difference is small. Based on the positions of the parties the 
difference between the most left-wing and most right-wing party would be 3.7 per cent. 
Finally, the effective number of candidates has a positive influence on the number of 
preference votes cast. For each extra candidate on the list, the party can expect half a 
                                                                
81 These effects would have been visible if instead of using the votes of a candidate as a percentage of the total 
preference votes cast for that party, the percentage of the total votes cast for the party (thus including list votes) 
would have been used. 
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percentage point more preference votes. 
 
Table 4.8 Percentage of preference votes within Belgian parties 
 Model 1 
(Intercept) 45.658*** 
 (5.307) 
Effective candidates on list 0.402 
 (0.205) 
Traditional party 19.342*** 
 (3.500) 
Government party t-1 -0.658 
 (2.026) 
Populist party -3.670 
 (6.220) 
Left Right scale -0.468 
 (0.774) 
AIC 1312.8 
BIC 1345.1 
Log likelihood -646.4 
Observations 186 
Groups (Parties/Districts/Elections) 16/13/4 
Variance: Party (intercept) 25.16 
Variance: District (intercept) 20.88 
Variance: Election (intercept) 19.01 
Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Regression coefficients with standard 
errors in parentheses. 
Source: Own dataset. 
4.5 Discussion and conclusion 
In this chapter I study what factors affect the electoral success of candidates. An overview of 
the results is given in table 4.9. As expected, list position and political experience have a 
strong and positive influence on the electoral success of candidates, both in Belgium and the 
Netherlands. However, not all expectations were met and some differences exist between 
Belgium and the Netherlands. The effects for gender are different in the Netherlands and 
Belgium. In general the effects are stronger for female candidates more towards the end of 
the list in Belgium. In the Netherlands the first woman on the list has a larger advantage, 
while in Belgium there is no such advantage for the first female candidate. These differences 
might be explained by the fact that in Belgium rules exist that guarantee an equal number of 
male and female candidates on the list. In addition, the top two candidates should not be 
from the same gender. That female candidates towards the top of the list do not seem to 
benefit as much in Belgium as they do in the Netherlands might be explained by the fact 
that the lists in Belgium are more gender balanced: the need to vote for a woman in Belgian 
might actually be smaller, because there are more women towards the top of the list. The 
fact that female candidates lower on the list receive more votes than male candidates in 
Belgium might be a result of the fact that Belgian voters can cast multiple preference votes. 
The explanation therefore might also be that it is not so much that the first female candidate
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Table 4.9 Summary of findings for chapter 4 
Group Categories H Exp. Bel. Net. 
Underrepresented social 
groups 
Women 4.1 + ++ + 
Candidates with a non-
European background 
4.1  
+ 
+ + 
First of a underrepresented 
social groups 
First woman 4.2 + ~ ++ 
First candidate with a non-
European background 
4.2 + - ~ 
Geographical representation Dutch candidates in their own 
kieskring 
4.3 +  ++ 
List position More towards the top 4.4 + ++ ++ 
 Lowest position 4.5 + + + 
Political experience Incumbent MP 4.6 + ++ + 
 Minister 4.6 + ++ ++ 
 Junior minister 4.6 + ++ + 
Deviating from party line Deviating from party line 4.7 + ~ ~ 
 Interaction with list position 4.8 + ~ - 
 Stronger for question than for 
plenary sessions 
4.9 + ~ ~ 
Party effects Traditional parties 4.10 + + ~ 
 Populist parties 4.11 - ~ - 
 Right-wing parties 4.12 + - - 
 Parties with unpopular list-
pullers 
4.13 +  + 
Note: ++ strong positive effect; + positive effect; ~ no effect; - negative effect 
 
in Belgium does not benefit from being the first woman on the list, but rather that lower 
placed female candidates benefit as well (and therefore making the difference between the 
first female candidate and the lower placed candidates smaller), because voters in Belgium 
have multiple preference votes. It would be interesting to look at this phenomenon by 
looking at other electoral systems and see whether there is a relationship between the 
number of votes and the advantages for the first candidate of a specific (underrepresented) 
group.  
A common assumption is that proportional representation benefits the 
representation of women in parliament (e.g. Norris, 2004), although this also depends on 
the context of the political system. However, studies focussing on the electoral success of 
women in list systems show mixed results. Some studies show that women receive fewer 
votes (Wauters et al., 2010) and some studies show no difference (Schmidt, 2003; Van 
Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012). However, whether women actually receive more votes is not 
the most relevant question, if we are interested in the representation of women in 
parliament. In such a case it is much more interesting to see whether the votes actually make 
a difference. It remains surprising that it is the first woman on the list who has such a large 
advantage in the Netherlands, since normally these candidates are elected anyway (see also 
Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012). However, it seems that there is a small change in this 
respect. In the most recent elections four candidates were elected out of list order, three of 
them being a woman. It is difficult to say whether this actually has something to do with the 
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'vote for a woman' initiative, but at least it seems there is more awareness for the fact that if 
the goal is to make sure more women are elected, voting for the first woman on the list does 
not really help that cause. 
In this chapter I also tested whether deviating from the party line has an effect on 
preference votes. To my knowledge, only one other study has investigated the effect 
ideology has on the intraparty competition in proportional representation systems. Van 
Erkel (2017) used a candidate survey to ask candidates about their opinion on different 
issues. He showed that differences between co-partisans exist, but that these differences had 
no effect on the electoral success of the candidates. I used quantitative text analyses to 
estimate policy positions of candidates and test whether candidates who deviate from their 
party receive more preference votes. Both in Belgium and the Netherlands there was no 
effect of deviating from the party line on the number of preference votes a candidate 
receives, neither for candidates near the top of the list nor for candidates lower on the list. 
For intraparty competition, it does not seem to matter whether a candidate deviates from 
the party line or not. 
What could explain this non-finding? In Belgium, depending on the size of the 
district, voters can choose between 4 to 24 candidates. In the Netherlands, voters for most 
parties can choose between 30 candidates82, although lists may include up to 80 candidates. 
It may be that for most voters in the Netherlands there are just too many candidates to be 
able to collect enough information about each candidate to see whether they have (slightly) 
different options than the party and whether this would be a reason to vote for such a 
candidate. Voters take ideology into consideration when distinguishing between parties, but 
look at other aspects when deciding which candidate within a party they prefer. It would be 
a difficult task for a voter to find the information necessary to make an informed choice 
based on the policy positions of all candidates on a party list. The question is even justified 
whether it is possible to obtain this information at all. While there are voting advice 
applications to help voters choose between parties, these tools are normally not available for 
all individual candidates83. Some parties have some information about their candidates on 
the website when they announce the lists for the upcoming elections, but the information is 
usually not very elaborate and focuses more often on the motivations of candidates to 
become an MP. 
The electoral systems of Belgium and the Netherlands can both be classified as 
flexible list systems. In such systems parties still have a large influence on which candidates 
are elected. Therefore it might be that in flexible list systems the cost of making an informed 
choice about a candidate’s policy position is too high, compared to the expected benefit. In 
systems where the expected benefit is higher, ideology at the interparty level might have a 
larger influence. For example in open list systems, where voters have way more influence on 
                                                                
82 Some parties present shorter lists, but these are mostly new parties who do not receive enough seats to be elected. 
83 Although this is beginning to change. For example, in Belgium a VAA was launched in Flanders for the federal 
elections of 2014 (Van Erkel, 2017, pp. 50–51). 
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the actual composition of parliament, it might be worthwhile to look for a candidate who 
represents certain interests. In addition, such an effect might also be stronger in systems that 
allow for panachage voting, if candidates try to attract voters from other parties as well. 
Further research should therefore test the hypotheses in list systems that are more open as 
well. 
Another important finding in this chapter is that in the Netherlands candidates tend 
to receive relatively more votes in the district in which they live. In the Netherlands the 
place of residence of a candidate is mentioned on the ballot, which makes it easy for voters 
to search for a candidate from their own region. This is different for Belgium, where the 
municipality of a candidate is not mentioned on the ballot. However, this phenomenon 
does not play the same role in Belgium as it plays in the Netherlands, since in Belgium 
voters can only vote for candidates from their own district. 
Yet, it is striking that most of the factors that strongly influence the electoral success 
of a candidate (gender, list position, municipality in the Netherlands) are those factors that 
depend on or are given on the ballot. In the conclusion of this dissertation I will reflect on 
this issue of information availability on the ballot. 
  
 
5 The consequences: what’s in it for a candidate? 
5.1 Introduction 
In the run-up to the Dutch parliamentary elections of 2006 the VVD organized an internal 
election to choose a new party leader. The main contenders were Mark Rutte and Rita 
Verdonk. According to opinion polls Mrs Verdonk, who was the minister for immigration 
and integration at the time, was very popular amongst the (potential) electorate of the VVD. 
However, within the party, and especially the top of the party, Rutte was most popular. 
Rutte won the election by a small margin (51 versus 46 per cent) and became the new party 
leader and the list-puller for the VVD in the 2006 elections. Rita Verdonk was put on the 
second place on the party list (Van Holsteyn, 2007, p. 1141). 
The battle seemed over, but both Verdonk and the voters decided differently. 
Verdonk led a personal campaign, thereby dividing the party. But her campaign, at least 
from a personal point of a view, was a success. Rita Verdonk received more votes than Mark 
Rutte. This was a first in the Netherlands for elections at the national level. Never before did 
a candidate lower on the list receive more votes than the list-puller. 
A long internal power struggle followed. The leadership position of Rutte, who had 
the support of the parliamentary party group, was challenged by Verdonk. Verdonk felt 
backed by the massive support she had received from voters. Verdonk claimed she earned 
the right to become the party leader and was in constant disagreement with the rest of the 
party. Eventually, after yet another criticism of Verdonk of the party line, Rutte and the rest 
of the party felt that Verdonk could no longer be a member of the parliamentary party 
group and she was expelled from the parliamentary group. Dutch constitutional rules state 
that she could keep her seat in the Second Chamber and Verdonk became an independent 
MP. She started her own movement / party, and while briefly very successful in opinion 
polls, in the elections of 2010 she failed to reach the electoral threshold and was not elected. 
Mark Rutte, who remained the leader of the VVD, led his party to a victory in the elections 
and became prime minister. 
An impressive number of preference votes do not guarantee a success in the long 
run, as the Verdonk story shows, but she definitely tried to play the 'mandate by preference 
votes' card. In this regard the story of the Christian Democratic politician Pieter Omtzigt 
was more successful. For the elections of 2012 he initially was not placed on the draft list of 
candidates of his party, after having been an MP for that party since 2003. This was not only 
to his own regret but also to that of his followers. When the congress had to approve the 
final list of candidates, after a campaign from local and prominent party members, Omtzigt 
was put on the 39th place. Despite now being on the list, this was still not a good perspective, 
since according to opinion polls his party would only receive around 12 seats (Louwerse, 
2014). However, Omtzigt received 36,750 preference votes, more than enough to be elected 
out of list order. Five years later, when the Christian Democratic Party presented the list of 
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candidates for the 2017 elections, Omtzigt held the fourth position. Here, preference votes 
likely played a major role in his career. 
While rather anecdotal, and somewhat extreme, Verdonk and Omtzigt show that 
preference votes may matter for a candidate’s legislative behaviour and political career. In 
the previous three chapters I looked at factors affecting preference votes. This chapter will 
look in a more systematic manner at the consequences of preference votes for both the 
legislative behaviour and political career of a candidate. With regard to the political career 
of a candidate, in the context of this chapter I focus on political functions at the national 
level performed by a candidate after the elections.  
Studies focusing on the consequences of the number of preference votes in flexible 
list systems are rare. A single quote from De Winter referring to the Belgian electoral system 
(2005, p. 423) was, for a long time, one of the few comments in the academic literature on 
the consequences: “Preference votes are not entirely irrelevant to a candidate’s political 
career. Selectors do take into account a candidate’s previous electoral performance.” 
The few studies that focus on the consequences of preference votes are related to the 
political career of candidates. Ackaert (1996) found that in Flanders (Belgium) political 
parties take the number of preference votes candidates received into account for the 
composition of the government and the reselection of candidates at the local level. Another 
study looked at the effect of preference votes on the career of ministers and junior minsters 
in Belgium (Weekers, 2003). The conclusion of her comprehensive study was that between 
1981 and 1999 preference votes did not play a decisive role in the career of ministers. But 
since only ministers and junior ministers were analysed in that study, it is not possible to say 
how the number of preference votes for a candidate influences his or her actual chances of 
obtaining a government post. Karvonen (2004) also studied the effects of preference voting, 
but he focussed on effects of preference votes on the political system and, more specific, on 
the party system. Some more recent studies deal with the question of whether there is an 
effect of preference votes on the political career of a candidate (André, Depauw, Shugart, et 
al., 2017; Crisp et al., 2013; Folke et al., 2016), showing that there is an effect (these studies 
will be discussed in more detail below). 
Thus, while we know something about the impact of the number of preference votes 
for a candidate, there is much we do not know. For countries as Belgium and the 
Netherlands, where only a few candidates are elected solely on the basis of preference votes 
(see section 5.2), this question is especially relevant both for voters and candidates. If the 
number of preference votes for a candidate has consequences, this could lead to an 
increased incentive for candidates to seek preference votes. For voters, the value of casting a 
preference vote could increase if they know it will have consequences. These potential 
consequences could also (at least partly) answer the puzzling finding why so many voters 
would vote for candidates who would have been elected anyway.  
In terms of consequences of preference votes, at least three aspects are relevant. The 
first and most direct effect is whether candidates are elected based on preference votes. In 
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section 5.2 an overview is given of the number of candidates who receive enough votes to be 
elected based on preference votes, and how many of these candidates are elected out of list 
order. The second and third aspects are indirect consequences of preference votes. The 
number of preference votes may have an effect on the parliamentary behaviour of the 
candidates (see section 5.3). Finally, if parties value the number of preference votes a 
candidate receives, this potentially influences the political career of the candidate, i.e. 
whether candidates with more preference votes for example have a higher chance to be 
‘promoted’ to (junior) minister or obtain a better list position in the next election (see 
section 5.4). 
5.2 Candidates elected based on preference votes 
In Belgium and the Netherlands only a small proportion of the elected candidates receive 
enough votes to be elected independent of their list position. At the same time, most of the 
candidates who are elected based on preference votes, would also have been elected based 
on their list position. 
In Belgium, between 1919 and 1999, 30 candidates were elected out of list order: only 
0.6 per cent of the total number of elected candidates in that period (Deschouwer, 2009, p. 
117). But since the weight of preference votes was increased in 2003, by reducing the 
number of list votes that are transferred to the candidates (see section 1.4.1), the number of 
candidates elected out of list order increased dramatically. 
First of all, in the four elections between 2003 and 2014 respectively 35, 33, 35 and 30 
of the 150 elected candidates received enough votes to be elected on their own. 
Approximately 40 per cent of these candidates were elected out of list order. Both in 2003 
and 2007 17 candidates (11.3 per cent of the elected candidates) were elected out of list 
order. In 2010 and 2014 respectively 12 (8.0 per cent) and 7 candidates (4.7 per cent) were 
elected out of list order. At first sight this seems an impressive effect. However, there is a 
downside. A large part of these elected candidates did not accept their seat. Out of the 
candidates elected out of list order six (35.2 per cent) did not enter parliament after the 
elections in 2003, seven (50.0 per cent) did not do so in 2007 and six (41.2 per cent) of them 
refused in 2010. Most of these candidates were list-pushers, and at the same time already 
held a position either in a regional parliament or government. The drop in elected 
candidates out of list order (and the fact that in 2014 all candidates who were elected out of 
list order accepted their seat), can likely be explained by the newly introduced rule that it 
was no longer allowed to be a candidate for multiple elections held at the same day if the 
mandates for the elected bodies are incompatible. 
In the Netherlands, between 1946 and 1994, three candidates were elected out of list 
order: only 0.1 per cent of all candidates elected in that period. Political parties do not really 
encourage candidates to try to be elected out of list order: some parties even ask their 
candidates to state that they would not accept their seat if they would be elected out of list 
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order (Andeweg, 2005, p. 494; Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012, p. 169). 
The number of candidates elected out of order increased, after changing the formal 
weight of preference votes, although not as dramatically as in Belgium. Since the election of 
1998 a candidate only needs 25 per cent of the electoral threshold to be elected based on 
preference votes (this was 50 per cent). In the seven parliamentary elections between 1998 
and 2017 only 145 of the 979 elected candidates (excluding list-pullers) received enough 
votes to be elected on their own. However, also in the Netherlands most of these candidates 
would have been elected anyway. In most elections only one or two of the 150 elected 
candidates were elected out of order (14 candidates in a total of 7 elections). In the elections 
of 2017 a ‘record’ of four candidates were elected out of list order. An important difference 
with Belgium is that all these candidates accepted their seat after the elections. 
5.3 Consequences for legislative behaviour 
5.3.1 Expectations 
Preference votes may influence the legislative behaviour of candidates. In general, according 
to André et al. (2014, p. 231) “[e]lectoral institutions shape the behaviour of (would-be) 
legislators between elections”. More specifically, electoral institutions influence the “relative 
value to legislators (…) of personal reputations versus party reputations for advancing 
political careers” (Carey & Shugart, 1995). Systems that allow intra-party preference voting 
encourage behaviour of politicians that is focused on their personal reputations, since, in 
these systems legislators do not solely depend on their party in order to be re-elected, but 
also on the voter. 
Research suggests that both the weight given to preference votes and the use of 
preference votes by voters influence the level of personal vote-seeking incentives 
(Bräuninger et al., 2012). This is where the competing principals theory comes into play 
(Carey, 2007). Members of parliament normally have at least one principal: the legislative 
party leadership. However, the institutional context might influence whether MPs also have 
other principals. If competing principals exist, this might reduce party unity, since voters do 
not only depend on the party leadership (Carey, 2007). So, if an electoral systems allows 
intraparty competition, party unity might be reduced because MP’s try to distinguish 
themselves from party colleagues in order to attract voters. 
MPs have two options to attract these voters: via constituency service and by voting 
against the party in parliament (Kam, 2009, p. 24). However, candidates in Belgium and the 
Netherlands partly depend on voters, but both countries should be classified as party-
centered systems (Shugart, 2001). In the Netherlands and Belgium, but also in other 
countries, MPs to a large extent indeed vote according to party lines (see for example Van 
Vonno, 2016, p. 62). And that is not only a result of MPs being forced by the party 
leadership, but mainly because MPs simply are in agreement with the party, rely on cue-
taking or voluntarily decide to vote according to party lines (Van Vonno, 2016). Yet, there 
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are other, to some extent more subtle, ways for an MP to distinguish him- or herself from 
co-partisans than voting against the party. Still, members of parliament who do not reach 
the individual threshold are not more active in parliament, in terms of sponsorship of 
amendments and motions and the submission of written question, to boost their chances of 
being re-elected (Louwerse & Otjes, 2016). 
In this section, the starting point is that a candidate seeks re-election. The 
assumption is that what an MP does in parliament is driven by future elections: the 
behaviour is motivated by vote-seeking arguments. In terms of preference votes one might 
also turn the argument around. What if it is not the behaviour of a member that influences 
his or her preference votes at the next election, but the preference votes that influence the 
behaviour of an MP in the subsequent legislative term? Candidates with many preference 
votes could feel they were given a stronger personal mandate and therefore either perceive a 
responsibility (to the voter) or a right (for themselves) to act less in accordance with the 
party line. 
One way an MP could do this, is by delivering speeches in parliament and therein 
deviate from the party line. According to Proksch and Slapin (2015) MPs do not use their 
speeches given in parliament with the goal to persuade their colleagues to change their 
opinion. Their main goal is to communicate with their voters and show them their policy 
positions. Therefore, if an MP feels he or she has a stronger personal mandate, and therefore 
has the opportunity to more strongly deviate from the party, speeches in parliament could 
be a way to show that to the voters. I will therefore test the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 5.1: Candidates who receive more preference votes are more 
likely to deviate from the parliamentary party group line. 
5.3.2 Data and methods 
To test the effect of preference votes on the legislative behaviour of members of parliament 
in both Belgium and the Netherlands, two multilevel regression models will be conducted 
for each country. One model tests the effects of preference votes on the behaviour of MPs 
during plenary sessions and one model tests the effects of preference votes on the positions 
MPs take in the written questions they submit to (junior) ministers. These models contain 
random intercepts for parties and elections and districts (only for Belgium). The period of 
analysis is 1998 until 2017 for the Netherlands (6 legislative periods) and 2003 until 2014 for 
Belgium (3 legislative periods). 
5.3.2.1 Deviating from the average party score 
For the two analyses two different dependent variables will be used. One estimates the 
deviation of an MP from the average party score based on text analysis of speeches made 
during plenary sessions. The other dependent variable measures the deviation of MPs from 
the average party score based on text analysis of the written questions they submitted. These 
variables are discussed in section 4.3.3.  
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5.3.2.2 Independent variables 
The most important independent variable should be an indicator of the number of 
preference votes for the members of parliament. However, it is not possible to simply use 
the votes a candidate received, since the size of both the party and the district (in Belgium) 
have an influence on the absolute number of votes. For Belgium a solution is to use the ratio 
of the number of received preference votes and the number of preference votes for a 
candidate necessary to be elected (which is calculated by dividing the number of votes of a 
party by the number of seats the party won in a district + 1). This last figure depends on the 
size of the party and (indirectly) on the size of the district. Therefore, this ratio is 
comparable between parties and districts. The higher the ratio the better the candidate 
performed. In the Netherlands the ratio between the number of votes for a candidate and 
the threshold for individual candidates will be used as the indicator for the number of 
preference votes. So, for both Belgium and the Netherlands this independent variable 
measures how close a candidate was to winning a seat on his or her own. A score of ‘1’ 
means that the candidate received the exact number of preference votes necessary to be 
elected independent of his or her list position. To make sure the analysis is not influenced 
by only a few outliers (i.e. candidates who passed the threshold by a large margin), the 
maximum value this variable can take is one84. The data necessary for this variable were 
taken from official sources containing the elections results (for Belgium: Belgium.be, 2003, 
2007, 2010, for the Netherlands: Kiesraad, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2010, 2012). 
Next to the indicator for preference votes three other variables will be included. First 
whether a candidate was a member of a party that was in government at that time, since 
governing parties are more unified than opposition parties in parliamentary systems (Carey, 
2007). If agreements were made between governing parties, the pressure on individual 
members to stick to the party (or government) line might be larger. Second, the position on 
the list of a candidate (relative to the number of elected members of the party) is included as 
a control variable. Third, as an additional control variable incumbency is included. 
Descriptive statistics for all variables can be found in appendix E.2 (for the Netherlands in 
table e.3 (part I and II), on page 193 and for Belgium in table e.4 (part I and II), on page 
194). 
5.3.3 Results 
Table 5.1 and table 5.2 show the results of the multilevel regression analyses for the effect of 
preference votes in the Netherlands and Belgium. The results are mixed, but in general they 
are not in line with the first hypothesis of this chapter. In figure 5.1 the effects the
                                                                
84 There might be a downside to this choice. If the effect would only manifest itself once the threshold is reached by 
a candidate, the analysis would not find any effect. Therefore the analyses presented in section 5.3.3 were also 
conducted for only those candidates who passed the threshold (with the preference votes variable not set at a 
maximum of 1). The results of these analyses did not show any different pattern than those presented in section 
5.3.3 (the magnitude of the effect changed slightly, but if the effects were significant, they were in the same 
direction). 
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Table 5.1 Effect of preference votes on legislative behaviour (the Netherlands) 
 Plenary sessions Written questions 
(Constant) 0.029*** 0.059*** 
 (0.007) (0.012) 
Preference votes 0.006* 0.007 
 (0.003) (0.006) 
List position 0.000 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.005) 
Government party 0.003 0.004 
 (0.002) (0.004) 
Member of parliament t-1 -0.004* -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.004) 
AIC -4317.5 -2683.1 
BIC -4278.9 -2645.2 
Log likelihood 2166.7 1349.6 
Observations 923 839 
Groups(Parties) 8 8 
Groups(Election) 6 6 
Variance: Party (intercept) 0.000 0.001 
Variance: Election (intercept) 0.000 0.000 
Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: Own dataset. 
 
 
Table 5.2 Effect of preference votes on legislative behaviour (Belgium) 
 Plenary sessions Written questions 
(Constant) 0.030** 0.080*** 
 (0.008) (0.011) 
Preference votes 0.025** -0.018 
 (0.009) (0.142) 
List position -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
Government party -0.009 -0.019 
 (0.008) (0.010) 
Member of parliament t-1 -0.002 0.006 
 (0.004) (0.007) 
AIC -945.1 -901.1 
BIC -914.1 -867.0 
Log likelihood 481.5 459.6 
Observations 231 328 
Groups(Parties) 11 12 
Groups(Districts) 11 11 
Groups(Election) 2 3 
Variance: Party (intercept) 0.000 0.000 
Variance: District (intercept) 0.000 0.000 
Variance: Election (intercept) 0.000 0.000 
Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: Own dataset. 
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Figure 5.1 Effects of preference votes on parliamentary behaviour 
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preference votes have in the different models are plotted. The Y-axis in these plots show the 
entire range of the relevant deviation variable, to help the interpretation of the coefficients 
presented in the tables. In both countries the model with the behaviour of MPs in plenary 
sessions as the dependent variable, show that the preference votes variable has a statistically 
significant and positive influence. However, both in the Netherlands and Belgium the effects 
are very limited in substantial terms. Moving from the minimum at the preference votes 
scale (0 per cent of the individual threshold) to the maximum (100 per cent of the 
individual threshold) a candidate only makes a small step on the deviation scale. In the 
Netherlands that step would be 0.006, while the deviation scale has a minimum score of 0.0 
and a maximum of 0.19. Therefore, the maximum effect only equals 1/30 of the entire range 
of the deviation scale. While statistically significant, in substantial terms that effect is almost 
negligible. In Belgium the effect is somewhat stronger, but the maximum effect still only 
equals 1/7 of the entire deviation scale. 
When the deviation of an MP from the average party score is measured based on his 
or her written question, a positive effect is only found in the Netherlands and it is very 
small. While moving through the entire range of the preference votes scale, an MP would 
only move 1/63 of the range of the deviation scale. In Belgium the effect is even negative, 
but also small. Moving through the entire range of the preference vote scale leads to a 
decrease on the dependent variable of 0.018, which is only 1/25 of the range of that scale. 
These effects are controlled for by list position and incumbency, which both have no major 
influence on deviating from the party line. In addition, the model controls for being a 
member of a government party. One might expect that this has a negative influence on 
deviating from the party line. This holds for Belgium, but not for the Netherlands. 
However, these effects are not statistically significant85. Hypothesis 5.1 therefore has to be 
rejected. 
5.4 Consequences for the political career of a candidate 
5.4.1 Expectations 
For the Netherlands Andeweg and Irwin (2009, p. 93) observe a pattern in which “the 
possibility for a career in politics is now almost completely under the control of parties”. 
Before the 1960s Dutch ministers were recruited from outside parliament more often and 
sometimes ministers without any party affiliation entered government (Secker, 1991). With 
the near disappearance of this type of politician, a development towards ‘career politicians’ 
has taken place, not only in the Netherlands (King, 1981). In addition, the selection of 
candidates is one of the most important functions of a political party (Hazan, 2014). 
Selectors take into account characteristics of candidates such as incumbency, gender, 
                                                                
85 Additional analyses were conducted to test whether interaction effects between these control variables and 
preference votes exist. In none of the models the inclusion of interaction effects had a result on the conclusion 
presented here. 
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ethnicity and region (Gallagher, 1988), and the assumption is that they strive for ‘ticket-
balancing’, i.e. a mix of candidates with different characteristics (Matthews & Valen, 1999). 
Of course, this task is simpler if the district magnitude and the length of the list increase 
(Matland & Studlar, 1996; in the context of geographical representattion, see also Put, 2016, 
p. 192). So, especially for the Netherlands, but also for the larger districts in Belgium there is 
at least the possibility of drafting balanced lists86. 
Recent studies have shown that preference votes could also influence the selection 
process. The study of André et al. (2017) is especially relevant, since it looks at the influence 
of preference votes on party nomination strategies in three countries where flexible-list 
systems are used. The study shows that in Belgium, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia 
preference votes do influence the list position of a returning candidate for the next election. 
Returning candidates who are ranked higher by the voters (in terms of votes) than by the 
party (in terms of their original list position) are moved up the list by the party in the next 
election87. Crisp et al. (2013) come to similar conclusions for Slovakia, but they included 
only incumbents in their analysis: once elected, those who received more preference votes 
are more likely to move up the list for the next election. Since this mechanism seems to 
work both in nationwide (single district) and district proportional representation systems, I 
expect the same to be true for the Netherlands. 
 
Hypothesis 5.2: Candidates who receive more preference votes have a better 
chance of getting a higher place on the list in the next elections. 
 
However, I do not expect that this effect necessarily is the same for both female and 
male candidates. For most parties there is a difference in the distribution between female 
and male candidates on the list. In the Netherlands, most parties not only have more male 
candidates on the list, but they also have more male candidates towards the top of the list. 
In Belgium rules dictate that there should be an equal number of male and female 
candidates on the list, however, the rules further only stipulate that the first two candidates 
may not have the same gender88. As a result, despite the fact that parties have an equal 
number of male and female candidates on their list, there are still more male candidates 
towards the top of the list in Belgian parties89. It is not immediately clear if and how this 
would influence the effect of preference votes on the list position for the next election. On 
                                                                
86 These balanced lists can (partly) be a deception, since arguably what matters most is which candidates have a 
realistic chance to be elected. The order of the list still has a large influence on which candidates are elected (see 
section 5.2) and selectors favour for example incumbents or ministers on more ‘realistic positions’ (i.e. positions 
more towards the top of the list) (Put & Maddens, 2012). This means that a balanced list can still lead to the group 
of elected candidates with highly similar characteristics. 
87 This result is based on an analysis of all parties (that won seats in the period under analysis), so it is not clear 
whether there is a difference between different parties.  
88 As a transition-rule, in 2003, the first election under these gender rules the first three candidates could not have 
the same gender. 
89 For example, in the 2014 elections, if we only look at the first 6 candidates on all lists, 46.9 per cent of the 
candidates were female. From the first three candidates on all lists, only 41.6 per cent was a female candidate. 
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the one hand, it is possible to argue that political parties still prefer (for whatever reason) to 
have male candidates towards the top of the list and the effect of preference votes on the list 
position would therefore also be stronger for male candidates. On the other hand, it is 
possible to argue that since political parties prefer male candidates, a good electoral 
performance is less important for them to gain a better list position for the next election. In 
that case, we could expect that the effect is stronger for female candidates, since they need 
something extra in order to be promoted to better list positions. The argument could also 
be reversed: because of overrepresentation of male candidates towards the top of the list, a 
better electoral performance is more important for them to distinguish themselves from 
their (male) co-partisans. Under that logic the effect would be stronger for male candidates 
and less important for female candidates because they have less (female) competition. In 
any way, it is difficult to theorize that the effect will be in a specific direction. Therefore the 
following, and rivalling, hypotheses are formulated: 
 
Hypothesis 5.3: The effect of preference votes on the list position in the next 
election is stronger for male candidates than for female candidates. 
Hypothesis 5.4: The effect of preference votes on the list position in the next 
election is stronger for female candidates than for male candidates. 
 
Another aspect of the political career which is relevant in this context is the 
ministerial career. For many ministers the ‘parliamentary pathway' to become a minister is 
important (De Winter, 1991). In both Belgium and the Netherlands the government is often 
formed by ministers and junior ministers who were elected as an MP first. In the 
Netherlands 69 per cent of the ministers between 1967 and 2013 had parliamentary 
experience (Andeweg & Irwin, 2014, p. 159) and in Belgium nearly all ministers are 
recruited from parliament (De Winter, 1991; Dumont et al., 2009). 
From the perspective of a party, selecting popular candidates as ministers could 
strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the government. In the Netherlands for example a 
critique of the system is that voters do not have influence on the government that is formed 
(e.g. Andeweg & Irwin, 2009, pp. 132–134; Parlementair Documentatie Centrum, 2018). A 
political party could choose to partly address this critique by taking the number of 
preference votes into consideration when allocating government positions. Promoting 
popular candidates to minister or junior minister could at least give voters the feeling they 
have some influence on the composition of government. Research has shown that political 
parties indeed take preference votes into account when 'promoting' politicians. Winning 
more preference votes in local elections in the Swedish semi-open list system and the 
Brazilian open list systems, for example, increases the chances of becoming a local party 
leader (Folke et al., 2016). Therefore, I expect that: 
 
Hypothesis 5.5: Candidates who receive more preference votes have a higher 
chance of obtaining a post in the government installed after the elections (if 
their party participates in the governmental coalition). 
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Of course, it should be kept in mind that there are various constraints which 
influence which individuals enter government (Dowding & Dumont, 2009). A 
constitutional constraint is the pool from which ministers can be recruited, e.g. whether 
they should come from parliament or not. The ‘linguistic parity’ rule in Belgium, stating 
that there should be an equal number of Dutch-speaking and French-speaking ministers 
(Deschouwer, 2009, p. 140), also complicates the portfolio allocation. Constraints may also 
be 'political': how the different ministerial positions are filled may reflect power balances 
and policy interests. Furthermore, because of strategic considerations a junior minister may 
be linked to a minister from a different party. Therefore it is unlikely to expect a strong 
effect of preference votes on the appointment of ministers. 
5.4.2 Data and method 
5.4.2.1 Effects of preference votes on list position at the next election 
The effects of preference votes on the list position of candidates in the next election in 
Belgium is comprehensively studied by André et al. (2017). To a large extent I will replicate 
their research design to test whether the same effects hold for the Netherlands. However, I 
add some independent variables to the model, mainly to test for a gender effect. I will 
therefore also replicate their analyses for Belgium. 
To test the effect of preference votes (t-1) on the list position in the next election (t), 
a multilevel regression model was constructed with random intercepts for both Belgium and 
the Netherlands. For both countries random intercepts were included for the election and 
parties. For Belgium a third random intercept for districts was included. The dependent 
variable used for the analysis is the decimal logarithm of a candidate’s list position at t. With 
this logarithmic transformation the analysis accounts for the fact that it is more difficult to 
gain positions for a candidate who already occupies a high list position at t-1 than it is for a 
candidate more towards the bottom of the list. 
As André et al. (2017, p. 593) point out, an important - but not easy - decision that 
has to be made, is how to measure a candidate’s preference vote-earning, i.e. the most 
important independent variable for this analysis. If I would use the absolute number of 
votes a candidate receives, candidates could not be compared across parties, because it may 
depend on the size of the party and (for Belgium) the district. The solution that André et al. 
propose is to compare the ranking of candidates by the party (i.e. the order in which 
candidates appear on the list) with the ranking of candidates by the voter (i.e. by ordering 
the candidates based on the votes they received). The list position and the position on the 
voter ranking are used to calculate the rank difference90. A positive rank difference means 
                                                                
90 The rank difference is a deviant operationalization of a candidate’s electoral performance compared to how it is 
operationalized in the rest of this study (i.e. a more absolute measurement of the number of preference votes a 
candidate received, either by looking at the percentage of preference votes within a party or by looking at the 
percentage of preference votes related to the individual threshold). This is a result of the fact that in the other parts 
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that a candidate performed better in terms of votes than in terms of party support: the 
candidate has a better voter rank than list position. The expectation is that if preference 
votes matter, a candidate’s rank difference has a negative effect in the regression analyses. 
This would mean that a higher rank difference (i.e. voters rank a candidate higher than the 
party) leads to a position more towards the top of the list. 
Figure 5.2 and figure 5.3 show the distribution of the rank difference variable for 
respectively the Netherlands and Belgium for all candidates at t-1. These histograms thus 
include both candidates who did and who did not return in the next election. Both 
histograms are distributed relatively normally, although they are both slightly positively 
skewed. The distribution of the rank difference variable for those candidates included in the 
analysis looks relatively similar. At least they (almost) have the same range. The rank 
difference variable ranges from -15 to 23 in Belgium, both for candidates participating again 
at t and for all candidates participating at t-1. For the Netherlands the distributions ranges 
from -43 to 59 (all candidates at t-1) and -43 to 45 (all returning candidates at t). There is 
thus considerable variation in the rank difference of the candidates included in the analysis, 
to test the effect of rank difference at t-1 on the list position at t. It is not the case that all 
candidates with a low rank difference do not even participate in the next election, which 
would have created a selection bias. 
 
Figure 5.2 Distribution rank difference 
(the Netherlands) 
 
Figure 5.3 Distribution rank difference 
(Belgium) 
 
 
In addition, and in line with the study of André et al. (2017), two other independent 
variables will be included: 1) a candidate’s list position at t-1 to account for general qualities 
of the candidate and 2) incumbency. Previous literature has shown that parties are more 
likely to put incumbent candidates on positions more towards the top of the list (Put & 
Maddens, 2013), so we should control for this. 
Next to these independent variables used by André et al. (2017), I include some other 
variables. First, a variable is included that measures whether the candidate was a minister or 
                                                                                                                                                                   
of this study we are interested in the electoral performance of a candidate relative to all other (co-partisan) 
candidates, but in this analysis we are mainly interested in a candidate’s electoral performance in relation to co-
partisan candidates close to his or her own list position. 
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junior minister in the previous legislative period. It is reasonable to expect that if a minister 
or junior minister would like to return on the party list in the next election, he or she is 
given a position towards the top of the list; we should control for this. Furthermore, I 
include gender and an interaction between gender and rank difference in the analysis, to test 
whether there is a gender difference in the effects of rank difference. Descriptive statistics for 
all variables can be found in appendix E.2 (for the Netherlands in table e.3 (part III) and for 
Belgium in table e.4 (part III)). 
Data on individual election results were obtained from official documents 
containing the election results, both for Belgium (Belgium.be, 2003, 2007, 2010, 2014) and 
the Netherlands (Kiesraad, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2010, 2012, 2017c). From these 
documents all candidates, their gender, their list position and the absolute number of 
preference votes at the national (for the Netherlands) or district (for Belgium) level were 
obtained. In the Netherlands, for most candidates the candidate's gender is given on the 
ballot. However, not all parties have the gender on the list. Missing data was completed as 
much as possible by hand coding the gender91. Data about which candidates were also a 
minister or junior minister was obtained from the website Parlement & Politiek 
(Parlementair Documentatie Centrum, 2017a) for the Netherlands and the Political Data 
Yearbook (Political Data Yearbook, 2017; Rihoux et al., 2013) for Belgium. To determine 
whether a candidate was a member of parliament in the period before the election I used 
information given on the website of Parlement & Politiek (Parlementair Documentatie 
Centrum, 2017b) for the Netherlands and the Belgian Chamber of Representatives 
(Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers, 2017a) for Belgium. Based on these sources 
a dataset was created in which each case represents a candidate in a single election. 
For the Netherlands, only candidates from parties that received at least one seat in 
parliament between 1998 and 2017 are included. Next, for all candidates it was determined 
whether they also participated (for the same party) in the next election. Only these 
candidates are included in the analysis. Candidates at the first position in t-1 were also 
excluded from the analysis. 
A problem occurs due to the fact that political parties in the Netherlands may 
present different electoral lists in each district. These districts normally do not influence the 
electoral outcome (Andeweg, 2005, p. 497), but complicate the comparison between 
candidates. Usually a large part of the list is the same in each district, but some parties have 
variations at the end of the list in each district. This gives them the opportunity to present 
more candidates nationwide than the maximum number of candidates on one list would 
allow them to do and to add some regional candidates in each district. Therefore, some 
candidates are not on the ballot in all districts. Moreover, some candidates are on the ballot 
                                                                
91 This was done by checking whether the gender of the candidate was mentioned in another election or by looking 
at the first name of a candidate, which is also given on the ballot for candidates of most parties. If the first name 
was not given or it was not a typical male or female name, the gender of a candidate was coded based on an 
internet search. 
The consequences: what’s in it for a candidate? 
Consequences for the political career of a candidate 
115 
 
in all districts, but do not always have the same list position in all districts. This is 
problematic for the analysis. First, if candidates do not participate in an equal number of 
districts their votes cannot be compared. Second, if a candidate participates in all districts 
but at varying positions, it is not straightforward which positions at two consecutive 
elections should be compared. Therefore, only candidates who in two subsequent elections 
have the same position on the party-list in all districts are included in the analysis (to be 
clear: the position can be different in the first and second election)92. 
For Belgium all effective candidates from parties that won at least one seat in the 
elections between 2003 and 2014 are included in the analysis. For each of them it was 
determined whether they participated in the next election, again as an effective candidate, 
for the same party and in the same district. Candidates who fulfil all these criteria are 
included in the multilevel regression model. 
5.4.2.2 Effects of preference votes on chances of becoming a (junior) minister 
To test hypothesis 5.5 three multilevel logistic regression analyses will be conducted, all with 
a different dependent variable. The first model predicts the chances of becoming a member 
of government, the second one predicts the chances of becoming a minister and the third 
model predicts the chances of becoming a junior minister. Included in the analyses are all 
candidates of parties that entered government in a certain legislative period. The models will 
contain random intercepts for parties, elections and (for Belgium) districts. 
For the Netherlands the analysis is conducted for the period 1998 until 2017; the 
results of six elections are included93. For Belgium the analysis is conducted for the period 
2003 until 201794. In addition to the data containing the electoral results described in the 
previous section, data about which candidates became a (junior) minister after the election 
was collected. The data required for the Netherlands was obtained from the Parlement & 
Politiek website (Parlementair Documentatie Centrum, 2017a) and for Belgium data was 
obtained from the Political Data Yearbook website (Political Data Yearbook, 2017; Rihoux 
                                                                
92 Within a party the voter rank order is based on all candidates who participate at the same position and in all 
districts. So for example, if a party presents lists with 50 candidates, but varies the last 5 positions in each district, 
the rank order runs from 1 to 45. A candidate who does not participate in all districts, but receives more votes than 
candidates who participate in all districts, would thus not influence the rank order of the candidates who 
participate in all districts. This solution is chosen because in the example mentioned before a party would present 
in total 45 + (5 * 20) = 145 candidates. If the rank order was based on all these candidates a candidate included in 
the analysis could have a potential rank difference of -105 (if the candidate running from position 40 receives for 
example only a few votes and therefore ends up at the end of the rank order). This would create a problem for the 
distribution of the independent variable and would increase the chances of finding invalid results. 
93 While in other parts of this book the election of 2017 is also included, the election results of candidates in this 
election are not considered in this chapter, since at the time of writing the formation process was still underway. 
94 The Verhofdstadt III government was in office between December 2007 and March 2008 and took office after the 
elections of 2007. However, it was clear from the start that this was an interim government (Sinardet, 2008, p. 
1029). The allocation of (junior) ministers may have followed a different process because of the interim nature of 
this cabinet. To ensure that this does not have an influence on the results of the analyses, this cabinet is excluded 
from the analyses. 
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et al., 2013). Based on these sources a dataset was created with all candidates of the parties 
that entered the government after the elections. 
The dependent variable measures whether a candidate obtained a specific function in 
the period between two elections (i.e. depending on the model, whether the candidate 
became a minister, a junior minister, or both). Thus, for the analysis no distinction is made 
between government members who obtained their position the day the government took 
office, or whether they obtained their position later, for example after a reshuffle of the 
cabinet. 
Four independent variables are included in each model. First, an indicator of the 
electoral performance of the candidate is included. This indicator is calculated by dividing 
the number of preference votes of the candidate by the threshold for an individual 
candidate to be elected on his or her own95. For the Dutch candidates this is 25 per cent of 
the electoral threshold for a political party (i.e. 0.17 per cent of the total votes casted). For 
Belgian candidates this is the number of votes cast for the party of the candidate divided by 
the number of seats won by the party + 1. This variable is set at a maximum of 1 to prevent 
that the results are influenced by a few candidates who passed the threshold with a large 
margin. 
Second, to account for general qualities of the candidate his or her list position (as a 
log(10) transformation) is included in the model. If we do not control for this, we may find 
a positive effect between preference votes and the chances of becoming a minister, while 
actually both are influenced by the list position of the candidate. 
Third, a variable is included which measures whether the candidate performed the 
same function in the previous legislative period (i.e. depending on the model, whether the 
candidate was a minister, junior minister or both in the previous legislative period). 
Fourth, an indicator with the gender of the candidate is included together with an 
interaction effect between the preference vote indicator and gender to test whether there is a 
different effect for male and female candidates. Descriptive statistics for all variables can be 
found in appendix E.2 (for the Netherlands in table e.3 (part IV) and for Belgium in table 
e.4 (part IV)). 
5.4.3 Results 
5.4.3.1 Effects of preference votes on list position in the next election 
In table 5.3 the number of returning candidates in the Dutch elections are shown. In most 
elections around 40 per cent of the candidates who participate in an election can also be 
found on the ballot for the next election. Only in 2002 the percentage of returning 
candidates is much higher: 70 per cent. This does not come as a surprise, since the next 
election was held only eight months later, when the government formed after the election of 
                                                                
95 See also footnote 90 (on page 112) with respect to the different operationalization for the electoral performance 
variable used in this study. 
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2002 fell after being in office for only three months. Therefore, many parties presented 
(almost) identical or only slightly changed lists for the 2003 election. The candidates for 
whom figures are presented in the table are those candidates who were on the ballot in all 
districts at the same position in election t-1. Whether they participated for the same party or 
in all districts at t is not considered here. 
 
Table 5.3 Rank difference and returning candidates (the Netherlands) 
Election Category N % Mean RD SE T-test 
1998 Not running in 2002 146 41.8 0.49 0.89 t(334.5)=0.654 
 Running in 2002 203 58.2 -0.33 0.87  
2002 Not running in 2003 102 29.8 0.22 1.27 t(167.3)=0.131 
 Running in 2003 240 70.2 0.03 0.71  
2003 Not running in 2006 210 57.9 0.71 0.64 t(262.9)=1.213 
 Running in 2006 153 42.1 -0.76 1.03  
2006 Not running in 2010 244 60.2 1.41 0.82 t(365.4)=2.741** 
 Running in 2010 161 39.8 -1.96 0.91  
2010 Not running in 2012 265 53.8 0.46 0.79 t(490.9)=0.866 
 Running in 2012 228 46.2 -0.47 0.74  
2012 Not running in 2017 336 63.2 0.30 0.66 t(446.2)=0.758 
 Running in 2017 196 36.8 -0.47 0.78  
Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001 
Source: Own dataset. Included are all candidates who participated in election t in all districts and at 
the same position in each district, and who run for parties that won at least one seat in the elections 
between 1998-2017. 
 
The table also shows a comparison between the average rank difference of those 
candidates not running again and those who did run again. When looking at the effect of 
rank difference at t-1 on the list position at t, logic dictates that only candidates who 
participate in two subsequent elections can be included. However, if we only look at the 
effect for returning candidates, a part of the effect of the electoral performance might be 
overlooked. The electoral performance at t-1 might also affect which candidates are given a 
place on the list at election t. For example, a candidate who performs very badly in electoral 
term at t-1 might not even be re-selected. Therefore, before considering the effect rank 
difference has on the list position for returning candidates, I first compare the rank 
difference of candidates who did not return with the rank difference of candidates who did 
return. 
Based on the logic of hypothesis 5.2, we expect that candidates with a higher rank 
difference are more likely to be selected for the next election. With the exception of the 2006 
election, comparisons of the rank difference between candidates running again and not 
running again are not significant. However, since these averages are for the entire 
population one might argue that statistical significance is less important. What therefore is 
most striking about the t-test presented in table 5.3 is the direction of the effect. Candidates 
running again on average have a lower rank difference than candidates who did not run 
again. This seems to contradict the expectation, because what this means is that candidates 
who performed better in terms of votes than based on party ranking are less likely to return. 
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If parties would benefit those candidates who perform well in elections, we would have 
expected that this would have been the other way around. 
The comparison is not very thorough subtle, however, and it is therefore difficult to 
draw strong conclusions. For example, it is not considered what the reasons are for (not) 
running again. Some candidates might not have the ambition to run again in the next 
election and in these cases rank difference does not have an influence on the selection 
process within the party96. Furthermore, the results might be influenced by the differences 
between candidates who served as an MP in the legislative terms between the two election 
and those candidates who did not. Therefore table 5.3 is replicated in appendix E.1 (table 
e.1 on page 191), but now includes an additional distinction between incumbent and non-
incumbent candidates at the time of election t97. This table shows that, with the exception of 
2006, incumbents who return on average have higher rank differences than (incumbent) 
candidates who do not return. For most years the same is true for non-incumbents as well; 
they too are more likely to return when there rank difference is higher. These effects are not 
statistically significant, but nevertheless telling, since the averages are based on the entire 
population. The effect is not large, but there seems to be a positive effect of rank difference 
on the chances of reselection. 
Table 5.4 shows the average rank difference for returning and not returning 
candidates in Belgium. In 2003, 2007 and 2010 respectively 32, 44 and 21 per cent of the 
effective candidates at t-1 were also on the ballot in the elections at t. Contrary to the 
Netherlands, in all three years the ranking difference of returning candidates is higher than 
it is for non-returning candidates. In two of these years the difference is also statistically 
significant. There is a difference between incumbents and non-incumbents, however, as can 
be seen in appendix E.1 (table e.2, on page 192). Incumbent candidates who return have a 
lower rank difference than incumbent candidates who do not return. For non-incumbent 
candidates this is the other way around: if they have a higher rank difference they are more 
likely to return on the ballot in the next election. Rank difference in Belgium thus seems to 
be of less importance for members of parliament than it is for candidates who were not an 
MP between two subsequent elections. 
Table 5.5 shows the results of the multilevel regression models testing the influence 
of rank difference at t-1 on the list position at t for the Netherlands. In the most basic model 
(model 1), which only controls for the list position at t-1, the electoral performance of a 
candidate has no statistical significant influence on the list position in the next election. List 
position t-1 is highly significant and with a regression coefficient of almost one it is an 
important predictor of list position at t. Returning candidates normally run at a position at t
                                                                
96 This does not hold if a relatively bad electoral performance would be the reason for a candidate not to run again. 
But even then it is a personal decision and in this chapter we are interested in if and how the party considers 
electoral performance in the selection process. 
97 This does not necessarily mean that the candidate was elected at t-1. The incumbent candidate may have entered 
parliament at a later time, as a replacement for another MP. 
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Table 5.4 Rank difference and returning candidates (Belgium) 
Year Category N % Mean RD SE T-test 
2003 Not running in 2007 740 67.9 -0.36 0.20 t(774.5)=-3.671*** 
 Running in 2007 350 32.1 0.80 0.25  
2007 Not running in 2010 613 56.2 -0.31 0.20 t(990.0)=-2.334** 
 Running in 2010 477 43.8 0.42 0.24  
2010 Not running in 2014 960 78.7 -0.09 0.16 t(459.6)=-1.455 
 Running in 2014 259 21.3 0.37 0.27  
Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001 
Source: Own dataset. Included are all effective candidates of parties that won at least one seat in the 
elections between 2003-2014. 
 
similar to the one at which they ran at t-1. In the second model the influence of political 
functions in the previous period is shown as well. Serving as a minister, junior minister or 
being an incumbent leads to a position more towards the top of the list in the next election 
if the candidate runs again, although the effect of being a junior minister is not significant. 
The third model also includes the gender of a candidate, together with an interaction 
between gender and rank difference. Although women are placed relatively more towards 
the bottom of the list, for them rank difference at t-1 has a significant influence on their list 
position at t. Women who are ranked higher by voters than by the party at t-1 are rewarded 
with a list position more towards the top of the list at t. For example, all other things being 
equal, women around position 40 at t-1 need a rank difference of three to move up one 
position. This required rank difference to move up one position increases if the candidate 
already had a better position at t-1. Women around position 25 at t-1, for example, need a 
rank difference of 5 to move up one position. For women in the top 10 at t-1, a positive 
rank difference alone is not sufficient to gain a better list position at t. The interaction effect 
is also graphically shown in figure 5.4. The figure shows the effect of rank difference for men 
and women, when all other variables stay at their mean or mode value. What is visible is 
that for men rank difference does not influence the list position, but for women there is 
quite a substantial range of list positions at t possible based on the electoral performance at 
t-198. 
The fourth model also tests whether there is an interaction between rank difference 
and the election of 2003. Since this election was held so closely after the previous election, 
and many parties presented a list similar to the list in 2002, this possibly reduces the effects 
that are presented in the other models. However, the interaction effect is not significant and 
the other effects do not change after the inclusion of the interaction effect. All models have 
random intercepts for each election and each party. However, they have almost no variance. 
                                                                
98 The candidate selection process in the Netherlands has changed drastically at the beginning of the 21st century for 
some major parties. The elections of 2002 can be seen as a turning point: since then most parties give their 
members more influence on the selection process (Voerman, 2014). Since the first election included in the analysis 
is the election of 2002 (with the rank difference of 1998), the entire period of analysis is after this turning point. 
However, it might be that it took some time for the changes to have an effect. Therefore, the analysis was also 
conducted based on the elections since 2006. This had no effect on the results. 
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Table 5.5 Effect of preference votes on list position next election (the Netherlands) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
(Constant) 0.104*** 0.182*** 0.182*** 0.182*** 
 (0.027) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Rank difference t-1 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
List position t-1 0.852*** 0.826*** 0.826*** 0.826*** 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) 
Member of parliament  -0.070*** -0.071*** -0.071*** 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Minister  -0.144* -0.143* -0.142* 
  (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
Junior Minister  -0.062 -0.060 -0.054 
  (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
Woman   0.004 0.004 
   (0.017) (0.017) 
Rank difference t-1 * woman   -0.004* -0.004* 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
Rank difference t-1 * 2003    0.001 
    (0.002) 
AIC 81.0 67.4 65.2 66.8 
BIC 110.6 111.9 119.6 126.1 
Log likelihood -34.5 -24.7 -21.6 -21.4 
Observations 1040 1040 1040 1040 
Groups(Parties) 11 11 11 11 
Groups(Elections) 6 6 6 6 
Variance: Party (intercept) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Variance: Election (intercept) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: Own dataset. Included are all candidates who run at two subsequent elections (t-1 and t) for 
the same party and in both elections run in all districts and at the same position in each district. In 
addition, list-pullers at t-1 are excluded from the analysis. 
 
Figure 5.4 Effect of rank difference t0 at list position t+1 (the Netherlands) 
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Table 5.6 Effect of preference votes on list position next election (Belgium) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
(Constant) 0.167*** 0.287*** 0.274*** 
 (0.030) (0.041) (0.042) 
Rank difference t-1 -0.013*** -0.010*** -0.014*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
List position t-1 0.674*** 0.548*** 0.548*** 
 (0.028) (0.035) (0.035) 
Member of parliament  -0.148*** -0.142*** 
  (0.029) (0.029) 
Minister  -0.242*** -0.235** 
  (0.072) (0.072) 
Junior Minister  -0.187 0.160 
  (0.120) (0.120) 
Woman   0.020 
   (0.021) 
Rank difference t-1 * woman   0.011* 
   (0.005) 
AIC 530.4 507.2 505.0 
BIC 564.3 555.6 563.0 
Log likelihood -258.2 -243.6 -240.5 
Observations 931 931 931 
Groups(Parties) 18 18 18 
Groups(Districts) 12 12 12 
Groups(Elections) 3 3 3 
Variance: Party (intercept) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Variance: District (intercept) 0.004 0.007 0.007 
Variance: Election (intercept) 0.000 0.001 0.001 
Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: Own dataset. Included are all effective candidates at t who also ran as an effective candidate in 
the same district and for the same party in the previous election (t-1). 
 
Figure 5.5 Effect of rank difference t at list position t+1 (Belgium) 
122 
The consequences: what’s in it for a candidate? 
Consequences for the political career of a candidate 
 
 
The multilevel regression models for Belgium are shown in table 5.6. The first model 
shows a negative and significant influence of rank difference. For Belgium candidates' rank 
difference thus matters if we only control for list position. Candidates who return at the 
next election can expect a list position similar to the list position they held in the previous 
election, but candidates who performed better in the previous election move up some 
places. As is the case in the Netherlands, the political functions performed in the legislative 
term between the two elections all lead to a list position more towards the top of the list in 
the next election. The effect for junior ministers was not significant (see model 2). Model 3 
also includes the gender interaction, for which the results are graphically shown in figure 
5.5. What is clear from this figure is that the effect gender has in Belgium is the opposite of 
the effect it has in the Netherlands. In Belgium the effect is much stronger for male 
candidates than it is for female candidates99.  
In both countries the electoral performance at t-1 measured as the rank difference 
thus has an influence on the list positions of candidates at t100. However, the effect is much 
stronger in Belgium and whereas the effect mainly applies to female candidates in the 
Netherlands, in Belgium it mainly applies to male candidates. In the conclusion I will reflect 
upon these differences. 
                                                                
99 In addition, a model was ran with an interaction term between gender, incumbency and rank difference as well. 
The general conclusion presented based on the models presented in the text did not change, although the results of 
this three-way interaction showed that the effect for male candidates is mostly caused by candidates who were not a 
member of parliament before election t. For women there was no difference between incumbents and non-
incumbents. The same interaction was also ran for the Dutch case, but the results did not change with the inclusion 
of this interaction. 
100 The length of list of candidates varies between parties and districts in Belgium, which could potentially influence 
the results. Therefore, another operationalization for the variables list position and rank difference was used in 
additional checks. In the analysis presented here absolute numbers were used for rank difference and a logarithmic 
transformation for list position. The length of a party list does not only have a direct influence on the variable list 
position, but also on the rank difference. For larger parties the (theoretical) range of rank difference is larger. 
Therefore the analysis was also conducted where list positions were transformed in a way that the first candidate on 
the list was at position 0 and the last candidate on the list at position 1. In this way for each candidate the list 
position was a measurement of the relative position on that list. For rank difference the same was done: the relative 
position on the list was compared to the relative position in the order based on the number of preference votes 
received. This decreased the range difference between political parties. When these variables were used, results did 
not change. Another option to deal with the variation in the length of party lists is to use a relative position, in 
which not the last candidate on the list is assigned position 1, but the last elected candidate. This however creates a 
different problem, since the variation between elected candidates and non-elected candidates varies considerably 
from party to party as well. For a party with 30 candidates and 2 elected members, the position of the number 30 
on the list would be transformed to 15. For a party with 60 candidates and 30 elected members, the position of the 
number 60 on the list would be transformed to 2. This would not solve the problem that lists are hard to compare. 
Since the first solution did not have an effect on the results, and the second one has other problems, the 
logarithmic transformation of list position and the absolute rank difference are used, because they have the 
advantage of having a slightly more intuitive interpretation compared to the relative list positions described above. 
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5.4.3.2 Effects of preference votes on chances of becoming (junior) minister 
Hypothesis 5.5 states that candidates who receive more preference votes have a higher 
chance of obtaining a government post if their party enters government. Table 5.7 and table 
5.8 show for both the Netherlands and Belgium respectively three logistic multilevel 
regression models predicting the chances of a candidate to become a minister, junior 
minister or both in the legislative period after the elections. These models control for list 
position, gender and whether the candidate performed the same function in the previous 
legislative period. In addition an interaction effect between preference votes and gender is 
included. 
In the Netherlands there is no significant effect of preference votes on the chances of 
obtaining a government post (see table 5.7). Both for male and female candidates the 
chances of becoming a minister or junior minister do not significantly change when the 
candidate receives more preference votes. For junior ministers there is even a negative 
effect, although in substantive terms there is no effect. List position and performing the 
same function in the previous period are far better predictors of the chances of obtaining a 
government post for Dutch candidates. Candidates more towards the top of the list have a 
higher probability of becoming minister or junior minister and candidates who performed 
the same function in the previous legislative period have a higher chance as well. The fact 
that candidates near the top of the list have a higher chance is not surprising: a party puts 
their political heavyweights near the top of the list. 
In Belgium the effects are different. Preference votes have a significant influence in 
all three models. For incumbent ministers there is a relatively strong positive effect of 
preference votes on the chances of obtaining a government post, but there is a positive effect 
for junior ministers as well. Research in the Dutch context has shown that when ministers 
are appointed they have relatively more political experience, while junior ministers have 
relatively more technical experience (Elfferich, 2017). Such a difference could explain why 
the effect is stronger for ministers than it is for junior ministers. These effects remain when 
we control for list position (as a measure of the general qualities of the candidate101) and 
whether the candidate performed the same function in the previous legislative term (which 
also has a positive effect, but this effect is not as strong as it is in the Netherlands). The 
gender effect is different in Belgium as well. For female candidates the effect of preference 
votes on the chance of becoming a minister is larger than it is for male candidates. For 
female candidates who reach the individual threshold the chance of becoming a minister is 
30 per cent, while for male candidates it is 15 per cent. For junior ministers the effect is the 
other way around, but the difference is smaller. Male candidates who reach the individual 
threshold have a 10 per cent chance of becoming a junior minister; for female candidates 
this chance is 5 per cent. 
                                                                
101 Given the districts in Belgium, this indicator is mostly a measure of the qualities of a candidate within a district / 
party and only to a lesser extent a general measure of the qualities of a candidate (within a party), particularly 
compared to the Netherlands. However, it remains a workable proxy for the qualities of a candidate. 
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Table 5.7 Effects of preference votes on entering government (the Netherlands) 
 Minister Junior minister Government 
(Constant) 0.895 1.203 2.483* 
 (1.024) (1.003) (0.999) 
Preference votes 0.084 -1.146 -0.685 
 (0.820) (0.867) (0.708) 
List position -3.693*** -3.510*** -4.770*** 
 (0.772) (0.776) (0.708) 
Woman -1.442 -1.040 -1.063 
 (1.025) (0.681) (0.617) 
Same function t-1 1.600** 2.117*** 1.384*** 
 (0.505) (0.454) (0.398) 
Preference votes * woman 1.254 1.257 0.829 
 (1.273) (1.031) (0.967) 
AIC 205.5 258.9 313.4 
BIC 244.0 297.5 351.9 
Log likelihood -94.7 -121.5 -148.7 
Observations 915 915 915 
Groups(Parties) 6 6 6 
Groups(Elections) 6 6 6 
Variance: Party (intercept) 0.000 0.134 1.305 
Variance: Election (intercept) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: Own dataset. Included are all candidates who participated in all districts, at the same position 
in each district and who come from the parties that entered government after the election. In addition, 
list-pullers at t-1 are excluded from the analysis. 
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Table 5.8 Effects of preference votes on entering government (Belgium) 
 Minister Junior minister Government 
(Constant) -6.951*** -6.410*** -6.650*** 
 (1.252) (1.130) (0.965) 
Preference votes 5.896*** 3.996*** 5.839*** 
 (1.287) (1.130) (0.984) 
List position -0.893 0.148 -0.343 
 (0.610) (0.690) (0.480) 
Woman -0.145 0.502 0.340 
 (1.449) (1.005) (1.012) 
Same function t-1 1.566*** 1.259 1.335** 
 (0.433) (0.860) (0.426) 
Preference votes * woman 0.970 -1.413 0.222 
 (1.693) (1.615) (1.248) 
AIC 252.7 208.1 327.3 
BIC 301.3 256.7 375.9 
Log likelihood -117.3 -95.1 -154.6 
Observations 1639 1639 1639 
Groups(Districts) 13 13 13 
Groups(Parties) 9 9 9 
Groups(Elections) 4 4 4 
Variance: District (intercept) 0.053 0.000 0.000 
Variance: Party (intercept) 0.000 0.116 0.011 
Variance: Election (intercept) 0.124 0.000 0.070 
Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: Own dataset. Included are all effective candidates of parties that entered government after the 
election. 
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5.5 Discussion and conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to explore whether preference votes have an influence on the 
political career and parliamentary behaviour of candidates. These votes influence which 
candidates are elected (although as shown in section 5.2 the effects are limit both in Belgium 
and the Netherlands), but are there other consequences? 
First, I looked at whether preference votes influence the parliamentary behaviour of 
elected candidates. The results suggest that preference votes do not have an influence on the 
ideological positions MPs in Belgium and the Netherlands take either in speeches made in 
parliament or in the written questions they submit to ministers. This fits the observation of 
Bäck and Debus (2016) for the German Bundestag that directly elected MPs did not deviate 
more from the party line than MPs elected on a party list. I will reflect further on this 
finding in the concluding chapter of this book, thereby also taking into account the causal 
link between preference voting and an MP's position. Based on the textual data collected for 
the analysis presented in this chapter, it would be possible to investigate other factors which 
did not receive attention in this dissertation. For example, further research could focus on 
whether MP’s actually refer to regions in their speeches. It seems plausible to expect that in 
district systems MP’s would refer to their own region more often. However, as we saw in 
chapter 4, also in the Netherlands candidates receive relatively more votes in their own 
district. Therefore, it might be that also in systems where the election result is determined 
by the national vote, candidates still refer to their own region. Further research, based on 
text analysis, could look to more detail at the speeches of MP’s to see whether those with 
higher number of preference votes behave differently than those with lower number of 
preference votes. For example, do candidates with a strong local support refer more to their 
own region, or do female candidates who received a lot of votes more often refer to gender-
equality? While the analysis presented in this chapter showed that preference votes do not 
affect whether candidates deviate more from the party line, it might be that preference votes 
affect candidates in a more specific way, which is not actually captured by a general 
ideological position. 
I also looked at whether preference votes have an influence on the political career of 
a candidate. The influence of preference votes on the ministerial career differs in Belgium 
and the Netherlands. In Belgium an effect of preference votes on the selection of ministers 
was found. In the Netherlands such an effect does not exist. Since all sorts of constraints 
exist (Dowding & Dumont, 2009) which complicate the allocation process of ministers this 
might not come as a surprise. This raises the questions how the effect in Belgium can be 
explained. It might be that the fact that in Belgium it is unusual to recruit a (junior) mister 
from outside parliament (Deschouwer, 2009, p. 145), can explain the result. While in the 
Netherlands most ministers are also recruited from parliament, there are more ministers 
recruited from outside the parliament. This stronger link between parliament and 
recruitment in Belgium might explain a stronger effect of preference votes. If the electoral 
The consequences: what’s in it for a candidate? 
Discussion and conclusion 
127 
 
success of candidates indeed influences the recruitment of ministers, this could strengthen 
the chain of delegation (Strøm, 2000). 
However, a limitation to the analysis is that it might also be that there is a simpler 
explanation and that the effect is not so much an effect of preference votes at all. Political 
parties normally place their top candidates towards the top of the list, and these candidates 
also receive most preference votes (partly because of an pure position effect (see for example 
Van Erkel & Thijssen, 2016)). Since Belgium has 11 districts, there are thus more candidates 
with a high list position. Belgian parties, when recruiting ministers, also strive to achieve a 
regional balance: ministers should be recruited evenly from these districts (Deschouwer, 
2009, p. 143). It is likely that parties choose their top candidates for ministerial posts. 
Therefore, the selected (junior) ministers may all be candidates who had a list position 
towards the top of the list (at least with less variation than the list positions of Dutch 
ministers). In this case, preference votes might show up as highly significant in the Belgian 
models, but these effects might in reality be of less importance.  
The strongest effects of preference votes can be found on the list position for the next 
elections. Both in the Netherlands and in Belgium there is an effect of preference votes on 
the list position of a candidate for the next election. Candidates who perform better in 
terms of votes than in terms of the list-position assigned by the party move up the list for 
the next election. For Belgium André et al. (2017) already found that preference votes 
influenced a candidate’s list position for the next election. They also found that the same 
effect can be found in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Thus, the effect of preference vote 
on list-position for the next election is demonstrated in two flexible list systems which have 
districts (Belgium and the Czech Republic) and two flexible list systems with a single 
nationwide constituency (the Netherlands and Slovakia). The same mechanism might also 
be present in other countries using flexible list systems. In other types of list systems it is less 
likely that we find this pattern. By definition, in closed list systems no such effect is possible, 
since voters do not have the option to cast a candidate vote. However, in open list system it 
is also unlikely that there will be a similar effect, since in an open system the voters directly 
determine the ranking of candidates. In addition, parties do not always provide a ranking 
themselves. For example in Finland, most parties rank candidates in alphabetical order (von 
Schoultz, 2017, p. 609). In such instances looking at ranking difference does not make sense. 
Therefore, in these systems it makes more sense to look at how the number of preference 
votes influence whether candidates are running again in the next election. 
Turning back to the Netherlands and Belgium, an important distinction has to be 
made about the candidates to which the effect applies in both countries. In the Netherlands 
the effect only exists for female candidates. If they perform better than might be expected 
based on their list position, they can expect a better list position in the next election. For 
male candidates this effect is not present. In Belgium, it is the other way around. For male 
candidates there is a much stronger effect of the electoral performance on the list position 
for the next election than there is for female candidates. 
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How could these differences be explained? The fact that in the Netherlands the effect 
for female candidates is stronger might be a result of how male and female candidates are 
distributed on the list. Since in most parties more male candidates can be found near the 
top of the list, it might be that for women it is easier to benefit from a good electoral 
performance: since they are in lower positions to begin with, there is more room for 
improvement. This conclusion is supported by the fact that for female candidates towards 
the top of the list the electoral performance alone does not suffice to move up one position 
on the list for the next election. At the same time it might be a result of the fact that because 
most parties have fewer female candidates on their list, they promote women who perform 
well to better list positions. This could either be to reward those women for their good 
electoral performance or to have more influence over which candidates are elected in the 
next election. Having candidates who are able to be elected out of list order on lower 
positions, might disturb the balance between the candidates a party puts on eligible 
positions. Therefore, a party might choose to put these electorally successful candidates 
towards the top of the list. If the party still tries to keep a balanced list, it might help to end 
up with a balanced parliamentary group as well. The results for Belgium are more difficult 
to explain. Based on the gender rules, which stipulate that lists in Belgium contain an equal 
number of male and female candidates, one would expect the effects to be smaller, since 
parties have relatively limited options to change the balance between male and female 
candidates. However, many parties have relatively more male candidates on the first half of 
their list than on the lower half, which would suggest that there is still more room for female 
candidates to improve their position than there is for male candidates. If indeed the effect in 
Belgium is less strong because of the gender-quota, this would not be the first negative effect 
of quota’s on women’s success. Research has shown that quota to ensure female 
representation in different contexts have a negative influence on the electoral success of 
female candidates (Górecki & Kukołowicz, 2014; Miguel, 2008). I argued there are different 
mechanisms which could explain differences between male and female candidates. Based on 
the results it is difficult to state which explanation works best. We do know for which 
candidates the effect is stronger, but we do not know what drives this mechanism. Future 
research should focus on this mechanism.  
Although it is not yet entirely clear how the mechanism exactly works, the results 
show that preference votes might be important for some candidates, depending on country 
and gender, to increase their chances of being elected, however, indirectly. If a candidate on 
a non-electable list position fails to cross the threshold but still performs relatively well in 
terms of preference votes, he or she might be moved up the list for the next election, thereby 
increasing his or her chances of becoming an MP after that election. These findings have 
important implications for the literature on candidate selection methods as well. Traditional 
studies on candidate selection mainly focus on individual characteristics of candidates to 
explain the process of candidate selection. The results in this chapter show that adding the 
electoral performance of re-running candidates to models which explain the process is 
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important, in order to get a better understanding of the selection process. But is also relates 
to a highly salient discussion surrounding candidate selection: the democratization of 
candidate selection processes (Pennings & Hazan, 2001). In times of weakening bonds 
between parties and voters, the democratization of candidate selection is one of the methods 
parties try to use to strengthen the link with their members and/or voters. Democratization 
of the selection process occurs when the selectorate (i.e. those who may select the 
candidates) becomes more inclusive (i.e. an increase in the number of individuals who have 
a say in the selection process) (Hazan & Rahat, 2010, p. 54). The findings in this chapter 
relate to this democratization process. If the selectorate indeed takes the electoral 
performance of candidates into account, this can also be seen as an (indirect) form of 
democratization since voters of the party influence the candidate selection. Therefore these 
findings also have implications for the literature on the democratization of parties. 
  
 
6 Conclusion 
6.1 Main findings of the study 
The main research question of this study is what the causes and consequences of preference 
votes are. In order to fully understand the phenomenon of preference voting I argued that it 
is important to look at all factors influencing preference voting and at what the effects of 
preference votes are. The three factors influencing preference voting are the institutional 
rules, the voters casting a preference voting and the candidates receiving and sometimes 
actively campaigning for preference votes. I argue that these three factors together affect the 
preference votes in a political system. Preference votes in turn could have consequences on 
other factors (see figure 6.1). Table 6.1 provides an overview of the hypotheses tested in this 
book. In this section I will discuss the most important findings, both in terms of these 
individual aspects of preference voting and their relation. 
 
Figure 6.1 The causes and consequences of preference voting 
 
 
6.1.1 A negative preference vote? 
The first notable finding is the fact that, contrary to what was expected, the results of the 
experiment presented in chapter 2 strongly suggest that the introduction of a list vote would 
affect list-pullers and other candidates than list-pullers in the same way. The expectation 
was that the introduction of a list vote would only have an effect on votes for the list-puller 
(H2.1), but not for the other candidates (H2.2). However, what the experiment showed was 
that voters casting a vote for another candidate would also switch to a list vote if that option 
would become available. 
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Table 6.1. Overview of the findings of this study   
Hypothesis BEL NET 
2.1 Voters who do not have the option to cast a list vote are more likely to 
vote for the list-puller than voters who do have the option to cast a list 
vote. 
+ + 
2.2 Voters who do not have the option to cast a list vote are not more 
likely to vote for other candidates than voters who do have the option 
to cast a list vote. 
- - 
2.3 Voters who can cast multiple preference votes are more likely to vote 
for other candidates than voters who can only cast a single preference 
vote. 
+ - 
2.4 Voters who can cast multiple preference votes are not more likely to 
vote for the list-puller than voters who can only cast a single 
preference vote. 
- + 
3.1 If a voter has more resources available he or she is more likely to cast a 
preference vote than a voter with fewer resources. 
M M 
3.2 A voter belonging to an underrepresented social group in parliament 
will be more likely to cast a preference vote than a voter from a social 
group that is overrepresented in parliament. 
M M 
3.3 Voters who feel closer to a particular (group of) candidate(s) are more 
likely to cast a preference vote than voters who do not feel close to a 
particular (group of) candidate(s). 
+ M 
3.4 If a voter, prior to the elections, gives lower evaluations to the first 
candidate (list-puller) on the list, he or she is more likely to cast a vote 
for another candidate, i.e. a preference vote. 
~ + 
3.5 Hypothesis 3.4 holds only if the electoral system forces a voter to vote 
for a candidate, and not if the electoral system allows the voter to cast 
a list vote. 
+ 
4.1 If a candidate belongs to a traditionally underrepresented social group 
in parliament he or she will receive more preference votes, than a 
candidate who belongs to a social group that is traditionally 
overrepresented in parliament. 
+ + 
4.2 The effect described in hypothesis 4.1 is stronger for the first candidate 
of a specific group, than it is for other candidates belonging to that 
group. 
- M 
4.3 Dutch candidates receive relatively more votes in their own district 
(kieskring) than they receive in other districts. 
 + 
4.4 The more a candidate is positioned towards the top of the list, the 
more preference votes he or she will receive. 
+ + 
4.5 The last candidate on the list (the list-pusher) attracts more votes than 
might be expected based on the low list position he or she occupies. 
+ + 
4.6 Candidates with more political experience receive more preference 
votes than candidates with less political experience. 
+ + 
4.7 Candidates who deviate more from the party line will receive more 
preference votes than candidates who deviate less from the party line. 
~ ~ 
4.8 The more the candidate has a position towards the end on the list, the 
stronger the effect of deviating from the party line (hypothesis 4.7). 
~ ~ 
4.9 Deviating from the party line has a stronger effect on preference votes 
when it is done through submitting questions, than it has during 
speeches in plenary sessions of parliament. 
~ ~ 
4.10 Candidates from traditional parties are more likely to receive 
preference votes than candidates from newer parties. 
+ ~ 
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Table 6.1. Overview of the findings of this study   
Hypothesis BEL NET 
4.11 Candidates from populist parties are less likely to receive preference 
votes than candidates from other parties. 
~ ~ 
4.12 Candidates from right-wing parties are more likely to receive 
preference votes than candidates from left-wing parties. 
~ - 
4.13 In the Netherlands, candidates of parties with less popular list-pullers 
receive more preference votes than candidates of parties with more 
popular list-pullers. 
 + 
5.1 Candidates who receive more preference votes are more likely to 
deviate from the parliamentary party group line. 
~ ~ 
5.2 Candidates who receive more preference votes have a better chance of 
getting a higher place on the list in the next elections. 
+ ~ 
5.3 The effect of preference votes on the list position in the next election is 
stronger for male candidates than for female candidates. 
+ - 
5.4 The effect of preference votes on the list position in the next election is 
stronger for female candidates than for male candidates. 
- + 
5.5 Candidates who receive more preference votes have a higher chance of 
obtaining a post in the government installed after the elections (if their 
party participates in the governmental coalition). 
+ ~ 
Note: + expectation met; - effect in other direction that expected; M mixed effect; ~ no effect. 
 
This issue was further examined when looking at the motivations for voters to cast a 
preference vote. I explored whether there are negative reasons for casting a preference vote, 
which also could explain the results of the experiment. I analysed motivations of voters for 
casting a preference vote and looked at whether voters mentioned a negative evaluation of 
the list-puller as a reason to cast a preference vote. I expected that in the Netherlands, where 
a list vote is absent, such motivations could be found, but that for Belgium, where voters 
have an option to cast a list vote, such motivations would be absent (H3.4 and H3.5). The 
expectation was supported by the results. In the Netherlands approximately 7 per cent of 
voters who cast a preference vote, mentioned that they did not want to vote for the list-
puller and therefore voted for another candidate. In most of these motivations, a reason for 
preferring the specific other candidate was missing. Thus, a substantial part of preference 
votes cast in the Dutch context might be seen as ‘negatively motivated preference votes’. 
This type of preference votes was absent in Belgium, where almost none of the voters 
mentioned the list-puller in their motivation for their vote for another candidate. While 
multiple differences exist between (the electoral systems of) Belgium and the Netherlands, I 
argue that the most likely cause of the absence of the 'negatively motivated preference vote' 
in Belgium is the fact that Belgian voters have the option to cast a list vote. In the 
Netherlands, if a voter has no positive preference for a specific candidate, but also does not 
want to vote for the list-puller, he or she has no other option than to vote for another 
candidate. In Belgium, such a voter could cast a list vote. 
6.1.2 No role for ideology 
The second notable finding is that there does not seem to be a relation between preference 
134 
Conclusion 
Main findings of the study 
 
 
votes and the policy position of a candidate. Amongst other things, the relationship between 
the ideological position and preference votes of candidates was explored in chapter 4 and 5. 
In chapter 4 I looked at whether candidates who took an ideological position more towards 
the extremes within their party are more likely to receive preference votes. The expectation 
was that candidates who deviate more from the party line, especially if they are more 
towards the end of the list, would receive more preference votes (H4.7 and H4.8). When 
voters distinguish between candidates from the same party, it might be that they take the 
policy positions of candidates into consideration. The results show that the ideology of 
candidates did not matter for their electoral success. In chapter five I explored whether the 
effect between ideology and preference votes might be the other way around: that 
candidates start deviating more from the party line after they received relatively more 
preference votes. This relationship also does not exist. There seems to be no causal link in 
either direction. Since the causal link was studied in both directions, and theory suggests 
that the causal link is possible in both directions, the link was further explored in appendix 
E.3. The relationship was tested again in both directions, based on a first-event analysis. The 
results presented in this appendix did not lead to any revisions of conclusions of both 
chapters. When it comes to intraparty preference voting ideology seems to have no 
influence on either the voter or the candidate. 
6.1.3 Limited consequences of preference votes 
The third notable finding relates to the consequences of preference voting. First of all, I 
show that the consequences of preference voting are limited. In Belgium and the 
Netherlands there are not that many candidates who are elected out of list order. Most 
candidates do not even receive enough votes to be elected based on preference votes. Yes, in 
theory both systems have flexible list systems, but in practice it still are to a great extent the 
parties who decide which candidates become an MP after the elections. 
Preference votes also do not seem to matter that much for the legislative behaviour 
of candidates, neither in Belgium nor in the Netherlands. In addition, in the Netherlands 
there also seems to be no effect of preference voting on the allocation of ministers and 
junior ministers. In Belgium this effect exists. However, as I argued before, the question 
remains how large this influence actually is. There is one area in which preference votes 
seem to matter: namely when it comes to candidate selection (H5.2, H5.3 and H5.4). 
However, the effect manifests itself in different ways in the Netherlands and Belgium. 
Previous research already showed that in Belgium those candidates who receive more 
preference votes receive a better list position in the subsequent election (André, Depauw, 
Shugart, et al., 2017). However, I argued that it might be important to look at the 
differences between male and female candidates when it comes to this effect. And if gender 
is taken into account, the interpretation of the findings changes. In Belgium, the effect of 
preference votes on the list position of a candidate in the next election only exists for male 
candidates. In the Netherlands, at first preference votes do not seem to have an effect on the 
Conclusion 
Implications 
135 
 
list position of a candidate for the next election. However, if gender is taken into account, 
the results show that in the Netherlands there is an effect, but contrary to Belgium, the effect 
applies to female candidates. This is an important contribution to the literature of candidate 
selection and something that should be taken into account when studying the way selectors 
draft the list of candidates. 
6.2 Implications 
One of the findings of this study is that the absence of a list vote can lead to negatively 
motivated preference votes. This has two important implications, one for research on 
preference voting and one more practical implication for the Dutch electoral system. 
So far, the literature with regard to the Dutch case assumes that votes for a list-puller 
are predominantly a party vote or a preference vote for the list-puller. Votes for other 
candidates on the list are seen as a pure preference vote (see for example Van Holsteyn & 
Andeweg, 2010). The findings presented in this book challenge this distinction. They show 
that votes for another candidate should sometimes be considered to be more of a party vote 
than a preference vote for that candidate. Some voters who cast a vote for another candidate 
may switch to a list vote, if that option is available. For research on preference voting in 
general, but specifically for the Dutch case, this adds to the complexity of the phenomenon 
of personalization. Future research should take this into account. 
Of course, it is not possible to know exactly what a voter has in mind when casting a 
vote. A whole set of motivations may be related to one act; i.e. indicating a preference for 
one specific party or candidate. However, it seems that if voters have the option to cast a list 
vote it contributes to a better interpretation of the motivations of voters, based on the 
results presented in this study. 
In 2016 the Tweede Kamer in the Netherlands voted against a law that would have 
allowed an experiment for a new ballot design. However, after the elections of 2017 the 
Kiesraad (Electoral Council) again pleaded for a re-evaluation of the ballot in an evaluation 
of the elections, after various problems as a result of the size of the ballot occurred 
(Kiesraad, 2017b). In the original proposal, different options for a new design of the voting 
ballot were proposed. All contained a process of two steps: first choosing a party and 
subsequently voting for a candidate. This was not intended as an introduction of a list vote, 
but if a new government would indeed take a new ballot design into consideration, an 
electoral reform in terms of the introduction of a list vote could also be considered. After all, 
such a ballot implies that the party is more important than the candidate, since that would 
be the first step in the voting process under such a ballot design. Why not allow the voter to 
only cast a vote for the party then? Introducing a list vote would increase the options of 
Dutch voters and therefore result in election results that are more in line with the intentions 
of voters. At least the difference between the pure party voters and the pure candidate voters 
would be much clearer in such a system. Such a system was proposed once in the 
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Netherlands, by the Dutch Electoral System Civic Forum. However, the government did not 
implement the suggested changes (Fournier et al., 2011, pp. 8–9). Recently, the proposed 
changes by the Civic Forum have been echoed by a State Commission (Staatscommissie 
parlementair stelsel, 2018). 
Another implication relates to the importance of preference votes. Comments with 
regard to preference voting in the Netherlands sometimes relate to the surprising number of 
preference votes for candidates who do not actually need them, since these candidates have 
a high enough list position to be elected based on the success of the party. In the elections 
between 1998 and 2017 only 17 per cent of all preference votes are cast for candidates who 
are not elected and this percentage is even lower when looking at candidates from parties 
who won seats (15 per cent). In Belgium this percentage is much higher. Non-elected 
candidates together receive approximately 60% of the preference votes. In addition, in the 
Netherlands only a few candidates are elected out of list order. Based purely on which 
candidates are elected, preference votes thus have a limited influence, both in Belgium and 
the Netherlands. It should be noticed, however, that in the Netherlands there seems to be a 
development in how voters deal with this issue. In the most recent parliamentary election, 
for example, the website www.stemopeenvrouw.nl (voteforawoman) advised voters not to 
vote for the first female candidate on the list, who normally is elected regardless of 
preference votes. Instead, the website gave some strategic options to try and get more female 
candidates elected. It is hard to say whether this actually had an effect, the first woman on 
the list still received much more votes than other women on the list. However, a record of 4 
candidates got elected out of list order, three of whom are female candidates. 
Apart from that, the analyses in chapter 5 show that it is not necessarily the case that 
all these votes for candidates who would have been elected anyway are ‘wasted’, since 
preference votes may also have other effects. For female candidates in the Netherlands in 
particular, a larger number of preference votes helps them to get a better list position in the 
next election. Still, this effect does not hold for candidates more towards the top of the list, 
so the influence stays limited in that respect. In Belgium a good electoral performance also 
helps candidates in their political career, although the effect applies to male candidates 
there. Preference votes thus have an influence beyond which candidates are elected or not, 
which is not only an important finding in itself, but also underlines the relevance of research 
on preference voting. 
6.3 The value of preference votes 
All findings and implications discussed above lead to two important questions. First, what 
do these findings mean for the academic literature on personalization? And second, what 
are the advantages of preference votes for representative democracy? 
The findings presented in this study do not show overwhelming support for the 
personalization thesis. Yes, both in the Netherlands and Belgium the use of preference votes 
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has increased over the last decades, but the influence of political parties remains strong. We 
see that parties still control to a very large extent which candidates are elected. List position 
still has the largest influence on whether a candidate gets elected or not. Thus it is more 
important for a candidate to be popular with the selectorate of the party, than to be popular 
with voters. This is partly because of the electoral rules. Both in Belgium and the 
Netherlands the threshold for winning a seat without the support of the party are relatively 
high. In addition, the rules also benefit the higher placed candidates. On the other hand, 
this is also because of the way voters use the electoral rules. At least in theory, it is possible 
that more candidates are elected out of list order. However, voters tend to vote mostly for 
those candidates who are elected anyway. On top of that, not all of these preference votes 
seem to be real personal votes. Sometimes they are cast for negative reasons, especially in a 
system where no party vote exists. Sometimes they are cast simply for the first person on the 
list with a certain characteristic. For example, the first woman on the list in the Netherlands 
can count on a considerable number of votes. Such votes are not necessarily personal: they 
have more to do with a specific characteristic of that candidate, but if a different female 
candidate occupied that position, she would have been the one obtaining all those votes. 
This does not mean that such a vote is not important. It most likely shows that a part of the 
electorate is in favour of female representation, but it is not so much a sign of personalized 
politics. Both the electoral rules and the voters themselves therefore still give political parties 
a large influence on which candidates end up in parliament. 
Increasing levels of preference votes therefore do not necessary mean that politics 
become more personalized. Therefore, preference votes alone should not be used as an 
indicator for personalization of politics. But does this mean there is actually no sign of 
personalized politics at all? Not entirely. Looking in more detail at preference votes can shed 
light on the issue. For example, some candidates receive votes because candidates know 
them personally, resulting in a real personal vote. And the results presented in this 
dissertation show that preference votes can have some indirect effects on the political career 
of a candidate, by giving candidates who perform well in elections better list positions in 
subsequent elections. Parties respond to preference votes, which leaves room for candidates 
to build a political career based on performing well in elections. 
The advantages of preference voting for representative democracy in Belgium and 
the Netherlands seem limited. If we would look at the chain of delegation (Strøm, 2000), the 
influence of voters on this chain of delegation in terms of influencing the actual politicians 
who end up in parliament or government seems weak. In a representative democracy the 
chain of delegation is important, because, it links voters in several steps to those who 
govern. The first step in this chain is from voters to elected representatives. We saw that 
parties to a very large extent still control which candidates are elected. In addition, if we 
would look further at the chain of delegation, the influence becomes even weaker. In the 
second and third step of the chain, elected legislators are linked with the head of 
government and ministers. The chain of delegation could be strengthened by given 
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preference votes more influence in the selection of those ministers. However, I have shown 
that the influence of preference vote on the selection of ministers is also weak, especially in 
the Netherlands. Using preference votes in the selection process could indirectly give voters 
more influence, which would further strengthen the chain of delegation. The influence of 
preference votes on representative democracy in its currents form therefore seems limited. 
So, these answers might be somewhat disappointing for those who think preference 
votes have value. Should the conclusion be that it is redundant to allow voters to cast a 
preference vote and that preference votes should be abolished? I do not think that this is the 
case. Preference votes still could be of great value, but voters should be able to make it more 
clear what their intentions are. Therefore, it is necessary to make changes to the electoral 
systems of the Netherlands and Belgium. For the Netherlands this would mean introducing 
a list vote. This at least would make it possible for voters who do not have a candidate 
preference to cast a vote that shows their true intentions. As an additional, and maybe even 
more important advantage, when we look at the actual preference votes it would become 
more clear who the popular candidates are. By definition, introducing a list vote means 
abolishing the obligatory candidate vote. This might seem a devaluation of the candidate 
vote, but I actually believe that it is the other way around. If voters have the option to not 
cast a candidate vote, those candidate votes that are cast are more meaningful. 
To further strengthen the value of preference votes, the system could be made more 
open by making it easier for candidates to be elected out of list order. This also applies to 
Belgium. In that case, preference votes could actually have an important influence on the 
composition of parliament. In the current systems the effects of preference votes seem quite 
limited, which seems to make them somewhat redundant. If this is the case, I argue that the 
better way to go would be to increase the weight of preference votes, instead of abolishing 
them. This could also have a positive influence on representative democracy, since it allows 
for a more direct link between voters and MPs. In times where the relationship between 
voters and parties is weakening, this might be of importance for representative democracy. 
6.4 Suggestions for further research 
A first suggestion for further research relates to the information about candidates given to 
voters on the ballot. Many of the indicators that seem to have a strong effect on which 
candidates receive more preference votes, are related to information given on the ballot: 
gender (explicitly in the Netherlands, as the gender of (most) candidates is given and 
implicitly in Belgium, as the first name of candidates is given) and municipality (in the 
Netherlands). The information about the candidate that is given on the ballot thus seems to 
influence preference voting. Research could focus on the actual size of the effect of the 
information given on the ballot. This is also a more normative question, since it might 
influence the election result. To which extent is information given on the ballot desirable, if 
other potentially relevant information is left out? 
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A second suggestion relates to the nature of preference votes. The current literature 
on preference voting assumes that casting a preference vote is in general positively 
motivated. I argued and showed that motivations can also be negative, by focusing on one 
such negative motivation (a negative evaluation of the list-puller). Further research could 
focus more on the distinction between negative and positive motivations for casting a 
preference vote. In addition, further research could be conducted on the ‘random’ aspect of 
some preference votes. I showed that, in the Dutch case, some voters who do not want to 
vote for the list-puller voted for another candidate, without mentioning a reason for voting 
for the candidate who was chosen. Future research might delve into this mechanism, by 
studying whether the vote actually is random or that in addition to the negative 
motivations, positive motivations for the actual vote exist as well. 
In this dissertation one chapter focuses on the voter, and one chapter focuses on the 
candidate. While these analyses are valuable to get a better insight in the reasons for voters 
who cast a preference vote and the candidates who receive preference votes, this does not 
explain the whole dynamic of preference voting. Therefore, another suggestion for further 
research would be to focus on the link between voters and candidates and how this affects 
preference voting. Only few studies have done this so far, mainly because it is difficult to 
obtain the data necessary, as detailed data about voting behaviour is necessary for such a 
study. 
Some studies have linked voters and candidates in terms of gender based voting. 
However, the results of these studies are not consistent. Some studies found that voters are 
more likely to vote for a candidate from the same gender (Erzeel & Caluwaerts, 2015; Giger 
et al., 2014; Marien et al., 2017), while other studies did not (McElroy & Marsh, 2010; 
Wauters et al., 2010). In contrast to what literature would suggest, political sophistication 
has a limited influence on gender-based voting (De Leeuw, 2017). Gender-based voting thus 
does not seem to be simply a ‘shortcut’ (Cutler, 2002) for those voters with low levels of 
political sophistication. This strengthens the need for research that links voters and 
candidates, since the findings of De Leeuw suggest this type of voting is a strategy used by a 
broader spectrum of voters. 
The only study in which multiple voter and candidate characteristics are included in 
an approach that links voters and candidates is conducted by Van Erkel (2017, pp. 155–
180). Van Erkel included gender, age and location in his model and found a “strong effect of 
shared municipality, (…) a moderate effect of sex and no general effect of age” (2017, p. 
177). But further studies are still necessary, not only in different contexts, but also with 
different candidate characteristics. One such characteristic which would be particularly 
interesting is ethnicity, as was mentioned in chapter 4. Results in chapter 4 showed no 
robust effects of whether candidates who have a non-European background receive more 
preference votes. Further research is necessary, which should delve deeper into this issue 
and also gather better information about the ethnic background of candidates. In this 
dissertation I coded whether candidates belong to an ethnic minority based on last names, 
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which is not ideal, and leaves little room for variation between members of different ethnic 
minorities. 
Studying the link between voters and candidates more closely might give valuable 
insights in what voters try to accomplish by casting a preference vote. It might help to think 
about changes in the electoral system to facilitate that which voters actually would like to 
achieve with preference votes. In the current electoral systems of Belgium and the 
Netherlands the influence of preference votes all in all seems limited, while it could actually 
help to strengthen the link between voters and candidates in a representative democracy. 
  
 
Bibliography 
Aarts, K. (2001). The impact of leaders on electoral choice in the Netherlands revisited. Acta 
Politica, 36(4), 380–401. 
Aarts, K., Blais, A., & Schmitt, H. (Eds.). (2011). Political Leaders and Democratic Elections. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ackaert, J. (1996). De kiezers delen de kaarten uit, de partijen spelen ermee.... In J. Buelens 
& K. Deschouwer (Eds.), De Dorpsstraat is de Wetstraat niet (pp. 49–74). Brussel: 
VUBPress. 
Andeweg, R. B. (2005). The Netherlands: The Sanctity of Proportionality. In M. Gallagher & 
P. Mitchell (Eds.), The Politics of Electoral Systems (pp. 491–510). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Andeweg, R. B., & Irwin, G. A. (2009). Governance and Politics of the Netherlands (third ed.). 
Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Andeweg, R. B., & Irwin, G. A. (2014). Governance and Politics of the Netherlands (fourth 
ed.). Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Andeweg, R. B., & Thomassen, J. (2011). Pathways to party unity: Sanctions, loyalty, 
homogeneity and division of labour in the Dutch parliament. Party Politics, 17(5), 
655–672. 
Andeweg, R. B., & Van Holsteyn, J. J. M. (2011). Second order personalization: preference 
voting in the Netherlands. Paper Presented at the ECPR General Conference, University 
of Iceland, Reykjavík, 25 - 27 August. 
André, A., Baudewyns, P., Depauw, S., & de Winter, L. (2015). Het waarom van de 
voorkeurstem. In K. Deschouwer, P. Delwit, M. Hooghe, P. Baudewyns, & S. 
Walgrave (Eds.), De kiezer ontcijferd. Over stemgedrag en stemmotivaties. (pp. 57–75). 
Leuven: Lannoo Campus. 
André, A., & Depauw, S. (2017). Too much choice, too little impact: a multilevel analysis of 
the contextual determinants of preference voting. West European Politics, 40(3), 598–
620. 
André, A., Depauw, S., & Pilet, J.-B. (2017). The nature of preference voting: Disentangling 
the party and personal components of candidate choice. In K. Deschouwer (Ed.), 
Mind the Gap. Political Participation and Representation in Belgium (pp. 251–273). 
Colchester: ECPR Press. 
André, A., Depauw, S., & Shugart, M. S. (2014). The effect of electoral institutions on 
legislative behaviour. In S. Martin, T. Saalfeld, & K. W. Strøm (Eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Legislative Studies (pp. 231–249). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
André, A., Depauw, S., Shugart, M. S., & Chytilek, R. (2017). Party nomination strategies in 
flexible-list systems: Do preference votes matter? Party Politics, 23(5), 589–600. 
André, A., Pilet, J.-B., Depauw, S., & Van Aelst, P. (2013). De partij, de leider of een 
“gewone” kandidaat? Het gebruik van voorkeurstemmen bij de 
gemeenteraadsverkiezingen van 2012. In R. Dassonneville, M. Hooghe, S. Marien, & 
J.-B. Pilet (Eds.), De lokale kiezer: het kiesgedrag bij de Belgische 
gemeenteraadsverkiezingen van oktober 2012 (pp. 117–140). Brussel: ASP. 
André, A., Wauters, B., & Pilet, J.-B. (2012). It’s Not Only About Lists: Explaining 
Preference Voting in Belgium. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 22(3), 
293–313. 
Anker, H. (1992). Normal vote analysis. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis. 
Ansolabehere, S., & Jones, P. E. (2010). Constituents’ Responses to Congressional Roll-Call 
Voting. American Journal of Political Science, 54(3), 583–597. 
Arzheimer, K., & Evans, J. (2012). Geolocation and voting: Candidate–voter distance effects 
on party choice in the 2010 UK general election in England. Political Geography, 
142 Bibliography 
 
 
31(5), 301–310. 
Bäck, H., & Debus, M. (2016). Political Parties, Parliaments and Legislative Speechmaking. 
London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Bäck, H., Debus, M., & Müller, W. C. (2010). The ideological cohesion of political parties. 
an evaluation of the method of deriving MPs’ policy positions from parliamentary 
speeches. Paper Presented at the 68th Annual MPSA Conference in Chicago, 22–25 
April. 
Bakker, R., De Vries, C., Edwards, E., Hooghe, L., Jolly, S., Marks, G., … Vachudova, M. A. 
(2015). Measuring party positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill expert survey trend file, 
1999-2010. Party Politics, 21(1), 143–152. 
Balmas, M., Rahat, G., Sheafer, T., & Shenhav, S. R. (2014). Two routes to personalized 
politics. Party Politics, 20(1), 37–51. 
Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers. (2017a). Belgische Kamer van 
Volksvertegenwoordigers - De Kamerleden. Retrieved July 7, 2017, from 
http://www.dekamer.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=/depute&language=nl&cfm=/si
te/wwwcfm/depute/cvlist54.cfm 
Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers. (2017b). Belgische Kamer van 
volksvertegenwoordigers - Parlementaire stukken van de Kamer. Retrieved July 5, 
2017, from 
http://www.dekamer.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=/flwb&language=nl&cfm=List
Document.cfm 
Belgium.be. (2003). Verkiezingen 2003. Retrieved October 6, 2015, from 
http://verkiezingen2003.belgium.be 
Belgium.be. (2007). Verkiezingen 2007. Retrieved October 7, 2015, from 
http://verkiezingen2007.belgium.be 
Belgium.be. (2010). Verkiezingen 2010. Retrieved October 13, 2015, from 
http://verkiezingen2010.belgium.be 
Belgium.be. (2014). Verkiezingen 2014. Retrieved October 14, 2015, from 
http://verkiezingen2014.belgium.be/ 
Benoit, K., & Laver, M. (2007). Compared to What? A Comment on “A Robust 
Transformation Procedure for Interpreting Political Text” by Martin and Vanberg. 
Political Analysis, 16(1), 101–111. 
Benoit, K., & Nulty, P. (2016). Quanteda: Quantitative Analysis of Textual Data. R package 
version 0.9.8. 
Bernauer, J., & Bräuninger, T. (2009). Intra-Party Preference Heterogeneity and Faction 
Membership in the 15th German Bundestag: A Computational Text Analysis of 
Parliamentary Speeches. German Politics, 18(3), 385–402. 
Black, J. H., & Erickson, L. (2003). Women candidates and voter bias: do women politicians 
need to be better? Electoral Studies, 22(1), 81–100. 
Blais, A. (2010). Making electoral democracy work. Electoral Studies, 29(1), 169–170. 
Blais, A., & Carty, R. K. (1991). The Psychological Impact of Electoral Laws: Measuring 
Duverger’s Elusive Factor. British Journal of Political Science, 21(1), 79–93. 
Blais, A., Héroux-Legault, M., Stephenson, L. B., Cross, W., & Gidengil, E. (2012). Assessing 
the psychological and mechanical impact of electoral rules: A quasi-experiment. 
Electoral Studies, 31(4), 829–837. 
Blom-Hansen, J., Elklit, J., Serritzlew, S., & Villadsen, L. R. (2016). Ballot position and 
election results: Evidence from a natural experiment. Electoral Studies, 44, 172–183. 
Blumenau, J., Eggers, A. C., Hangartner, D., & Hix, S. (2017). Open/Closed List and Party 
Choice: Experimental Evidence from the UK. British Journal of Political Science, 47(4), 
809–827. 
Bräuninger, T., Brunner, M., & Bäubler, T. (2012). Personal vote-seeking in flexible list 
systems: How electoral incentives shape Belgian MPs’ bill initiation behaviour. 
Bibliography 143 
 
European Journal of Political Research, 51(5), 607–645. 
Brockington, D. (2003). A Low Information Theory of Ballot Position Effect. Political 
Behavior, 25(1), 1–27. Retrieved from ht 
Brown, A. R. (2014). Voters Don’t Care Much About Incumbency. Journal of Experimental 
Political Science, 1(2), 132–143. 
Campbell, R., Cowley, P., Vivyan, N., & Wagner, M. (2016). Legislator Dissent as a Valence 
Signal. First published online 24 June 2016. British Journal of Political Science, 1–24. 
Carey, J. M. (2007). Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in 
Legislative Voting. American Journal of Political Science, 51(1), 92–107. 
Carey, J. M., & Shugart, M. S. (1995). Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank 
ordering of electoral formulas. Electoral Studies, 14(4), 417–439. 
Carson, J. L., Koger, G., Lebo, M. J., & Young, E. (2010). The Electoral Costs of Party 
Loyalty in Congress. American Journal of Political Science, 54(3), 598–616. 
Catt, H. (1996). Voting Behaviour. A Radical Critique. London and New York: Leicester 
University Press. 
Chen, E., Simonovits, G., Krosnick, J. A., & Pasek, J. (2014). The impact of candidate name 
order on election outcomes in North Dakota. Electoral Studies, 35, 115–122. 
Clark, W. R., & Golder, M. (2006). Rehabilitating Duverger’s Theory: Testing the 
Mechanical and Strategic Modifying Effects of Electoral Laws. Comparative Political 
Studies, 39(6), 679–708. 
Colomer, J. M. (2011). Introduction: personal and party representation. In J. M. Colomer 
(Ed.), Personal representation. The neglected dimension of electoral systems (pp. 1–19). 
Colchester: ECPR Press. 
Cox, G. W. (1997). Making votes count: strategic coordination in the world’s electoral systems. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Crisp, B. F., Olivella, S., Malecki, M., & Sher, M. (2013). Vote-earning strategies in flexible 
list systems: Seats at the price of unity. Electoral Studies, 32(4), 658–669. 
Curtice, J., & Marsh, M. (2008). How did they vote? Voters’ use of the STV ballot paper in 
the 2007 Scottish Local Elections. Representation, 44(4), 285–300. 
Cutler, F. (2002). The Simplest Shortcut of All: Sociodemographic Characteristics and 
Electoral Choice. The Journal of Politics, 64(2), 466–490. 
Dalton, R. J., McAllister, I., & Wattenberg, M. (2002). The Consequences of Partisan 
Dealignment. In R. J. Dalton & M. Wattenberg (Eds.), Parties without Partisans. 
Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies (pp. 37–63). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Darcy, R., & McAllister, I. (1990). Ballot position effects. Electoral Studies, 9(1), 5–17. 
Dataportaal van de Nederlandse overheid. (2017). Verkiezingsuitslag Tweede Kamer 2017. 
De Leeuw, S. (2017). Het geslacht van de kandidaat als heuristisch stemmotief: Een 
onderzoek naar het effect van politieke sofisticatie en electorale context op gender-
based stemgedrag. Res Publica, 60(2), 141–170. 
De Winter, L. (1991). Parliamentary and Party Pathways to the Cabinet. In J. Blondel & J.-L. 
Thiébault (Eds.), The Profession of Government Minister in Western Europe (pp. 44–
69). London: Macmillan. 
De Winter, L. (2005). Belgium: Empowering Voters or Party Elites? In M. Gallagher & P. 
Mitchell (Eds.), The Politics of Electoral Systems (pp. 417–432). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Deschouwer, K. (2009). The Politics of Belgium. Governing a Divided Society. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Deschouwer, K., Delwit, P., Hooghe, M., Baudewyns, P., & Walgrave, S. (Eds.). (2015). De 
kiezer ontcijferd. Over stemgedrag en stemmotivaties. Leuven: Lannoo Campus. 
Dinas, E. (2018). The Acquisition of Voting Habits. (J. Fisher, E. Fieldhouse, M. N. Franklin, 
R. Gibson, M. Cantijoch, & C. Wlezien, Eds.). London and New York: Routlegde. 
144 Bibliography 
 
 
Dowding, K., & Dumont, P. (2009). Structural and Strategic Factors Affecting the Hiring 
and Firing of Ministers. In K. Dowding & P. Dumont (Eds.), The Selection of Ministers 
in Europe: Hiring and Firing (pp. 1–20). London: Routledge. 
Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper. 
Duch, R. M., & Stevenson, R. T. (2008). The Economic Vote. How Political and Economic 
Institutions Condition Election Results. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Dumont, P., Fiers, S., & Dandoy, R. (2009). Belgium: Ups and downs of ministerial careers 
in a partitocratic federal state. In K. Dowding & P. Dumont (Eds.), The Selection of 
Ministers in Europe: Hiring and Firing (pp. 125–146). London: Routledge. 
Dumont, P., Kies, R., & Fivaz, J. (2014). Being a VAA candidate: Why do candidates use 
voting advice applications and what can we learn from it. In D. Garzia & S. Marschall 
(Eds.), Matching Voters with Parties and Candidates. Voting Advice Applications in a 
comparative perspective (pp. 145–159). Colchester: EC. 
Duverger, M. (1951). Les partis politiques. Paris: Armand Colin. 
Elfferich, A. (2017). Politieke en technische expertise van Nederlandse ministers en 
staatssecretarissen van 1967 tot 2015. Res Publica, 59(2), 171–191. 
Erzeel, S., & Caluwaerts, D. (2015). Is It Gender, Ideology or Resources? Individual-Level 
Determinants of Preferential Voting for Male or Female Candidates. Journal of 
Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 25(3), 265–283. 
Erzeel, S., De Leeuw, S., Marien, S., & Rihoux, B. (2017). Gender-based voting. In K. 
Deschouwer (Ed.), Mind the Gap. Political Participation and Representation in Belgium 
(pp. 227–250). Colchester: ECPR Press. 
Faas, T., & Schoen, H. (2006). The importance of being first: Effects of candidates’ list 
positions in the 2003 Bavarian state election. Electoral Studies, 25(1), 91–102. 
Farrell, D. M., & McAllister, I. (2006). Voter satisfaction and electoral systems: Does 
preferential voting in candidate-centred systems make a difference? European Journal 
of Political Research, 45(5), 723–749. 
Folke, O., Persson, T., & Rickne, J. (2016). The Primary Effect: Preference Votes and 
Political Promotions. American Political Science Review, 110(3), 559–578. 
Fournier, P., Van der Kolk, H., Carty, R. K., Blais, A., & Rose, J. (2011). When Citizens 
Decide. Lessons from Citizen Assemblies on Electoral Reform. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Fox, J. (2003). Effect displays in R for generalised linear models. Journal of Statistical 
Software, 8(15), 1–27. 
Gallagher. (1988). Conclusion. In M. Gallagher & M. Marsh (Eds.), Candidate Selection in 
Comparative Perspective (pp. 236–283). London: Sage. 
Gelman, A., & Hill, J. (2007). Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical 
Models. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Giger, N., Holli, A. M., Lefkofridi, Z., & Wass, H. (2014). The gender gap in same-gender 
voting: The role of context. Electoral Studies, 35, 303–314. 
Gimpel, J. G., Karnes, K. A., McTague, J., & Pearson-Merkowitz, S. (2008). Distance-decay 
in the political geography of friends-and-neighbors voting. Political Geography, 27(2), 
231–252. 
Górecki, M. A., & Kukołowicz, P. (2014). Gender quotas, candidate background and the 
election of women: A paradox of gender quotas in open-list proportional 
representation systems. Electoral Studies, 36, 65–80. 
Hakhverdian, A., & Koop, C. (2007). Consensus Democracy and Support for Populist 
Parties in Western Europe. Acta Politica, 42(4), 401–420. 
Hazan, R. Y. (1996). Presidential parliamentarism: Direct popular election of the Prime 
Minister, Israel’s new electoral and political system. Electoral Studies, 15(1), 21–37. 
Hazan, R. Y. (2014). Candidate selection: implications and challenges for legislative 
behaviour. In S. Martin, T. Saalfeld, & K. W. Strøm (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Bibliography 145 
 
Legislative Studies (pp. 213–230). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hazan, R. Y., & Rahat, G. (2010). Democracy within Parties: Candidate Selection Methods 
and Their Political Consequences. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Retrieved from 
http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199572540.001.000
1/acprof-9780199572540 
Hessing, R. C. (1985). Bij Voorkeur: Een onderzoek naar het gebruik van 
voorkeurstemmen. Acta Politica, 20(2), 157–177. 
Hirschman, A. O. (1970). Exit, voice, and loyalty : responses to decline in firms, organizations, 
and states. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University 
Press. 
Irwin, G. A., & Van Holsteyn, J. J. M. (2004). The 2002 and 2003 Parliamentary Elections in 
The Netherlands. Electoral Studies, 23(3), 551–557. 
Jacobs, K. (2018). Electoral Systems in Context: The Netherlands. In E. S. Herron, R. J. 
Pekkanen, & M. S. Shugart (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Electoral Systems (pp. 
557–580). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Jankowski, M. (2016). Voting for locals: Voters’ information processing strategies in open-
list PR systems. Electoral Studies, 43, 72–84. 
Jones, B. S. (2009). Multilevel Models. In J. M. Box-Steffensmeier, H. E. Brady, & D. Collier 
(Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology (pp. 605–623). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Kadaster, & Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek. (2013). Wijk- en buurtkaart 2010. Retrieved 
August 21, 2017, from https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/dossier/nederland-
regionaal/geografische data/wijk-en-buurtkaart-2010 
Kadaster, & Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek. (2015). Wijk- en buurtkaart 2012. Retrieved 
August 21, 2017, from https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/dossier/nederland-
regionaal/geografische data/wijk-en-buurtkaart-2012 
Kadaster, & Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek. (2016). Wijk- en buurtkaart 2016. Retrieved 
August 21, 2017, from https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/dossier/nederland-
regionaal/geografische data/wijk-en-buurtkaart-2016 
Kam, C. J. (2009). Party Discipline and Parliamentary Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Karvonen, L. (2004). Preferential Voting: Incidence and Effects. International Political 
Science Review, 25(2), 203–226. 
Karvonen, L. (2010). The personalisation of politics: a study of parliamentary democracies. 
Colchester: ECPR Press. 
Karvonen, L. (2011a). Preferential vote in party list. In J. Colomer (Ed.), Personal 
representation. The neglected dimension of electoral systems (pp. 119–134). Colchester: 
ECPR Press. 
Karvonen, L. (2011b). Preferential Voting in Finland: How Much Do Candidates Matter, 
and to Whom and Why? Paper Prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American 
Political Science Association, Seattle, Washington, USA, September 1-4, 2011. 
Katz, R. S. (1980). A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
Katz, R. S. (1985). Preference Voting in Italy. Comparative Political Studies, 18(2), 229–249. 
Katz, R. S. (1986). Intraparty Preference Voting. In B. Grofman & A. Lijphart (Eds.), 
Electoral laws and their political consequences (pp. 85–103). New York: Agathon Press 
Inc. 
Kiesraad. (1998). Proces-verbaal van de zitting van het centraal stembureau tot het opnieuw 
vaststellen van de uitslag van de verkiezing van de leden van de Tweede Kamer. The 
Hague. 
Kiesraad. (2002). Proces-verbaal van de zitting van het centraal stembureau tot het vaststellen 
van de uitslag van de verkiezing van de leden van de Tweede Kamer. The Hague. 
146 Bibliography 
 
 
Kiesraad. (2003). Proces-verbaal van de zitting van het centraal stembureau tot het vaststellen 
van de uitslag van de verkiezing van de leden van de Tweede Kamer. The Hague. 
Kiesraad. (2006). Proces-verbaal van de zitting van het centraal stembureau tot het vaststellen 
van de uitslag van de verkiezing van de leden van de Tweede Kamer. The Hague. 
Kiesraad. (2010). Proces-verbaal van de zitting van het centraal stembureau tot het vaststellen 
van de uitslag van de verkiezing van de leden van de Tweede Kamer. The Hague. 
Kiesraad. (2012). Proces-verbaal van de zitting van het centraal stembureau tot het vaststellen 
van de uitslag van de verkiezing van de leden van de Tweede Kamer. The Hague. 
Kiesraad. (2017a). Databank verkiezingsuitslagen. Retrieved August 21, 2017, from 
http://www.verkiezingsuitslagen.nl/ 
Kiesraad. (2017b). Evaluatie-advies Tweede Kamerverkiezing 15 maart. Retrieved 
September 25, 2017, from https://www.kiesraad.nl/adviezen-en-
publicaties/adviezen/2017/06/02/evaluatieadvies-tweede-kamerverkiezing-2017 
Kiesraad. (2017c). Proces-verbaal van de zitting van het centraal stembureau tot het vaststellen 
van de uitslag van de verkiezing van de leden van de Tweede Kamer. The Hague. 
King, A. (1981). The rise of the career politician in Britain—and its consequences. British 
Journal of Political Science, 11(3), 249–285. 
King, A. (2002). Do Leaders’ Personalities Really matter? In A. King (Ed.), Leaders’ 
personalities and the Outcomes of Democratic Elections (pp. 1–43). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Kitschelt, H. (1995). The Radical Right in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis. Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Klemmensen, R., Hobolt, S. B., & Hansen, M. E. (2007). Estimating policy positions using 
political texts: An evaluation of the Wordscores approach. Electoral Studies, 26(4), 
746–755. 
Koole, R. A. (2009). Mensenwerk; herinneringen van een partijvoorzitter, 2001-2007. 
Amsterdam: Bert Bakker. 
Langer, A. I. (2007). A Historical Exploration of the Personalisation of Politics in the Print 
Media: The British Prime Ministers (1945-1999). Parliamentary Affairs, 60(3), 371–
387. 
Laslier, J.-F., Blais, A., Bol, D., Golder, S. N., Harfst, P., Stephenson, L. B., & Van der 
Straeten, K. (2015). The EuroVotePlus experiment. European Union Politics, 16(4), 
601–615. 
Laver, M., & Benoit, K. (2002). Locating TDs in Policy Spaces: The Computational Text 
Analysis of Dáil Speeches. Irish Political Studies, 17(1), 59–73. 
Laver, M., Benoit, K., & Garry, J. (2003). Extracting Policy Positions from Political Texts 
Using Words as Data. American Political Science Review, 97(2), 311–331. 
Lijphart, A. (1985). The field of electoral systems research: A critical survey. Electoral 
Studies, 4(1), 3–14. 
Lijphart, A., & López Pintor, R. (1988). Alphabetic bias in partisan elections: Patterns of 
voting for the Spanish Senate, 1982 and 1986. Electoral Studies, 7(3), 225–231. 
Louwerse, T. (2014). Peilingwijzer 2010-2012. Harvard Dataverse. 
Louwerse, T., & Otjes, S. (2016). Personalised parliamentary behaviour without electoral 
incentives : the case of the Netherlands. West European Politics, 39(4), 778–799. 
Lowe, W. (2011). JFreq: Count words, quickly. Java software version 0.5.4. Retrieved from 
http://www.conjugateprior.org/software/jfreq/ 
Lutz, G. (2010). First come, First Served: The Effect of Ballot Position on Electoral Success 
in Open Ballot PR Elections. Representation, 46(2), 167–181. 
Maddens, B., & Fiers, S. (2004). The direct PM election and the institutional 
presidentialisation of parliamentary systems. Electoral Studies, 23(4), 769–793. 
Maddens, B., & Put, G.-J. (2013). Office effects and campaign spending in a semi-open list 
PR system: The Belgian/Flemish federal and regional elections 1999–2010. Electoral 
Bibliography 147 
 
Studies, 32(4), 852–863. 
Maddens, B., Put, G., & Vanlangenakker, I. (2010). Welke kandidaten zullen het meest 
voorkeurstemmen halen? Centrum voor Politicologie K.U.Leuven, Leuven. Retrieved 
November 11, 2015, from https://soc.kuleuven.be/web/files/5/16/2010-
nota_voorkeurstemmen.pdf 
Maddens, B., Wauters, B., Noppe, J., & Fiers, S. (2006). Effects of Campaign Spending in an 
Open List PR System: The 2003 Legislative Elections in Flanders/Belgium. West 
European Politics, 29(1), 161–168. 
Maddens, B., Weekers, K., Fiers, S., & Vanlangenakker, I. (2007). Op zoek naar een 
verklaring voor de persoonlijke score van de kandidaten bij lokale verkiezingen. Res 
Publica, 49(1), 132–149. 
Manin, B. (1997). The Principles of Representative Government. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Mansbridge, J. (1999). Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A 
Contingent “Yes.” The Journal of Politics, 61(3), 628–657. 
March, L., & Mudde, C. (2005). What’s Left of the Radical Left? The European Radical Left 
After 1989: Decline and Mutation. Comparative European Politics, 3(1), 23–49. 
Marcinkiewicz, K. (2014). Electoral contexts that assist voter coordination: Ballot position 
effects in Poland. Electoral Studies, 33, 322–334. 
Marien, S., Schouteden, A., & Wauters, B. (2017). Voting for Women in Belgium’s Flexible 
List System. Politics & Gender, 13(2), 305–335. 
Marschall, S., & Garzia, D. (2014). Voting advice applications in a comparative perspective: 
an introduction. In D. Garzia & S. Marschall (Eds.), Matching Voters with Parties and 
Candidates. Voting Advice Applications in a comparative perspective (pp. 1–10). 
Colchester: ECPR Press. 
Marsh, M. (1985). The Voters Decide?: Preferential Voting in European List Systems. 
European Journal of Political Research, 13(4), 365–378. 
Marsh, M. (2007). Candidates or Parties? Objects of Electoral Choice in Ireland. Party 
Politics, 13(4), 500–527. 
Martin, & Vanberg, G. (2008). A robust transformation procedure for interpreting political 
text. Political Analysis, 16(1), 93–100. 
Matland, R. E., & Studlar, D. T. (1996). The Contagion of Women Candidates in Single-
Member District and Proportional Representation Electoral Systems: Canada and 
Norway. The Journal of Politics, 58(3), 707–733. 
Matthews, D. R., & Valen, H. (1999). Parliamentary Representation: The Case of the 
Norwegian Storting. Columbus: Ohio State University Press. 
Mazzoleni, G., & Schulz, W. (1999). “Mediatization” of Politics: A Challenge for 
Democracy? Political Communication, 16(3), 247–261. 
McAllister, I. (2007). The Personalization of Politics. In R. J. Dalton & H.-D. Klingemann 
(Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior (pp. 571–588). New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
McDermott, M. L. (2009). Voting for myself: Candidate and voter group associations over 
time. Electoral Studies, 28(4), 606–614. 
McElroy, G., & Marsh, M. (2010). Candidate Gender and Voter Choice: Analysis from a 
Multimember Preferential Voting System. Political Research Quarterly, 63(4), 822–
833. 
Mickler, T. A. (2017a). Inferring Ideological Positions From Speeches and Questions - An 
Analysis of the Tweede Kamer. Paper Presented at the Politicologenetmaal 2017, Leiden. 
Mickler, T. A. (2017b). Parliamentary committees in a party-centred context : structure, 
composition, functioning. Leiden: Leiden University Institute of Political Science PhD 
Dissertation. 
Miguel, L. F. (2008). Political representation and gender in Brazil: Quotas for women and 
148 Bibliography 
 
 
their impact. Bulletin of Latin American Research, 27(2), 197–214. 
Miller, J. M., & Krosnick, J. A. (1998). The impact of candidate name order on election 
outcomes. Public Opinion Quarterly, 62(3), 291–330. 
Ministry of Home Affairs and Kingdom Relations. (2016). Officiële Bekendmakingen. 
Retrieved from http://www.officielebekendmakingen.nl 
Moser, R. G., & Scheiner, E. (2012). Electoral Systems and Political Context. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Mughan, A. (1993). Party leaders and presidentialism in the 1992 election: A postwar 
perspective. British Elections and Parties Yearbook, 3(1), 193–204. 
Nagtzaam, M. A. M., & Van Erkel, P. F. A. (2017). Preference votes without preference? 
Institutional effects on preference voting: an experiment. Journal of Elections, Public 
Opinion and Parties, 27(2), 172–191. 
Norris, P. (2004). Electoral Engineering. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ortega Villodres, C. (2003). Intra‐party competition under preferential list systems: the case 
of Finland. Representation, 40(1), 55–66. 
Parlementair Documentatie Centrum. (2017a). Parlement & Politiek: Selectiemenu 
Bewindslieden. Retrieved May 10, 2017, from 
https://www.parlement.com/id/vg6gfs1frizd/selectiemenu_bewindspersonen 
Parlementair Documentatie Centrum. (2017b). Parlement & Politiek: Selectiemenu Tweede 
Kamerleden. Retrieved May 10, 2017, from 
http://www.parlement.com/id/vg7zoaah7lqb/selectiemenu_tweede_kamerleden 
Parlementair Documentatie Centrum. (2018). Parlement & Politiek: Gekozen minister-
president of formateur. Retrieved July 6, 2018, from 
https://www.parlement.com/id/vh8lnhrsr2z0/gekozen_minister_president_of_format
eur 
PARTIREP. (2014). PartiRep Election Study 2014. Brussels: PARTIREP [dataset]. 
Pauwels, T. (2014). Populism in Western Europe. Comparing Belgium, Germany and the 
Netherlands. Abingdon: Routledge. 
Pennings, P., & Hazan, R. Y. (2001). Democratizing Candidate Selection: Causes and 
Consequences. Party Politics, 7(3), 267–275. 
Pilet, J.-B., & Van Haute, E. (2008). The federal elections in Belgium, June 2007. Electoral 
Studies, 27(3), 547–550. 
Poguntke, T., & Webb, P. (Eds.). (2005). The Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative 
Study of Modern Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Political Data Yearbook. (2017). Political Data Yearbook - Belgium. Retrieved March 14, 
2017, from http://www.politicaldatayearbook.com/Chart.aspx/106/Belgium 
Polk, J., Rovny, J., Bakker, R., Edwards, E., Hooghe, L., Jolly, S., … Zilovic, M. (2017). 
Explaining the salience of anti-elitism and reducing political corruption for political 
parties in Europe with the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey data. Research & Politics, 
4(1), 1–9. 
Proksch, S.-O., & Slapin, J. B. (2015). The Politics of Parliamentary Debate. Parties, Rebels, 
and Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Pruysers, S., & Cross, W. (2016). Negative personalization: party leaders and party strategy. 
Canadian Journal of Political Science, 49(3), 539–558. 
Put, G.-J. (2016). Determinants of Geographical Representation on Candidate Lists in 
Flexible-List Systems: Lessons from the Belgian Case. Politics, 36(2), 180–196. 
Put, G.-J., & Maddens, B. (2012). De selectie van verkiesbare kandidaten. Een analyse van 
de Belgische Kamerverkiezingen 1999-2010. Res Publica, 54(3), 289–308. 
Put, G.-J., & Maddens, B. (2013). The Selection of Candidates for Eligible Positions on PR 
Lists: The Belgian/Flemish Federal Elections 1999-2010. Journal of Elections, Public 
Opinion and Parties, 23(1), 49–65. 
Put, G.-J., & Maddens, B. (2015). The Effect of Municipality Size and Local Office on the 
Bibliography 149 
 
Electoral Success of Belgian/Flemish Election Candidates: A Multilevel Analysis. 
Government and Opposition, 50(4), 607–628. 
Rabinowitz, G., & Macdonald, S. E. (1989). A Directional Theory of Issue Voting. The 
American Political Science Review, 83(1), 93–121. 
Rahat, G., & Sheafer, T. (2007). The Personalization(s) of Politics: Israel, 1949–2003. 
Political Communication, 24(1), 65–80. 
Rasmussen, S. H. R. (2016). Education or Personality Traits and Intelligence as 
Determinants of Political Knowledge? Political Studies, 64(4), 1036–1054. 
Renwick, A., & Pilet, J.-B. (2016). Faces of the Ballot. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Rihoux, B., Dumont, P., Deruette, S., De Winter, L., & Baudewyns, P. (2013). Belgium. 
European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbook, 52(1), 32–34. 
Rosema, M. (2004). The sincere vote: a psychological study of voting. Doctoral dissertation. 
Rosema, M. (2006). Partisanship, candidate evaluations, and prospective voting. Electoral 
Studies, 25(3), 467–488. 
Schmidt, G. D. (2003). Unanticipated successes: Lessons from Perus experiences with 
gender quotas in Majoritarian closed list and open list PR systems. Paper Presented at 
the International IDEA Workshop The Implementation of Quotas, Latin American 
Experiences; 23–24 February 2003, Lima, Peru. 
Secker, W. (1991). Ministers in beeld. De sociale en functionele herkomst van de Nederlandse 
ministers, 1848-1990. Leiden: DSWO Press. 
Shugart, M. S. (2001). Electoral “efficiency” and the move to mixed-member systems. 
Electoral Studies, 20(2), 173–193. 
Shugart, M. S. (2005). Comparative Electoral Systems Research: The Maturation of a Field 
and New Challenges Ahead. In M. Gallagher & P. Mitchell (Eds.), The politics of 
Electoral systems (pp. 25–56). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sinardet, D. (2008). Belgian Federalism Put to the Test: The 2007 Belgian Federal Elections 
and their Aftermath. West European Politics, 31(5), 1016–1032. 
Singer, M. M., & Stephenson, L. B. (2009). The political context and Duverger’s theory: 
Evidence at the district level. Electoral Studies, 28(3), 480–491. 
Slapin, J. B., & Proksch, S.-O. (2008). A Scaling Model for Estimating Time-Series Party 
Positions from Texts. American Journal of Political Science, 52(3), 705–722. 
Slapin, J. B., & Proksch, S.-O. (2014). Words as Data: Content analysis in Legislative 
Studies. In S. Martin, T. Saalfeld, & K. W. Strøm (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Legislative Studies (pp. 126–144). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Söderlund, P. (2017). Candidate-centred electoral systems and voter turnout. West 
European Politics, 40(3), 516–533. 
Staatscommissie parlementair stelsel. (2018). Lage drempels, hoge dijken. Democratie en 
rechtsstaat in balans. Amsterdam: Boom Uitgvers. 
Strøm, K. (2000). Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies. European 
Journal of Political Research, 37(3), 261–290. 
Taggart, P. (2004). Populism and representative politics in contemporary Europe. Journal of 
Political Ideologies, 9(3), 269–288. 
Tavits, M. (2010). Effect of Local Ties On Electoral Success and Parliamentary Behaviour. 
Party Politics, 16(2), 215–235. 
Thijssen, P. (2013). Are parties stimulating candidate-centred voting? The case of the 
Belgian district council elections 2000–2006. Acta Politica, 48(2), 144–166. 
Thijssen, P., Wauters, B., & Van Erkel, P. F. A. (2017). Preferential voting in local versus 
national elections: The role of proximity revisited. In K. Deschouwer (Ed.), Mind the 
Gap. Political Participation and Representation in Belgium (pp. 275–293). Colchester: 
ECPR Press. 
Thomassen, J., & Andeweg, R. B. (2004). Beyond collective representation: individual 
members of parliament and interest representation in the Netherlands. The Journal of 
150 Bibliography 
 
 
Legislative Studies, 10(4), 47–69. 
Todosijevic, B., Aarts, K., & Van Der Kaap, H. G. (2010). Dutch Parliamentary Election 
Studies: Data Source Book 1971-2006. The Hague: DANS. 
Van Aelst, P., Maddens, B., & Noppe, J. (2006). Van de studio naar de Kamer? Over de 
relatie tussen media en voorkeurstemmen tijdens de verkiezingen van 2003. In S. Fiers 
& H. Reynaert (Eds.), Wie zetelt? De gekozen politieke elite in Vlaanderen doorgelicht 
(pp. 163–176). Heverlee: Lannoo. 
Van Aelst, P., Maddens, B., Noppe, J., & Fiers, S. (2008). Politicians in the News: Media or 
Party Logic? European Journal of Communication, 23(2), 193–210. 
Van Aelst, P., Sheafer, T., & Stanyer, J. (2012). The personalization of mediated political 
communication: A review of concepts, operationalizations and key findings. 
Journalism: Theory, Practice & Criticism, 13(2), 203–220. 
Van Aelst, P., & Vliegenthart, R. (2014). Studying the Tango. Journalism Studies, 15(4), 392–
410. 
Van der Straeten, K., Laslier, J.-F., & Blais, A. (2013). Vote Au Pluriel: How People Vote 
When Offered to Vote Under Different Rules. PS: Political Science and Politics, 46(2), 
324–328. 
Van Erkel, P. F. A. (2017). Preferential votes: explaining individual electoral success in intra-
party competition. Universiteit Antwerpen: PhD Dissertation. 
Van Erkel, P. F. A., & Thijssen, P. (2016). The first one wins: Distilling the primacy effect. 
Electoral Studies, 44, 245–254. 
Van Erkel, P. F. A., Thijssen, P., & Van Aelst, P. (2017). One for all or all for one: The 
electoral effects of personalized campaign strategies. Acta Politica, 52(3), 384–405. 
Van Holsteyn, J. J. M. (1994). Het woord is aan de kiezer: een beschouwing over verkiezingen 
en stemgedrag aan de hand van open vragen. Leiden: DSWO Press. 
Van Holsteyn, J. J. M. (2007). The Dutch Parliamentary Elections of 2006. West European 
Politics, 30(5), 1139–1147. 
Van Holsteyn, J. J. M., & Andeweg, R. B. (2010). Demoted leaders and exiled candidates: 
Disentangling party and person in the voter’s mind. Electoral Studies, 29(4), 628–635. 
Van Holsteyn, J. J. M., & Andeweg, R. B. (2012). Tweede Orde Personalisering: 
Voorkeurstemmen in Nederland. Res Publica, 54(2), 163–191. 
Van Holsteyn, J. J. M., & Irwin, G. A. (2003). Never a dull moment: Pim Fortuyn and the 
Dutch parliamentary election of 2002. West European Politics, 26(2), 41–66. 
Van Holsteyn, J. J. M., & Irwin, G. A. (2004). The Dutch Parliamentary Elections of 2003. 
West European Politics, 27(1), 157–164. 
Van Vonno, C. M. C. (2016). Achieving Party Unity. A sequential Approach to Why Mps Act 
in Concert. Leiden: Leiden University Institute of Political Science PhD Dissertation. 
Van Wijnen, P. (2000). Candidates and voting behaviour. Acta Politica, 35, 430–450. 
Vivyan, N., & Wagner, M. (2012). Do voters reward rebellion? The electoral accountability 
of MPs in Britain. European Journal of Political Research, 51(2), 235–264. 
Voerman, G. (2014). Kandidaatstelling op landelijk niveau. In S. de Lange, M. Leyenaar, & 
P. de Jong (Eds.), Politieke partijen: overbodig of nodig? (pp. 45–62). Den Haag: Raad 
voor het Openbaar Bestuur. 
von Schoultz, Å. (2017). Electoral Systems in Context: Finland. In E. S. Herron, R. J. 
Pekkanen, & M. S. Shugart (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Electoral Systems (pp. 
601–626). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Walgrave, S., & Van Aelst, P. (2006). The Contingency of the Mass Media’s Political Agenda 
Setting Power: Toward a Preliminary Theory. Journal of Communication, 56(1), 88–
109. 
Wattenberg, M. (1991). The Rise of Candidate-Centred Politics: Presidential Elections of the 
1980s. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Wauters, B., & Rodenbach, J. (2014). Het gebruik van de voorkeurstem bij de 
Bibliography 151 
 
parlementsverkiezingen van 25 mei 2014. Onderzoeksnota GASPAR. Retrieved from 
www.gaspar.ugent.be 
Wauters, B., Thijssen, P., Van Aelst, P., & Pilet, J.-B. (2016). Centralized personalization at 
the expense of decentralized personalization. The decline of preferential voting in 
Belgium (2003–2014). Party Politics. 
Wauters, B., Verlet, D., & Ackaert, J. (2012). Giving More Weight to Preferential Votes: 
Welcome or Superfluous Reform? The Case of the Local Elections in Flanders 
(Belgium). Local Government Studies, 38(1), 91–111. 
Wauters, B., & Weekers, K. (2008). Het gebruik van de voorkeurstem bij de federale 
parlementsverkiezingen van 10 juni 2007. Res Publica, 50(2), 49–88. 
Wauters, B., Weekers, K., & Maddens, B. (2010). Explaining the number of preferential 
votes for women in an open-list PR system : An investigation of the 2003 federal 
elections in Flanders (Belgium). Acta Politica, 45(4), 468–490. 
Wauters, B., Weekers, K., & Pilet, J.-B. (2004). Het gebruik van de voorkeurstem bij de 
regionale en Europese parlementsverkiezingen van 13 juni 2004. Res Publica, 46(2–3), 
377–411. 
Weekers, K. (2003). Electorale prestaties van regeringsleden: de betekenis van 
voorkeurstemmen in het carrièreverloop van Belgische ministers en staatssecretarissen 
(1981-1999). KU leven, Faculteit Sociale wetenschappen: niet gepubliceerde thesis. 
  
 
 
  
  
 
Appendices  
  
 
 
 
  
 
A General appendices 
A. Appendix 1  
A.1. Used party abbreviations 
Belgium 
Party Full name English name 
CD&V Christen-Democratisch & Vlaams Christian Democratic & Flemish 
CDH Centre Démocrate Humaniste Humanist Democratic Centre 
Ecolo Ecolo Ecolo 
Groen1 Groen Green 
MR Mouvement Réformateur Reformist Movement 
N-VA Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie New Flemish Alliance 
OpenVLD2 Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten Open Flemish Liberals and 
Democrats 
PS Parti Socialiste Socialist Party 
PVDA / PTB Partij van de Arbeid van België / 
Parti du Travail de Belgique 
Workers’ Party of Belgium 
Sp.A Socialistische Partij Anders Socialist Party Different 
VB Vlaams Belang Flemish Interest 
 
The Netherlands 
Party Full name English name 
CDA Christen Democratisch Appèl Christian Democratic Appeal 
CU ChristenUnie ChristianUnion 
D66 Democraten 66 Democrats 66 
GL GroenLinks GreenLeft 
GPV Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond Reformed Political League 
LPF Lijst Pim Fortuyn List Pim Fortuyn 
PvdA Partij van de Arbeid Labour Party 
PvdD Partij voor de Dieren Party for the Animals 
PVV Partij voor de Vrijheid Party for Freedom 
RPF Reformatorische Politieke Federatie Reformational Political 
Federation 
SGP Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij Political Reformed Party 
SP Socialistische Partij Socialist Party 
VVD Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie People’s Party for Freedom and 
Democracy 
50Plus 50Plus 50Plus 
 
1 In 2003 this party was called Agalev, and between 2004 and 2011 Groen!.  
2 Before 2007 this party was called VLD.  
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A.2. Analysed elections, legislative periods and governments 
Table A.1 Analysed elections, legislative periods, governments (Belgium) 
Election Legislative period Government 
(Parties) 
Date formed 
Date dissolved 
18-05-2003 51 05-06-2003 
26-04-2007 
Verhofstadt II 
(VLD,-MR- sp.a/SPIRIT-PS) 
11-07-2003 
21-12-2007 
10-06-2007 52 28-06-2007 
06-05-2010 
Verhofstadt III 
(Open VLD-MR-CD&V-cdH-PS) 
21-12-2007 
20-03-2008 
   Leterme I 
(CD&V-cdH-MR-Open Vld-PS) 
20-03-2008 
30-12-2008 
   Van Rompuy 
(CD&V-cdH-MR-Open Vld-PS) 
30-12-2008 
25-11-2009 
   Leterme II 
(CD&V-cdH-MR-Open Vld-PS) 
25-11-2009 
06-12-2011 
13-06-2010 53 06-07-2010 
24-04-2014 
Di Rupo 
(PS-sp.a-MR-Open Vld-CD&V-cdH) 
06-12-2011 
11-10-2014 
25-05-2014 54 19-06-2014 
- 
Michel 
(NVA-MR-CD&V-Open Vld) 
11-10-2014 
- 
 
Table A.2 Analysed elections, legislative periods, governments (the Netherlands) 
Election Legislative period Government 
(Parties) 
Date formed 
Date dissolved 
06-05-1998 19-05-1998 
23-05-2002 
Kok II 
(PvdA-VVD-D66) 
03-08-1998 
22-07-2002 
15-02-2002 23-05-2002 
29-01-2003 
Balkenende I 
(CDA-LPF-VVD) 
22-07-2002 
27-05-2003 
22-01-2003 30-01-2003 
29-11-2006 
Balkenende II 
(CDA-VVD-D66) 
27-05-2003 
30-06-2006 
  Balkenende III 
(CDA-VVD) 
07-07-2006 
22-02-2007 
22-11-2006 30-11-2006 
16-06-2010 
Balkenende IV 
(CDA-PvdA-CU) 
22-02-2007 
14-10-2010 
09-06-2010 17-06-2010 
19-09-2012 
Rutte I 
(VVD-CDA) 
14-10-2010 
05-11-2012 
12-09-2012 20-09-2012 
22-03-2017 
Rutte II 
(VVD-PvdA) 
05-11-2012 
26-10-2017 
15-03-2017 23-03-2017 
- 
  
 
  
 
B Appendices for chapter 2 
B. Appendix 2  
B.1. Respondents which were included and excluded in the experiment 
Table B.1 Included and excluded respondents based on vote intention 
Country Belgium The Netherlands 
Included respondents Who would vote: 
 CD&V 
 N-VA 
 Open VLD 
 sp.a 
 Groen 
 Vlaams belang 
Who would vote: 
 VVD 
 PvdA 
 PVV 
 CDA 
 SP 
 D66 
 GroenLinks 
 ChristenUnie 
 
Excluded respondents Who would vote: 
 PVDA 
 Other party 
 Blank 
 Who would not 
vote. 
 Who didn’t know 
what to vote or 
would not say what 
they would vote. 
Who would vote: 
 SGP 
 50Plus 
 Partij voor de Dieren 
 Other party 
 Blank 
 Who would not vote. 
 Who didn’t know what 
to vote or would not say 
what they would vote. 
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B.2. Explanations of the electoral rules (translated) 
Group 1 Group 2 
You would vote for [name of party]. On the 
next screen you will see the ballot for [name 
of party]. 
  
PAY ATTENTION! 
  
You have the option: 
- to vote for the party and thereby support 
the candidate list as a whole, by colouring 
the circle at the top of the list (below the 
party logo). 
OR 
- to vote for one of the candidates, by 
colouring the circle in front of that 
candidate. 
 
How would you vote in this case? 
You would vote for [name of party]. On the 
next screen you will see the ballot for [name 
of party]. 
  
PAY ATTENTION!1 
 
You have the option: 
- to vote for the party and thereby support 
the candidate list as a whole, by colouring 
the circle at the top of the list (below the 
party logo). 
OR 
- to vote for one or multiple candidates, by 
colouring the circle in front of that 
candidate or candidates. 
  
How would you vote in this case? 
Group 3 Group 4 
You would vote for [name of party]. On the 
next screen you will see the ballot for [name 
of party]. 
 
PAY ATTENTION! 2 
  
You have the option to vote for one of the 
candidates, by colouring the circle in front 
of that candidate. 
  
How would you vote in this case? 
You would vote for [name of party]. On the 
next screen you will see the ballot for [name 
of party]. 
  
PAY ATTENTION! 
  
You have the option to vote for one or 
multiple candidates, by colouring the circle 
in front of that candidate or candidates. 
  
How would you vote in this case? 
 
1 Since group 2 corresponds to the electoral system of Belgium, this line was not included for 
Belgian respondents. 
2 Since group 3 corresponds to the electoral system of the Netherlands, this line was not 
included for Dutch respondents.  
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B.3. Examples of ballot papers 
Figure B.1 Example of a ballot for group 1 and 2 (with list vote) 
 
 
Figure B.2 Example of ballot for group 3 and 4 (without list vote) 
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B.4. Draft lists of candidates 
# Government / larger parties Smaller parties 
 Belgium: CD&V, N-VA, VLD, Sp.A 
Netherlands: VVD, PvdA 
Belgium: Groen, VB 
Netherlands: CDA, D66, SP, GL, PVV, 
CU 
1. Current political leader / party chairman 
/ national figure 
Current political leader / party chairman 
/ national figure 
2. (ex) minister / mayor large city / other 
prominent party member 
Prominent member of parliament 
3. (ex) minister / mayor large city / other 
prominent party member 
Prominent member of parliament 
4. (ex) minister / mayor large city / other 
prominent party member 
Relatively unknown member of 
parliament 
5. (ex) minister / mayor large city / other 
prominent party member 
Relatively unknown member of 
parliament 
6. Prominent member of parliament Relatively unknown member of 
parliament, other ethnicity 
7. Prominent member of parliament Unknown candidate, but with local 
experience 
8. Prominent member of parliament Unknown candidate, but with local 
experience, other ethnicity 
9. Prominent member of parliament Unknown candidate, but with local 
experience  
10. Mayor / other prominent party member Unknown candidate, but with local 
experience 
11. Mayor / other prominent party member Unknown candidate, but with local 
experience 
12. Relatively unknown member of 
parliament, other ethnicity 
Unknown candidate, but with local 
experience, other ethnicity 
13. Relatively unknown member of 
parliament 
Unknown candidate 
14. Relatively unknown member of 
parliament 
Unknown candidate 
15. Relatively unknown member of 
parliament, other ethnicity 
Unknown candidate, other ethnicity 
16. Relatively unknown member of 
parliament 
Unknown candidate 
17. Unknown candidate Unknown candidate 
18. Unknown candidate Unknown candidate 
19. Unknown candidate Unknown candidate 
20. Prominent party member Prominent party member 
 
Other priorities: 
 Candidates from all different regions. 
 Equal distribution between male and female candidates. 
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B.5. Lists of candidates 
Belgium 
 
CD&V 
List position Candidate Gender District 
1 Kris Peeters M Antwerpen 
2 Hilde Crevits F West-Vlaanderen 
3 Wouter Beke M Limburg 
4 Joke Schauvliege F Oost-Vlaanderen 
5 Jo Vandeurzen M Limburg 
6 Tinne Rombout F Antwerpen 
7 Eric Van Rompuy M Vlaams-Brabant 
8 Sonja Becq F Vlaams-Brabant 
9 Servais Verherstraeten M Antwerpen 
10 Nicole Van Duyse F Oost-Vlaanderen 
11 Walter De Donder M Vlaams-Brabant 
12 Nahima Lanjri F Antwerpen 
13 Johan Verstreken M West-Vlaanderen 
14 Vera Jans F Limburg 
15 Veli Yuksel M Oost-Vlaanderen 
16 Katrien Partyka F Vlaams-Brabant 
17 Michel Lacroix M Antwerpen 
18 Loes Vandromme F West-Vlaanderen 
19 Thomas Vints M Limburg 
20 Marianne Thyssen F Oost-Vlaanderen 
 
N-VA 
List position Candidate Gender District 
1 Bart de Wever M Antwerpen 
2 Liesbeth Homans F Antwerpen 
3 Geert Bourgeois M West-Vlaanderen 
4 Nadia Sminate F Vlaams-Brabant 
5 Ben Weyts M Vlaams-Brabant 
6 Sarah Smeyers F Oost-Vlaanderen 
7 Jan Peumans M Limburg 
8 Annick De Ridder F Antwerpen 
9 Pol Van Den Driessche M West-Vlaanderen 
10 Veerle Baeyens F Oost-Vlaanderen 
11 Eddy Bevers M Antwerpen 
12 Nabilla Ait Daoud F Antwerpen 
13 Werner Janssen M Limburg 
14 An Capoen F West-Vlaanderen 
15 Seva Ndibesche M Brussel 
16 Miranda Van Eetvelde F Oost-Vlaanderen 
17 Dirk Kesteloot M West-Vlaanderen 
18 Karen Van Herck F Vlaams-Brabant 
19 Kristof Joos M Antwerpen 
20 Frieda Brepoels F Limburg 
 
  
162 
Appendices for chapter 2 
Lists of candidates 
 
 
VLD 
List position Candidate Gender District 
1 Maggie De Block  F Vlaams-Brabant 
2 Alexander De Croo M Oost-Vlaanderen 
3 Gwendolyn Rutten F Vlaams-Brabant 
4 Sven Gatz M Brussel 
5 Annemie Turtelboom F Antwerpen 
6 Bart Tommelein M West-Vlaanderen 
7 Carina Van Cauter F Oost-Vlaanderen 
8 Bart Somers M Antwerpen 
9 Lydia Peeters F Limburg 
10  Ward Vergote M West-Vlaanderen 
11  Tim Vandenput M Vlaams-Brabant 
12  Khadija Zamouri F Brussel 
13  Gwenny de Vroe F Vlaams-Brabant 
14  Egbert Lachaert M Oost-Vlaanderen 
15  Meral Özcan F Limburg 
16  Frank Wilrycx M Antwerpen 
17  Stefanie Platteau F West-Vlaanderen 
18  Jos Mombaers M Vlaams-Brabant 
19  Daisy Zaenen F Limburg 
20  Herman De Croo M Oost-Vlaanderen 
 
Sp.a 
List position Candidate Gender District 
1 John Crombez M West-Vlaanderen 
2 Ingrid Lieten F Limburg 
3 Bruno Tobback M Vlaams-Brabant 
4 Freya Van den Bossche F Oost-Vlaanderen 
5 Daniel Termont M Oost-Vlaanderen 
6 Yasmine Kherbache F Antwerpen 
7 Hans Bonte M Vlaams-Brabant 
8 Inga Verhaert F Antwerpen 
9 Bart Van Malderen M Oost-Vlaanderen 
10  Hilde Claes F Limburg 
11  Alain Top M West-Vlaanderen 
12  Meryame Kitir F Limburg 
13  Jan Bertels M Antwerpen 
14  Karine Jiroflée F Vlaams-Brabant 
15  Fouad Ahidar M Brussel 
16  Tine Soens F West-Vlaanderen 
17  Guy Van Acker M Oost-Vlaanderen 
18  Patricia Vanluyten F Vlaams-Brabant 
19  Daan Deckers M Limburg 
20  Johan Vande Lannotte M West-Vlaanderen 
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Groen 
List position Candidate Gender District 
1 Meyrem Almaci F Antwerpen 
2 Kristof Calvo M Antwerpen 
3 Elisabeth Meuleman F Oost-Vlaanderen 
4 Johan Danen M Limburg 
5 Ann Moerenhout F Vlaams-Brabant 
6 Imade Annouri M Antwerpen 
7 Martine de Meester F West-Vlaanderen 
8 Hassan Amaghlaou M Limburg 
9 Evita Willaert F Oost-Vlaanderen 
10  David Van Moerkercke M West-Vlaanderen 
11  Müzeyyen Çaliskan F Antwerpen 
12  Edward Van Keer M Vlaams-Brabant 
13  Marijke Vanlauwe F West-Vlaanderen 
14  Ludo Vanzeer M Limburg 
15  Sarah Wouters F Antwerpen 
16  Irfan Izgin M Vlaams-Brabant 
17  Nina De Wolf F Oost-Vlaanderen 
18  Tom Daerden M Limburg 
19  Lisa Buysse F Antwerpen 
20  Wouter Van Besien M West-Vlaanderen 
 
VB 
List position Candidate Gender District 
1 Filip Dewinter M Antwerpen 
2 Anke Van dermeersch F Antwerpen 
3 Tom Van Grieken M Antwerpen 
4 Barbara Pas F Oost-Vlaanderen 
5 Chris Janssens M Limburg 
6 Barbara Bonte F Oost-Vlaanderen 
7 Jan Jans M Limburg 
8 Mireille Buyse F Vlaams-Brabant 
9 Alain Quataert M West-Vlaanderen 
10  Femke Pieters F Oost-Vlaanderen 
11  Leo Joosten M Limburg 
12  Dominiek Sneppe F West-Vlaanderen 
13  Johan Verwerft M Antwerpen 
14  Anna Boey F Limburg 
15  Jan Meulepas M Vlaams-Brabant 
16  Katie Van der Heyden F Oost-Vlaanderen 
17  Wim Van Outryve M West-Vlaanderen 
18  Anja Dury F Vlaams-Brabant 
19  Wim Van Outryve M West-Vlaanderen 
20  Gerolf Annemans M Antwerpen 
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The Netherlands 
 
VVD 
List position Candidate Gender Municipality 
1 Mark Rutte M ’s-Gravenhage 
2 Edith Schippers F Baarn 
3 Stef Blok M ’s-Gravenhage 
4 Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert F  Nederhorst den Berg 
5 Ard Van der Steur M Warmond 
6 Anouchka Van Miltenburg F Zaltbommel 
7 Halbe Zijlstra M Wassenaar 
8 Helma Neppérus F Voorschoten 
9 Ton Elias M ’s-Gravenhage 
10 Annemarie Jorritsma-Lebbink F Almere 
11 Hans Van der Hoeve M Epe 
12 Malik Azmani M Stegeren 
13 André Bosma M Middelburg 
14 Sjoerd Potters M Waalwijk 
15 Dilan Yeṣilgöz-Zegerius F Amsterdam (NH) 
16 Chantal Nijkerken-de Haan F Schinveld 
17 Tjeerd Waterlander M Heerenveen 
18 Sabine Koebrugge F Groningen 
19 Linn Binnert F Assen 
20 Hans Van Baalen M ’s-Gravenhage 
 
PvdA 
List position Candidate Gender Municipality 
1 Diederik Samsom M Leiden 
2 Jet Bussemaker F Amsterdam 
3 Lodewijk Asscher M Amsterdam 
4 Jetta Klijnsma F ’s-Gravenhage 
5 Jeroen Dijsselbloem M Wageningen 
6 Mariëtte Hamer F Maassluis 
7 Martijn Van Dam M ’s-Gravenhage 
8 Tanja Jadnanansing F Amsterdam 
9 Ahmed Marcouch M Amsterdam 
10 Leontien Kompier F Vlagtwedde 
11 Hans Van der Pas M Rhenen 
12 Keklik Demir-Yücel F Deventer 
13 Jacques Monasch M Sneek 
14 Manon Fokke F Maastricht 
15 Mehmet Kavşitli M Middelburg 
16 Attje Kuiken F Breda 
17 Raymond Wanders M Emmen 
18 Carine Bloemhoff F Groningen 
19 Nelly Den Os F Lelystad 
20 Maarten Van Rossem M Utrecht 
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PVV 
List position Candidate Gender Municipality 
1 Geert Wilders M ’s-Gravenhage 
2 Fleur Agema F ’s-Gravenhage 
3 Martin Bosma M Amsterdam 
4 Reinette Klever F Ermelo 
5 Raymond Roon M Almere 
6 Lilian Helder F Venlo 
7 Léon De Jong M ’s-Gravenhage 
8 Annette Raijer F Almere 
9 Rene Eekhuis M Almere 
10 Daniëlle De Winter F ’s-Gravenhage 
11 Karen Gerbrands F ’s-Gravenhage 
12 Gidi Markuszower M Amstelveen 
13 Edgar Mulder M Zwolle 
14 Elly Broere-Kaal F Soest 
15 Ton Van Kesteren M Groningen 
16 Yvonne Waterman F Wouwse Plantage 
17 Peter Van Dijk M Goes 
18 Jitske Eizema F Leeuwarden 
19 Liesbeth Beving F Eelde 
20 Ronald Sörensen M Rotterdam 
 
CDA 
List position Candidate Gender Municipality 
1 Sybrand Van Haersma Buma M Voorburg 
2 Mona Keijzer F Volendam 
3 Raymond Knops M Hegelsom 
4 Agnes Mulder F Assen 
5 Pieter Omtzigt M Enschede 
6 Susan Faal-Takak F Rijssen 
7 Wilma Van der Rijt-Van der Kruis F Heeze 
8 Efstathios Andreou M Rotterdam 
9 Sander Van Waveren M Utrecht 
10 Ank Muller F Vlissingen 
11 Elske Van der Mik F Deventer 
12 Turan Yazir M Rotterdam 
13 Zegert Vis M Lochem 
14 Karin Dunning F Haren 
15 Fokke Molenaar M Urk 
16 Ananta Khemradj F Rotterdam 
17 John Heller M Breda 
18 Aletta Van Meer-Ruiten F Ermelo 
19 Marike Postma F Menameradiel 
20 Herman Wijffels M Maarn 
 
  
166 
Appendices for chapter 2 
Lists of candidates 
 
 
SP 
List position Candidate Gender Municipality 
1 Emile Roemer M Boxmeer 
2 Renske Leijten F Haarlem 
3 Ronald Raak M Amsterdam 
4 Tjitske Siderius F Zwolle 
5 Michiel Van Nispen M Breda 
6 Sadet Karabulut F Amsterdam 
7 Thijs Coppus M Horst aan de Maas 
8 Aisha Akhiat F 's-Gravenhage 
9 Pim Siegers M Nieuw Pekela 
10 Nicole van Gemert F Utrecht 
11 Lies van Aelst F Gorinchem 
12 Hasan Inekci M Nieuwegein 
13 Frank Wulms M West Maas en Waal 
14 Petra Meelker F Hoogezand-Sappemeer 
15 Rinus Pankow M Schouwen-Duiveland 
16 Roya Moayyed F Amsterdam 
17 Barend Houtman M Smallingerland 
18 Laura Van Os F Meppel 
19 Hemrika Vanessa F Lelystad 
20 Huub Oosterhuis M Amsterdam 
 
D66 
List position Candidate Gender Municipality 
1 Alexander Pechtold M Wageningen 
2 Stientje Van Veldhoven-van der Meer F Rijswijk 
3 Gerard Schouw M Dordrecht 
4 Pia Dijkstra F Utrecht 
5 Kees Verhoeven M Amersfoort 
6 Wassila Hachchi F Breda 
7 Michael Feelders M Heerhugowaard 
8 Selma Bas F Utrecht 
9 Gerbrant Fennema M Noordenveld 
10 Hilde Tjeerdema F Leeuwarden 
11 Martine Van Bemmel F Almere 
12 Gökhan Çoban M Veenendaal 
13 Danny Cevaal M Vlissingen 
14 Annet de Rooij F Bergen op Zoom 
15 Steven Rieder M Groningen 
16 Yassmine El Ksaihi F Amsterdam 
17 Bert Saarloos M Brunssum 
18 Sacha Kuijs F Bloemendaal 
19 Betsie Bijsterbosch F Almelo 
20 Hans Wijers M Utrecht 
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GroenLinks 
List position Candidate Gender Municipality 
1 Jesse Klaver M ’s-Gravenhage 
2 Liesbeth Van Tongeren F Amsterdam 
3 Rik Grashoff M Delft 
4 Linda Voortman F Utrecht 
5 Bas Eickhout M Utrecht 
6 Huri Sahin F Zoetermeer 
7 Pepijn Boekhorst M Nijmegen 
8 Saideh Hashemi F Alkmaar 
9 Carel Bruring M Goes 
10 Lisa Westerveld F Nijmegen 
11 Gea Smith F Assen 
12 Ahmed Harika M Rotterdam 
13 Roland van der Put M Almere 
14 Leanne Jansen F Dronten 
15 Rene Vink M Almelo 
16 Hayat Barrahmun F Venlo 
17 Jos Van Egmond M Smallingerland 
18 Katinka Waelbers F Oss 
19 Bea Moolenaar F Groningen 
20 Tof Thissen M Roermond 
 
ChristenUnie 
List position Candidate Gender Municipality 
1 Arie Slob M Zwolle 
2 Carola Schouten F Rotterdam 
3 Joël Voordewind M Amsterdam 
4 Carla Dik-Faber F Veenendaal 
5 Gert-Jan Segers M Hoogland 
6 Ixora Balootje F Rotterdam 
7 Arne Schaddelee M Houten 
8 Ravenna Kotadiny F Amsterdam 
9 Jurgen Van Houdt M Enschede 
10 Anja Haga F Leeuwarden 
11 Harmke Vlieg-Kempe F Assen 
12 Anil Kumar M 's-Gravenhage 
13 Arnout Van Kempen M Sint-Michielsgestel 
14 Lenny De Wolf F Meppel 
15 Ronald Kleiweg M Veendam 
16 Gea Gort F Rotterdam 
17 Maarten Van der Boon M Barneveld 
18 Tannie Kruit-de Bruijne F Vlissingen 
19 Marielle Woord F Urk 
20 Andries Knevel M Amsterdam 
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B.6. About the validity of the experiment 
An important issue is whether respondents understood the electoral rules under which they 
were asked to cast a vote. If respondents did not understand that they had different options 
than they are used to from real elections102, this very likely has an impact on the validity of 
the experiment. 
No questions were included in the survey to test whether respondents noticed, or 
understood the electoral rules (i.e. the experimental treatment). It is therefore difficult to 
say whether respondents understood the electoral rules. However, some insight could be 
gained by looking at the time respondents spent on the page where the electoral rules were 
explained. Table B.2 shows a comparison between the average time Dutch and Belgian 
respondents did spent on this page. It is clear that Belgian and Dutch respondents took 
more or less the same time to read the explanation in the first and fourth group: i.e. systems 
which neither are used to. It also shows that compared to the Dutch respondents, Belgians 
were quicker in reading the explanation for their own system (group 2). This is the other 
way around for group 3, which means that Dutch respondents have read the explanation of 
their own system faster than Belgian respondents did103. These results suggest that in general 
respondents have read the explanations accurately. 
 
Table B.2 Time spent on page with explanations of rules (country comparison) 
Group Country N Mean SE T-test 
1 Belgium 183 10.44 0.43 t(360.0)=-1.791 
 The Netherlands 181 11.57 0.46  
2 Belgium 194 9.44 0.45 t(369.5)=-3.177** 
 The Netherlands 185 11.61 0.51  
3 Belgium 194 7.86 0.33 t(365.6)= 3.119** 
 The Netherlands 179 6.52 0.28  
4 Belgium 195 8.73 0.36 t(392.2)= 0.131 
 The Netherlands 201 8.80 0.34  
Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001 
Source: Own dataset. The average time is given in seconds. Respondents who spent more than 30 
seconds on the page with the explanation of the electoral rules are excluded from this analysis (3.5 per 
cent of all respondents). 
 
Table B.3 provides information about the difference between respondents who made 
use of the options to cast a list vote or a multiple preference vote and the respondents who 
did not use these options. In all comparisons the group of respondents using an additional 
option on average spent more time on the page with the explanation of the voting rules than 
the group of respondents who did not use an additional option. In the Netherlands most of 
these differences are statistically significant, while in Belgium they are not. This is an 
                                                                
102 With the exception of Belgian respondents who were assigned to the 2nd group (list vote and multiple 
preference votes) and Dutch respondents who were assigned to the 3th group (single preference vote). 
103 This might also be a consequence of not including ‘pay attention’ in the explanation (see appendix B.2). 
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indication that some respondents, especially in the Netherlands, may not have been aware 
of the fact that they had other options because of ‘speeding through the survey’. On the 
other hand, since Dutch respondents on average spent more time on the page with the 
explanation of the rules in those groups were additional rules were explained, this does not 
seem to be problematic in terms of the overall results of the experiment. At least this might 
indicate a conservative estimation for the use of the list vote and multiple preference votes 
in the Netherlands. 
 
Table B.3 Time spent on page with explanations of rules (choice comparison) 
Group Category N Mean SE T-test 
Belgium 
1 No listvote 108 9.94 0.57 t(163.2)=-1.406 
 Listvote 75 11.16 0.66  
2 No listvote 125 8.82 0.53 t(122.4)=-1.767 
 Listvote 69 10.56 0.83  
 No multiple pref. votes 132 9.33 0.56 t(123.9)=-0.360 
 Multiple pref. votes 62 9.67 0.78  
4 No multiple pref. votes 87 7.68 0.49 t(191.5)=-2.732** 
 Multiple pref. votes 108 9.59 0.50  
 
The Netherlands 
1 No listvote 146 10.98 0.50 t(49.9)=-2.568* 
 Listvote 35 14.02 1.07  
2 No listvote 147 10.92 0.57 t(62.9)=-2.876** 
 Listvote 38 14.27 1.01  
 No multiple pref. votes 163 11.03 0.52 t(25.1)=-2.776* 
 Multiple pref. votes 22 15.90 1.68  
4 No multiple pref. votes 171 8.68 0.36 t(37.0)=-0.777 
 Multiple pref. votes 30 9.50 0.99  
Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001 
Source: Own dataset. The average times are given in seconds. Respondents who spent more than 30 
seconds on the page with the explanation of the electoral rules are excluded from this analysis (3.5 per 
cent of the total respondents). 
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B.7. Additional cross tabs 
Table B.4 Effect of list vote on votes for the list-puller 
In combination with single preference vote (Group 1 versus 3) 
 
Belgium 
2 (1) = 25.351, p < .001; 𝜑 = 
.256 
 The Netherlands 
2 (1) = 6.537, p = .011; 𝜑 = 
.131 
List vote  List vote 
No Yes Total  No Yes Total 
Not voted for list-
puller 
38% 64% 51% 
 
33% 46% 40% 
Voted for list-puller 62% 36% 49% 
 
67% 54% 60% 
Total (N) 195 192 387 
 
183 197 380 
In combination with multiple preference votes (Group 2 versus 4) 
 Belgium 
2 (1) = 20.983, p < .001; 𝜑 = 
.229 
 The Netherlands 
2 (1) = 8.119, p = .004; 𝜑 = 
.142 
List vote  List vote 
No Yes Total  No Yes Total 
Not voted for list-
puller 
34% 57% 46%  27% 40% 33% 
Voted for list-puller 66% 43% 54%  73% 60% 67% 
Total (N) 198 203 401  210 195 405 
Source: Own dataset. 
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Table B.5 Effect of list vote on voters for other candidates 
In combination with single preference vote (Group 1 versus 3) 
 Belgium 
2 (1) = 12.756, p < .001; 𝜑 = 
.182 
 The Netherlands 
2 (1) = 1.868, p = .172; 𝜑 = 
.070 
 List vote  List vote 
 No Yes Total  No Yes Total 
Not voted for other 
candidate 
62% 79% 70%  67% 73% 70% 
Voted for other 
candidate 
38% 21% 30%  33% 27% 30% 
Total (N) 195 192 387  183 197 380 
In combination with multiple preference votes (Group 2 versus 4) 
 Belgium 
2 (1) = 34.822, p < .001; 𝜑 = 
.295 
 The Netherlands 
2 (1) = 5.927, p = .015; 𝜑 = 
.121 
 List vote  List vote 
 No Yes Total  No Yes Total 
Not voted for other 
candidate 
26% 55% 40%  61% 73% 67% 
Voted for other 
candidate 
74% 45% 60%  39% 27% 33% 
Total (N) 198 203 401  210 195 405 
Source: Own dataset. 
  
172 
Appendices for chapter 2 
Additional cross tabs 
 
 
Table B.6 Effect of available number of preference votes on votes for list-puller 
In combination with compulsory candidate vote (Group 3 versus 4) 
 Belgium 
2 (1) =0.553, p =0.457; 𝜑 = 
.038 
 The Netherlands 
2 (1) =2.079, p =0.149; 𝜑 = 
.073 
 Preference votes  Preference votes 
 Single Multiple Total  Single Multiple Total 
Not voted for list-
puller 
38% 34% 36%  33% 27% 30% 
Voted for list-puller 62% 66% 64%  67% 73% 70% 
Total (N) 195 198 393  183 210 393 
In combination with list vote (Group 1 versus 2) 
 Belgium 
2 (1) =1.687, p =0.194; 𝜑 = 
.065 
 The Netherlands 
2 (1) =1.532, p =0.216; 𝜑 = 
.063 
 Preference votes  Preference votes 
 Single Multiple Total  Single Multiple Total 
Not voted for list-
puller 
64% 57% 60%  46% 40% 43% 
Voted for list-puller 35% 43% 40%  54% 60% 57% 
Total (N) 192 203 395  197 195 392 
Source: Own dataset. 
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Table B.7 Effect of available number of preference votes on votes for other candidates 
In combination with compulsory candidate vote (Group 3 versus 4) 
 Belgium 
2 (1) = 52.582, p < 0.001; 𝜑 = 
.366 
 The Netherlands 
2 (1) = 1.163, p = 0.281; 𝜑 = 
.054 
 Preference votes  Preference votes 
 Single Multiple Total  Single Multiple Total 
Not voted for other 
candidate 
62% 26% 44%  67% 61% 64% 
Voted for other 
candidate 
38% 74% 56%  33% 39% 36% 
Total (N) 195 198 393  183 210 393 
In combination with list vote (Group 1 versus 2) 
 Belgium 
2 (1) = 25.377, p < 0.001; 𝜑 = 
.253 
 The Netherlands 
2 (1) = 0.004, p = 0.951; 𝜑 = 
.003 
 Preference votes  Preference votes 
 Single Multiple Total  Single Multiple Total 
Not voted for other 
candidate 
79% 55% 66%  73% 73% 73% 
Voted for other 
candidate 
21% 45% 34%  27% 27% 27% 
Total (N) 192 203 395  197 195 392 
Source: Own dataset. 
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B.8. Additional logistic regression models 
Table B.8 Voting for list-puller & other candidates (with country dummy) 
 List-puller Other candidates 
(Constant) 0.586** -1.020*** 
 (0.208) (0.216) 
Option to cast a list vote -0.864*** -0.864*** 
 (0.126) (0.126) 
Option to cast multiple preference votes 0.333* 1.344*** 
 (0.164) (0.169) 
Netherlands 0.518** 0.142 
 (0.183) (0.188) 
Political interest (Ref. = not interested)   
 Somewhat interested 0.144 0.347* 
 (0.147) (0.150) 
 Highly interested 0.467* 0.328 
 (0.212) (0.215) 
Party member 0.102 0.334 
 (0.202) (0.202) 
Evaluation difference (Ref. = No difference)   
 List-puller < party -1.322*** 0.761*** 
 (0.164) (0.158) 
 List-puller > party 0.599*** -0.370* 
 (0.147) (0.149) 
Education (Ref. = low)   
 Middle -0.136 0.093 
 (0.160) (0.161) 
 High -0.664*** 0.367* 
 (0.167) (0.166) 
Multiple pref. votes * Netherlands -0.248 -1.012*** 
 (0.253) (0.253) 
-2LL 1509.385 1497.759 
Cox and Snell’s R2 0.147 0.138 
Nagelkerke R2 0.197 0.187 
N 1243 1243 
Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: Own dataset. 
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C.1. Included parties and list-pullers the Netherlands 
Party 1998 2002 2003 2010 2012 
CDA de Hoop 
Scheffer 
Balkenende Balkenende Balkenende van 
Haersma 
Buma 
CD Janmaat     
CU  Veling Rouvoet Rouvoet Slob 
D66 Borst-Eilers de Graaf de Graaf Pechtold Pechtold 
GPV Schutte     
GL Rosenmöller Rosenmöller Halsema Halsema Sap 
PvdD    Thieme Thieme 
LPF  Fortuijn Herben   
PvdA Kok Melkert Bos Cohen Samsom 
PVV    Wilders Wilders 
SGP  van der Vlies van der Vlies van der Staaij van der 
Staaij 
SP Marijnissen Marijnissen Marijnissen Roemer Roemer 
VVD Bolkestein Dijkstal Zalm Rutte Rutte 
  
176 
Appendices for chapter 3 
Descriptive statistics for variables entered in logistic regression models 
 
 
C.2. Descriptive statistics for variables entered in logistic regression 
models  
Table C.1 Descriptive statistics chapter 3 (the Netherlands) 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Preference vote 0.23 0.42   
Education     
 Elementary (REF) 0.08 0.28   
 (Lower) Vocational 0.15 0.36   
 Secondary 0.12 0.32   
 Middle level vocational. higher level 
 secondary 
0.32 0.46  
 
 Higher level vocational. University 0.33 0.47   
Political interest     
 Low (0) (REF) 0.06 0.24   
 1 0.42 0.49   
 2 0.25 0.43   
 3 0.18 0.39   
 High (4) 0.09 0.29   
Political knowledge     
 Low (0) (REF) 0.41 0.49   
 1 0.25 0.43   
 2 0.18 0.38   
 3 0.10 0.30   
 High (4) 0.06 0.25   
Qualified for politics     
 Fully agree 0.03 0.18   
 Agree 0.22 0.42   
 Disagree 0.45 0.50   
 Fully disagree (REF) 0.29 0.45   
Age of respondent 47.54 16.73 16 99 
Woman 0.51 0.50   
Country of origin (Ref. = Netherlands)     
 Netherlands 0.88 0.33   
 Western country 0.07 0.26   
 Non-western country 0.05 0.22   
Living outside Randstad 0.57 0.50   
Urbanization     
 Very strongly urban (REF) 0.16 0.36   
 Strongly urban 0.26 0.44   
 Mildly urban 0.21 0.41   
 Hardly urban 0.22 0.42   
 Not urban 0.15 0.36   
Party member 0.05 0.22   
Evaluation score list-puller - evaluation score 
party 
-0.12 1.44 -9 
9 
Evaluation score list-puller 7.36 1.68 0 10 
Number of candidates on party list 57.65 17.91 25 80 
Older party 0.73 0.44   
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Table C.2 Descriptive statistics chapter 3 (Belgium) 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Preference vote 0.50 0.50   
Education     
 Low (REF) 0.09 0.28   
 Middle 0.58 0.50   
 High 0.34 0.47   
Political interest 4.79 2.78 0 10 
Political knowledge     
 Low (0) (REF) 0.19 0.40   
 1 0.30 0.47   
 2 0.26 0.44   
 3 0.18 0.38   
 High (4) 0.07 0.25   
Age 47.97 17.32 18 84 
Woman 0.50 0.50   
Member political party 0.07 0.25   
Candidates on list 25.17 7.75 10 37 
Party old 0.58 0.49   
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C.3. Additional logistic regression models 
Table C.3 Preference voting in the Netherlands (including political knowledge) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
(Constant) -1.934*** (0.338) -1.454** (0.385) 
Education (Ref. = Elementary)     
 (Lower) Vocational 0.081 (0.188) 0.088 (0.193) 
 Secondary 0.203 (0.185) 0.252 (0.189) 
Middle level vocational, higher level 
secondary 
0.433* (0.176) 0.460* (0.181) 
 Higher level vocational, 
University 
0.496** (0.173) 0.505** (0.178) 
Political interest (Ref. = 0 (Low))     
 1 -0.086 (0.208) -0.006 (0.212) 
 2 0.105 (0.214) 0.165 (0.218) 
 3 0.200 (0.218) 0.277 (0.223) 
 4 (High) 0.298 (0.235) 0.430 (0.240) 
Qualified for politics (Ref. = fully disagree)     
 Disagree 0.105 (0.096) 0.138 (0.097) 
 Agree 0.193 (0.112) 0.231* (0.114) 
 Fully agree 0.496* (0.198) 0.503** (0.201) 
Political knowledge (Ref. = 0 (Low))     
 1 0.261** (0.094) 0.312** (0.096) 
 2 0.364** (0.121) 0.425*** (0.123) 
 3 0.388** (0.130) 0.427** (0.132) 
 4 (High) 0.428** (0.152) 0.516*** (0.155) 
Age -0.014*** (0.003) -0.012*** (0.003) 
Woman 0.386*** (0.076) 0.371*** (0.078) 
Living outside Randstad 0.152 (0.082) 0.166* (0.083) 
Urbanization (Ref. = Very strongly urban)     
 Strongly urban -0.355** (0.119) -0.370** (0.121) 
 Mildly urban -0.298* (0.125) -0.327* (0.127) 
 Hardly urban -0.367** (0.131) -0.403** (0.133) 
 Not urban -0.237 (0.140) -0.273 (0.143) 
Candidates on list 0.020*** (0.004) 0.019*** (0.004) 
Party old -0.105 (0.142) -0.132 (0.144) 
Evaluation score list-puller   -0.100*** (0.026) 
Evaluation score list-puller - evaluation score 
party 
  -0.194*** (0.031) 
-2LL 4658.198  4537.517  
Cox and Snell’s R2 0.063  0.087  
Nagelkerke R2 0.094  0.131  
N 4536  4536  
Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Standard errors in parentheses. Election dummies are included in 
model, but not presented here. Based on the elections of 1998, 2002 and 2010. 
Improvement model 2: 2 120.681, df = 2, p < .001. 
Source: DPES 1970-2006 integrated file; DPES 1998; DPES2002/03; DPES 2010. 
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Table C.4. Preference voting in the Netherlands (including country or origin) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
(Constant) -4.002*** (0.807) -3.332*** (0.897) 
Education (Ref. = Elementary)     
(Lower) Vocational 0.862 (0.567) 0.880 (0.570) 
Secondary 0.820 (0.594) 0.811 (0.597) 
Middle level vocational, higher level 
secondary 
1.193* (0.544) 1.200* (0.546) 
Higher level vocational, University 1.112* (0.549) 1.110* (0.551) 
Political interest (Ref. = 0 (Low))     
1 -0.144 (0.408) -0.043 (0.417) 
2 0.077 (0.416) 0.164 (0.425) 
3 0.172 (0.425) 0.281 (0.434) 
4 (High) 0.506 (0.447) 0.646 (0.456) 
Qualified for politics (Ref. = fully disagree)     
Disagree 0.130 (0.186) 0.144 (0.188) 
Agree 0.488* (0.019) 0.519 (0.212) 
Fully agree 0.775* (0.326) 0.804* (0.331) 
Age -0.007 (0.005) -0.006 (0.005) 
Woman 0.325* (0.141) 0.340* (0.143) 
Living outside Randstad 0.164 (0.151) 0.209 (0.153) 
Country of origin (Ref. = Netherlands)     
Western country 0.313 (0.246) 0.318 (0.249) 
Non-western country -0.321 (0.409) -0.281 (0.415) 
Urbanization (Ref. = Very strongly urban)     
Strongly urban -0.212 (0.219) -0.229 (0.222) 
Mildly urban -0.152 (0.230) -0.196 (0.233) 
Hardly urban -0.109 (0.239) -0.180 (0.242) 
Not urban -0.308 (0.275) -0.327 (0.279) 
Candidates on list 0.016 (0.008) 0.012 (0.008) 
Party old 0.358 (0.260) 0.502 (0.266) 
Evaluation score list-puller   -0.108* (0.051) 
Evaluation score list-puller - evaluation score 
party 
  -0.23*** (0.062) 
-2LL 1433.579  1397.855  
Cox and Snell’s R2 0.044  0.064  
Nagelkerke R2 0.074  0.108  
N 1665  1665  
Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Standard errors in parentheses. Election dummies are included in 
model, but not presented here. Based on the election of 2010. 
Improvement model 2: 2 35,724, df = 2, p < .001. 
Source: DPES 2010. 
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Table C.5. Preference voting in the Netherlands (including member political party) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
(Constant) -1.955*** (0.337) -1.481** (0.385) 
Education (Ref. = Elementary)     
 (Lower) Vocational 0.114 (0.188) 0.128 (0.192) 
 Secondary 0.280 (0.184) 0.339 (0.188) 
 Middle level vocational, higher level 
secondary 
0.500** 
(0.175) 
0.536** 
(0.179) 
 Higher level vocational, University 0.606*** (0.171) 0.631*** (0.175) 
Political interest (Ref. = 0 (Low))     
 1 -0.046 (0.207) 0.036 (0.211) 
 2 0.174 (0.212) 0.243 (0.217) 
 3 0.303 (0.216) 0.395 (0.221) 
 4 (High) 0.403 (0.232) 0.546* (0.237) 
Qualified for politics (Ref. = fully disagree)     
 Disagree 0.136 (0.095) 0.171 (0.097) 
 Agree 0.235* (0.111) 0.275* (0.113) 
 Fully agree 0.510** (0.199) 0.517* (0.202) 
Age -0.012*** (0.003) -0.011*** (0.003) 
Woman 0.360*** (0.076) 0.340*** (0.077) 
Living outside Randstad 0.148 (0.082) 0.160 (0.083) 
Urbanization (Ref. = Very strongly urban)     
 Strongly urban -0.356** (0.119) -0.370** (0.121) 
 Mildly urban -0.301* (0.125) -0.329** (0.127) 
 Hardly urban -0.362** (0.130) -0.395** (0.132) 
 Not urban -0.236 (0.140) -0.271 (0.142) 
Member political party 0.286 (0.147) 0.332* (0.150) 
Candidates on list 0.020*** (0.004) 0.019*** (0.004) 
Party old -0.097 (0.142) -0.117 (0.143) 
Evaluation score list-puller   -0.097*** (0.026) 
Evaluation score list-puller - evaluation score 
party 
  -0.190*** 
(0.031) 
-2LL 4670.474  4553.622  
Cox and Snell’s R2 0.060  0.084  
Nagelkerke R2 0.090  0.126  
N 4535  4535  
Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Standard errors in parentheses. Election dummies are included in 
model, but not presented here. Based on the elections of 1998, 2002 and 2010. 
Improvement model 2: 2 116.852, df = 2, p < .001. 
Source: DPES 1970-2006 integrated file; DPES 1998; DPES2002/03; DPES 2010. 
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D.1. Assigned positions for reference texts 
In the tables below the scores which are assigned to the reference texts are given. Scores are 
taken from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) 1999-2014 trend file (Bakker et al., 2015; 
Polk et al., 2017). For each legislative period the row labelled ‘CHES’ shows from which year 
in the survey the scores are used for the corresponding legislative period; for each legislative 
period the scores from the survey-year closed to start of the legislative term are used 
 
Belgium 
Party 2003-2007 2007-2010 2010-2014 
CD&V 5.95 5.56 5.79 
CDH 5.65 5.50 4.50 
Ecolo 2.56 2.83 2.29 
Groen 2.64 1.89 2.29 
MR 6.35 6.67 7.00 
N-VA 6.22 7.89 7.57 
OpenVLD 6.23 6.78 6.93 
PS 3.35 3.50 2.50 
Sp.A 3.50 3.22 3.43 
VB 9.55 9.67 9.86 
CHES 2002 2006 2010 
 
The Netherlands 
Party 1998-2002 2002-2003 2003-2006 2006-2010 2010-2012 2012-2017 
CDA 5.20 6.13 6.13 6.09 6.29 6.78 
D66 4.40 4.63 4.63 4.45 5.00 5.56 
GL 2.60 2.50 2.50 2.18 2.57 2.33 
LPF 
 
8.38 8.38 
   PvdA 3.80 4.00 4.00 3.73 3.86 3.67 
PVV 
  
 8.80 8.62 9.25 
SP 1.10 1.63 1.63 1.64 1.64 1.00 
VVD 6.90 7.38 7.38 7.45 7.86 7.89 
CHES 1999 2002 2002 2006 2010 2014 
  
182 
Appendices for chapter 4 
Measuring policy positions using Wordscores 
 
 
D.2. Measuring policy positions using Wordscores 
Once texts for individual members of parliament are prepared and reference texts are 
chosen, assigning a score to them using Wordscores is relatively easy. However, choosing 
the appropriate reference texts and preparing the virgin texts is not that easy. Several choices 
have to be made. This appendix addresses some issues of scoring texts using Wordscores. 
Some of the decisions which are made and discussed in section 4.3.3 are further explained in 
this section. In addition, some alternatives are discussed and the final choice defended. 
 
D.2.1 Additional information about the process  
The text files created for the MPs and parties were pre-processed using the computer 
program JFreq (Lowe, 2011). Since Wordscores counts words to estimate a position of a 
text, it would not make sense to include all Belgian parties in one analysis, since the country 
is bilingual. Therefore for Belgium two analyses are conducted: one for Flanders (Dutch 
speaking part of the country) and one for Wallonia (French speaking part of the country)104. 
With JFreq also a document-term matrix was created, containing for each document the 
frequency of all words in the entire corpus. Separate matrices were made for each legislative 
period in the Netherlands, the French-speaking MPs in Belgium and the Dutch-speaking 
MPs in Belgium. Based on the document-term matrices the policy positions of individual 
MPs were estimated, using the Quanteda-package in R (Benoit & Nulty, 2016). 
Some MPs are excluded from the analysis. Only MPs from parties who at least 
received four seats in each period they were represented in parliament are included in the 
analysis. In the end, the goal of the analysis is not so much to say something about the exact 
ideological position of a candidate, but more about how that ideological position deviates 
from the party line. Since the deviation is measured by calculating the difference between 
the average party score and the MP score, parties with one candidate are automatically ruled 
out: there is no difference to calculate. For very small parties with only two or three MPs the 
difference would not be that meaningful as well. With such small parties the difference 
would say just as much about the MPs own position as it would say something about the 
position(s) of the other one or two MP(s). 
This procedure leads to the inclusion of eight parties for the Netherlands. Six of 
them are represented in the entire period between 1998 and 2017: CDA, D66105, 
GroenLinks, PvdA, SP and VVD. Two parties were represented in fewer legislative periods: 
                                                                
104 In addition for each extracted paragraph of a speech it was determined whether the paragraph was primarily 
French or Dutch, using the detectlanguage function in Google spreadsheets. Most of the paragraphs were detected 
as either Dutch or French. For those paragraphs for which the function reported a different language, the language 
of the paragraph was coded manually. Paragraphs from MPs in Flanders which were primarily French, were 
excluded from the text file of that MP; and vice-versa. Furthermore, some paragraphs were in German; these were 
also excluded. 
105 Between 2006 and 2010 D66 only held 3 seats. However, the party is included since in the other legislative 
periods it had a substantially larger parliamentary party group. 
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LPF (2002-2003 and 2003-2006) and PVV (2006-2010, 2010-2012 and 2012-2017). In each 
legislative period these parties together held at least 138 (out of 150) seats. For Belgium 10 
parties are included: CD&V, CDH, ECOLO, Groen, MR, N-VA, openVLD, PS, sp.a, VB. 
These parties together held at least 144 (out of 150) seats. 
For Belgium, one other issue complicates the analysis. Some parties form a single 
parliamentary group in parliament, which might make it unclear what the party average is. 
For example, both green parties (Groen and ECOLO) form one parliamentary group in 
parliament. In the analysis these two are considered to be two different parties. This is partly 
a pragmatic choice: since Groen is the Flemish party and ECOLO the Walloon party, MPs of 
both parties speak in a different language and therefore have to be treated as two separate 
parties. But since they both participated in different regions of the country, and therefore 
one voter may only choose for candidates from ECOLO or only choose for candidates from 
Groen, this also makes sense on a substantial ground. 
A more difficult choice is what to do with the CD&V / N-VA cartel in the 2007 
elections (Pilet & Van Haute, 2008). The two parties formed an alliance before the elections 
and participated as one ‘party’. However, the alliance did not survive the entire legislative 
period. In September 2008 the alliance came to an end and continued as two separate 
parliamentary parties. In the 52nd legislative period (after the 2007 elections) 154 plenary 
sessions were held. In 52 of these the alliance existed, but in a large majority of the sessions 
the parties both had their own parliamentary group. All members of the CD&V and N-VA 
cartel will therefore be treated as being a member of either the CD&V parliamentary party 
group or the N-VA parliamentary party group for the entire legislative period106. 
Initially, Wordscores produces raw scores for each virgin text. These raw scores tend 
to cluster around the mean of the scores of the reference texts. The reason for the clustering 
of scores is that all texts contain ‘meaningless’ words, which are more or less used equally 
(in relative terms) across all texts. These raw scores are therefore difficult to interpret, since 
the scale on which they are placed is no longer intuitive. For example: if the original scale on 
which the reference texts were scored runs from 0 to 10, the scores for the virgin texts all 
will be closer to around 5. Therefore, within the original scale they do not make much sense 
anymore. For the regression models these raw scores are used, as suggested by Benoit and 
laver (2007, p. 109) since they “are informative relative to each other”. The advantage of 
using these raw scores for the regression analysis is that the results cannot be influenced by 
the way in which the raw scores were transformed. Transforming the raw scores has the 
advantage that they become intuitive again, but there are different ways in which they can 
be transformed and each way will result in a (slightly) different outcome. 
To get some notion whether the Wordscores analysis produces valid estimates, in 
this section boxplots containing the results of the analysis will be presented. However, for 
these boxplots the interpretation of scores plays a role and for this purpose in this section 
                                                                
106 In all other cases MPs are grouped in the same way as parliamentary groups were organized. 
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transformed scores are presented. There are different ways to transform the raw scores 
produced with Wordscores. One option is to use the original transformation method (Laver 
et al., 2003). However, Martin and Vanberg (2008) point out some difficulties with this 
transformation. If scores are transformed based on the original method, they depend on the 
combination of virgin texts and are no longer placed on the same scale as the reference 
texts, which complicates the interpretation of the scores. Therefore they propose another 
method. The scores presented below are transformed with the method proposed by Martin 
and Vanberg (from now on referred to as MV-method). The advantages of this method are 
that the transformed scores are independent of the included virgin texts and that the texts 
are placed on the same scale as the original scale which was used for the reference texts 
(Martin & Vanberg, 2008 also fur further details of the calculation of the transformed 
scores). 
Table D.1 shows the number of plenary sessions and submitted written questions 
analysed in each legislative period for the Netherlands. For 1,931 plenary sessions and 
38,265 written questions all contributions by MPs are extracted from these documents. 
Since one member in one legislative period is considered as an individual case, in total 1,106 
MPs held a seat between 1998 and 2012. For 960 of them it was possible to estimate their 
policy position based on contributions in plenary sessions, and for 862 the position based 
on written questions could be estimated. Some MPs were excluded because they were a 
member of one of the smallest parties and some members never participated in a debate or 
submitted a written question: members of parliament who became a minister in the newly 
formed government for example. In addition some MPs were excluded because their total 
contribution of speeches and questions did not exceed 500 words. Since for shorter texts the 
uncertainty of the policy positions obtained by Wordscores increases (Laver et al., 2003, p. 
315), these texts are excluded. Figure D.1 shows the policy positions which were measured 
based on these texts, in the form of a boxplot per party per legislative period. For the 
purpose of interpretation the policy position which are shown in this figure are the 
transformed scores, based on the MV- method. These boxplots suggest that the way the 
policy positions are measured works. It shows variation within political parties of policy 
position from individual MPs. At the same time, individual politicians from a party seem to 
cluster around an expected party position. 
In Belgium the policy positions for members of parliament from three legislative periods 
(2003-2007, 2007-2010 and 2010-2014) were measured. All contributions by MPs in 353 
plenary sessions and from 53,158 written questions were extracted from the parliamentary 
documents to create separate documents for each MP. From 181 Dutch speaking and 133 
French speaking MPs it was possible to determine a policy position based on their 
contributions to plenary sessions. Based on written questions, a position could be estimated 
for 272 Dutch speaking MPs and 189 French speaking MPs (see table d.2). Figure D.2 shows 
per party and per legislative term a boxplot for the policy positions of individual MPs. The 
transformed scores according to the MV-method based on the documents containing
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Figure D.1 Policy positions of Dutch MPs per party per legislative period 
 
 
Table D.1 Analysed documents to measure positions of MPs (the Netherlands) 
Legislative 
period 
MPs Plenary sessions Written questions 
Analyzed1 MPs2 Words3 Analyzed1 MPs2 Words3 
1998-2002 189 403 161 73055 5577 144 8864 
2002-2003 173 61 136 11957 1044 90 2145 
2003-2006 187 389 167 66170 7185 157 11582 
2006-20104 186 353 167 69469 5813 158 14803 
2010-2012 176 228 158 49224 6345 149 11420 
2012-2017 195 497 171 107548 12301 164 23225 
Total 1106 1931 960 64800 38265 862 12920 
Source: own dataset. 
1 Number of plenary sessions / written questions for the entire legislative period, from which texts 
from individual MPs were obtained. 
2 Number of MPs from parties included in the analysis and whose own document contained at least 
500 words.  
3 Average length of the text in words (before pre-processing) for those MPs mentioned in the previous 
column.  
4 In this period there were 383 plenary sessions. However, from 30 of them (between April and 
October 2009) the minutes were only available in a format from which it was not possible to 
automatically extract all speakers and their speeches. Therefore these plenary sessions are excluded. 
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Figure D.2 Policy positions of Belgian MPs per party per legislative period 
 
 
Table D.2 Analysed documents to measure positions of MPs (Belgium) 
Legislative 
period 
MPs Plenary sessions Written questions 
Analyzed1 MPs2 Words3 Analyzed1 MPs2 Words3 
Dutch speaking parliamentarians 
2003-2007 115 - - - 10555 90 19263 
2007-2010 106 154 89 18330 15538 91 26776 
2010-2014 102 199 92 25844 14548 91 30484 
Total 323 353 181 22149 40641 272 25650 
 
French speaking parliamentarians 
2003-2007 89 - - - 2341 56 7407 
2007-2010 89 154 70 13980 5172 67 15074 
2010-2014 90 199 63 21007 5004 66 16118 
Total 258 353 133 17308 12517 189 13167 
Source: own dataset. 
1 Number of plenary sessions / written questions for the entire legislative period, from which texts 
from individual MPs were obtained. 
2 Number of MPs from parties included in the analysis and whose own document contained at least 
500 words.  
3 Average length of the text in words (before pre-processing) for those MPs mentioned in the previous 
column.  
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D.2.2 Combing speeches and questions or not? 
With the texts obtained from official documents containing the speeches and written 
questions two things can be done: 1) combine speeches and written questions into a single 
virgin text, or 2) create two different virgin texts per MP, one with his or her speeches in 
plenary sessions and one with the written questions. I prefer the second option, both for 
theoretical and methodological reasons. The theoretical considerations are discussed in 
chapter 4. There are, however, also methodological reasons to choose for two different sets 
of virgin texts. Speeches and questions are two different types of texts. First of all, questions 
are shorter than regular contributions to the parliamentary debate. Second, questions are 
written while contributions to the debate in parliament are spoken. This leads to a different 
use of words. Since Wordscores is based on counting words, combining both would create 
possible problems. For example, if both texts would be combined the score of an MP might 
depend on the ratio questions/speeches, which would not be meaningful107. It is therefore 
from a methodological point of view, better to keep the texts separated and estimate two 
different scores based on the two sets of texts. 
 
D.2.3 Preparing the virgin texts 
The second decision to be made is to what extent virgin texts should be prepared and 
adjusted before using Wordscores to estimate the policy positions for the texts. The 
minimum requirements are to delete common stop words, which are useless in these texts 
anyway. Since we would expect that each MP would use them approximately in the same 
way, these stop words would receive an average score and would only pull all MPs more 
towards the middle of the range on which the texts are scored. In addition, words were 
reduced to their stems. I only excluded general stop words, so no stop words which are 
specific for parliament. For example, the word ‘Speaker’ is used many times, without having 
a substantive meaning. This is not problematic for the analysis. Assuming that all members 
approximately use these terms on a relative equal basis, the only effect it has is that scores 
would all move somewhat more to the centre. One thing which I tested was to see whether it 
made a difference to exclude words from the reference texts and virgin texts which were 
only used by a single MP.  
Figure D.3 shows the effect of also excluding single word usage (CLEAN) compared 
to only removing stop words (FULL), for the legislative period 2003-2006 in the 
Netherlands as an example. Removing these words has only a small effect. The correlation 
between deviation from the average score based on the FULL-method and deviation from 
the average score based on the CLEAN-method is extremely high (.911, p = < .01). Since 
this does not have an effect, in the analyses presented in chapter 4 and 5 the FULL-models 
are used. 
 
                                                                
107 This does not mean that I argue that the ratio on its one is not interesting. However, in the context of estimating 
positions with Wordscores it is not. 
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Figure D.3 Effect of removing individual use of words in Wordscores 
 
 
D.2.4 Choosing the reference texts 
Choosing the right reference texts is the next step. There are various options. First, one 
could use the manifesto of the party to use as a reference texts. However, this would results 
in a comparison of two different texts. Manifestos have a different ‘language’ than (spoken) 
speeches or (much shorter) written questions. Therefore we would compare texts which in 
essence already are different, which would not work. A second option is to use the text of 
the parliamentary party group leaders and use their texts as reference texts. The advantage 
would be that we would compare speeches with speeches and written questions with written 
questions. However, while based on face validity this provides relatively good results, at least 
to how the MPs of different parties are scored towards each other, this has a major setback. 
The number of words which can be scored is namely extremely low: leaders do not always 
discuss all topics (as extensively) as specialists do. To overcome these problems, as explained 
in the methodological section in chapter four, I combine all virgin texts of MPs in one text, 
which serves as the reference texts for that party. 
 
D.2.5 Including the estimated text in the reference text or not? 
There is one important and potential problematic consequence of the choice to combine the 
virgin texts of co-partisans into a single party reference text. For each virgin text for which a 
score is estimated, in one of the reference texts the same virgin text is included. rom a 
theoretical point of view this can be defended: the goal of the Wordscores analysis presented 
in this book is to measure the deviation of an MP to the average party score. Thus, that the 
MP for which the deviation is estimated also influences the average seems justified. 
However, the question is which effect this has in methodological terms. Do we still get valid 
results when this choice is made? In order to asses this I did two tests. First, I run the 
Wordscores without words which are only used by a single MP as already discussed. Second, 
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I run the Wordscores without the virgin text for which a score is estimated included in the 
reference text. In this procedure when we want to score 150 virgin texts, instead of using 1 
set of reference texts (which is the normal procedure) we need 150 different sets of reference 
texts. In each set of reference texts the text of MP-x is excluded and based on that set of 
reference texts a score is estimated for MP-x. In the end this results in 150 scores of separate 
Wordscores analyses, one for MP-1, one for MP-2 etc. These 150 scores are then combined 
as if they came from one single Wordscores analysis. Of course, this solution is not ideal, 
since the reference texts are not identical for all virgin texts, but it is the best estimation of 
the effect of an overlap in virgin- and reference texts. Figure D.4 shows the distribution of 
scores for texts, with the virgin text excluded from the reference text, for the legislative 
period between 2003 and 2006 in the Netherlands. What it shows is that all scores assigned 
to MPs move towards the middle of the scale. We still see that the boxplots for the parties 
are roughly in the order in which we would expect them, but the overlap is relatively large. 
This is even more so for the analysis based on the written questions. Including the virgin 
texts in the reference texts thus pulls the boxplot of a party more towards the position on 
which we would expect that party. This could be problematic; however, I am only interested 
in intraparty competition. And if we would calculate the deviation based on the analysis 
presented in Figure D.4 and compare it with the deviation used in the analyses in chapter 4 
and 5, there is a very high and statistically significant correlation (0.803, p < 0.01). While we 
should be aware of this effect, it thus seems that the results can be used for the analyses 
presented in this chapter. Including the virgin texts in the reference texts does not create 
major problems for the validity of a measurement of intraparty competition. 
 
Figure D.4 Effect of excluding an MP’s own text from the reference text 
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D.3. Descriptive statistics for analyses chapter 4 
Table D.3 Descriptive statistics for analysis chapter 4 (the Netherlands) 
Variable N Mean Median SD Min Max 
Preference votes 3591 -0.82 -0.88 0.68 -2.66 1.63 
Woman 3591 0.33 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 
First woman on list 3591 0.02 0.00 0.14 0.00 1.00 
Non-western background 3591 0.06 0.00 0.23 0.00 1.00 
First non-western background 3591 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.00 1.00 
List position (log) 3591 1.26 1.32 0.37 0.30 1.90 
List position (relative to elected 
members) 
1869 1.04 1.22 0.50 0.02 1.50 
List-pusher 3591 0.02 0.00 0.14 0.00 1.00 
Member of parliament t-1 3591 0.18 0.00 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Minister t-1 3591 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.00 1.00 
Junior minister t-1 3591 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.00 1.00 
Party - Candidates 1869 58.04 57.00 17.38 20.00 80.00 
Party - Evaluation list-pusher 1869 7.27 7.45 0.69 3.76 8.32 
Party - Old 1869 0.73 1.00 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Party - Government t-1 1869 0.49 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Party - Left Right scale 1869 5.23 5.20 2.21 1.00 9.25 
Party - Populist 1869 0.18 0.00 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Deviation (Plenary sessions) 433 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.14 
Deviation (Written questions) 394 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.44 
 
Table D.4 Descriptive statistics for analysis chapter 4 (Belgium) 
Variable N Mean Median SD Min Max 
Preference votes 6943 0.60 0.54 0.34 -0.24 1.73 
Woman 6943 0.49 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
First woman on list 6943 0.06 0.00 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Non-western background 6943 0.05 0.00 0.21 0.00 1.00 
First non-western background 6943 0.02 0.00 0.15 0.00 1.00 
List position (log) 6943 0.81 0.90 0.38 0.00 1.38 
List-pusher 6943 0.08 0.00 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Member of parliament t-1 6943 0.06 0.00 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Minister t-1 6943 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.00 1.00 
Junior minister t-1 6943 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 
Party - Effective candidates 3430 17.64 19.00 5.48 4.00 24.00 
Party - Old 3430 0.56 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Party - Government t-1 3430 0.51 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Party - Populist 3430 0.13 0.00 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Party - Left Right scale 3430 5.32 5.56 2.40 1.89 9.86 
Deviation (Plenary sessions) 174 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.18 
Deviation (Written questions) 262 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.45 
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E. Appendix 5  
E.1. Rank difference for non-incumbents and incumbents 
Table E.1 Rank difference for non-incumbents and incumbents (the Netherlands) 
Election Category N % Mean RD SE T-test 
Non-incumbents 
1998 Not running in 2002 86 53.8 3.20 1.11 t(155.7)=1.170 
 Running in 2002 74 46.3 1.31 1.17  
2002 Not running in 2003 67 38.3 2.44 1.65 t(120.6)=-0.234 
 Running in 2003 108 61.7 2.88 1.08  
2003 Not running in 2006 141 78.8 1.90 0.80 t(69.4)=2.140* 
 Running in 2006 38 21.2 -1.32 1.27  
2006 Not running in 2010 185 82.6 2.52 0.88 t(73.5)=0.275 
 Running in 2010 39 17.4 2.08 1.37  
2010 Not running in 2012 212 66.9 1.58 0.91 t(231.2)=-0.926 
 Running in 2012 105 33.1 2.92 1.14  
2012 Not running in 2017 258 76.6 1.28 0.76 t(150.1)=-0.297 
 Running in 2017 79 23.4 1.70 1.17  
 
Incumbents 
1998 Not running in 2002 60 31.7 -3.40 1.33 t(147.4)=-1.191 
 Running in 2002 129 68.3 -1.27 1.19  
2002 Not running in 2003 35 21.0 -4.00 1.74 t(53.6)=-0.862 
 Running in 2003 132 79.0 -2.31 0.90  
2003 Not running in 2006 69 37.5 -1.71 0.99 t(181.9)=-0.692 
 Running in 2006 115 62.5 -0.57 1.31  
2006 Not running in 2010 59 32.6 -2.10 1.90 t(98.1)=0.521 
 Running in 2010 122 67.4 -3.25 1.10  
2010 Not running in 2012 53 30.1 -3.98 1.36 t(98.1)=-0.379 
 Running in 2012 123 69.9 -3.37 0.89  
2012 Not running in 2017 78 40.0 -2.94 1.31 t(159.2)=-0.607 
 Running in 2017 117 60.0 -1.93 1.02  
Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001 
Source: Own dataset. Included are all candidates who participated in election t in all districts from the 
same position, of parties who at least won a seat in the elections between 1998-2017. 
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Table E.2 Rank difference for non-incumbents and incumbents (Belgium) 
Year Category N % Mean RD SE T-test 
Non-incumbents 
2003 Not running in 2007 706 74.2 -0.41 0.20 t(438.8)=-3.863*** 
 Running in 2007 245 25.8 1.08 0.33  
2007 Not running in 2010 585 61.7 -0.39 0.20 t(679.5)=-2.417** 
 Running in 2010 363 38.3 0.49 0.30  
2010 Not running in 2014 902 83.2 -0.13 0.17 t(257.2)=-1.836 
 Running in 2014 182 16.8 0.64 0.38  
 
Incumbents 
2003 Not running in 2007 34 24.5 0.62 0.79 t(42.97)=0.574 
 Running in 2007 105 75.5 0.13 0.30  
2007 Not running in 2010 28 19.7 1.29 1.06 t(32.31)=0.981 
 Running in 2010 114 80.3 0.20 0.33  
2010 Not running in 2014 58 43.0 0.41 0.61 t(64.2)=1.098 
 Running in 2014 77 57.0 -0.27 0.15  
Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001 
Source: Own dataset. Included are all effective candidates of parties who won at least one seat in the 
elections between 2003-2014. 
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E.2. Descriptive statistics for analyses chapter 5 
Table E.3 Descriptive statistics for analyse chapter 5 (the Netherlands) 
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max 
I - Effect preference votes on legislative behaviour (plenary sessions) (N=923) 
Deviation from average party score 
(plenary sessions) 
0.03 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.19 
Preference votes (% individual threshold) 0.27 0.13 0.31 0.01 1.00 
List position (relative to elected 
members) 
0.69 0.67 0.41 0.02 4.43 
Government party 0.58 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
MP t-1 0.47 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
 
II - Effect preference votes on legislative behaviour (written questions) (N=839) 
Deviation from average party score 
(written questions) 
0.06 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.44 
Preference votes t (% individual 
threshold) 
0.26 0.13 0.30 0.00 1.00 
List position t (relative to elected 
members) 
0.70 0.70 0.40 0.02 4.43 
Government party 0.54 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
MP t-1 0.47 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
 
III - Effect rank difference t-1 on list position t (N=1040) 
Position t (log) 1.12 1.18 0.41 0.00 1.88 
Rank difference t-1 -1.03 -1.00 11.66 -43.00 45.00 
Position t-1 (log) 1.19 1.26 0.38 0.30 1.87 
MP t-1 0.61 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Minister t-1 0.02 0.00 0.14 0.00 1.00 
Junior minister t-1 0.02 0.00 0.15 0.00 1.00 
Woman 0.33 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 
 
IV - Effect preference votes on becoming (junior) minister (N=915) 
Government 0.08 0.00 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Minister 0.04 0.00 0.20 0.00 1.00 
Junior minister 0.04 0.00 0.21 0.00 1.00 
Preference votes (% individual threshold) 0.20 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Women 0.37 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Government t-1 0.06 0.00 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Minister t-1 0.03 0.00 0.17 0.00 1.00 
Junior minister t-1 0.03 0.00 0.18 0.00 1.00 
Position t (log) 1.41 1.51 0.37 0.30 1.90 
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Table E.4 Descriptive statistics for analyse chapter 5 (Belgium) 
Variable Mean Median SD MIN MAX 
I - Effect preference votes on legislative behaviour (plenary sessions) (N=231) 
Deviation from average party score 
(plenary sessions) 
0.04 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.18 
Preference votes t (% individual 
threshold) 
0.56 0.52 0.25 0.10 1.00 
List position t (relative to elected 
members) 
0.62 0.50 0.92 0.00 7.67 
Government party 0.63 1.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 
MP t-1 0.64 1.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 
 
II - Effect preference votes on legislative behaviour (written questions) (N=328) 
Deviation from average party score 
(written questions) 
0.06 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.45 
Preference votes t (% individual 
threshold) 
0.56 0.51 0.26 0.10 1.00 
List position t (relative to elected 
members) 
0.69 0.50 1.06 0.00 11.50 
Government party 0.60 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
MP t-1 0.62 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
 
III - Effect rank difference t-1 on list position t (N=931) 
Position t (log) 0.64 0.70 0.43 0.00 1.38 
Rank difference t-1 0.46 0.00 4.34 -15.00 23.00 
Position t-1 (log) 0.66 0.70 0.41 0.00 1.38 
MP t-1 0.28 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Minister t-1 0.03 0.00 0.17 0.00 1.00 
Junior minister t-1 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.00 
Woman 0.45 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
 
IV - Effect preference votes on becoming (junior) minister (N=1639) 
Minister 0.03 0.00 0.18 0.00 1.00 
Junior minister 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.00 1.00 
Government 0.04 0.00 0.20 0.00 1.00 
Preference votes t (% individual 
threshold) 
0.30 0.21 0.26 0.03 1.00 
Women 0.49 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Minister t-1 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.00 1.00 
Junior minister t-1 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.00 
Government t-1 0.03 0.00 0.18 0.00 1.00 
Position t (log) 0.84 0.90 0.37 0.00 1.38 
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E.3. The causal link between preference votes & deviation from the 
party 
In two chapters of this book I test the relationship between the number of preference votes 
for a candidate and the deviation from the party line by that candidate. In the fourth 
chapter, where I focus on what factors impact the electoral success of a candidate, I test 
whether deviating from the party line in a certain legislative period affects the number of 
preference votes a candidate receives in the subsequent elections. In chapter five I test 
whether the preference votes a candidate receives influence whether he or she deviates more 
from the party line in the legislative period which follows after the election. In both chapters 
I do not find a strong relationship between both variables. It seems that in either direction 
both variables do not influence each other. 
However, if preference votes and deviation from the party line have a relationship, 
which works in both ways and reinforces each other, then maybe the methods used in the 
fourth and fifth chapter were not sufficient to pick up the effects. Therefore, I conducted 
some additional analyses. I test the relationship not with all possible cases in my dataset, but 
only around the first legislative term of a candidate to see whether the results change. By 
looking only at the first time an event happens the problem of the possible reinforcing 
relationship disappears. For example, if a candidate served as an MP in three legislative 
terms, instead of including three cases for that candidate, only the first legislative term 
would be included. Furthermore, for the Netherlands, for which I have data over a longer 
time period, for some candidates I show the evolution of their preference votes and 
behaviour in parliament to see if we can find any patterns. 
Table E.5 shows the replication of the analyses from chapter 4 (see table 4.4, page 87 
and table 4.7, page 92). This table only shows the relevant variables for this additional 
analysis; the other variables included in the analyses are not presented here. Only candidates 
are included who at a certain election were a member of parliament in the legislative period 
before the election for the first time. The results for the Netherlands are based on the 
elections between 2003 and 2017 and for Belgium of the 2010 and 2014 elections. The 
results do not change dramatically if we only look at the effect of a first legislative period for 
a candidate on his or her number of preference votes. The only differences are that the effect 
of deviation from the party line measured based on written questions has a positive 
influence on preference votes for candidates lower on the list. However, this difference is 
very small. With regard to Belgium we see in the third model that deviating from the party 
line has a negative influence on preference votes in the next election for all candidates. This 
latter finding is in contrast with the results presented in chapter 4, where the effect for 
candidates lower on the list was positive instead of negative. The effects for written 
questions are bigger. Deviating from the average party score has a substantial positive effect 
for those candidates lower on the list: they get a bonus of 5 percentage points preference 
votes. However, all in all we should conclude that the effects are limited when we only look
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Table E.5 Effect of deviation on preference votes after first legislative period 
 The Netherlands Belgium 
 Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4 
(Intercept) 1.557* 1.435* 1.416*** 1.431*** 
 (0.733) (0.673) (0.082) (0.083) 
List position -0.413* -0.536** -0.639*** -0.886*** 
 (0.177) (0.194) (0.091) (0.105) 
Deviation (Plenary sessions) t-1 2.591  -0.342  
 (3.324)  (0.775)  
Deviation (Written questions) t-1  -4.736*  0.027 
  (1.882)  (0.446) 
Deviation*list position -2.350 4.006 -3.194 1.949 
 (4.361) (2.873) (2.041) (1.021) 
AIC 193.8 163.0 -47.2 -46.8 
BIC 242.8 210.3 -9.2 -9.6 
Log likelihood -79.9 -64.5 39.6 39.4 
Observations 132 119 79 76 
Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Other 
variables which were included in the origin models in chapter 4 were included, but the results for 
these variables did not change and are therefore not presented here. The same applies to the random 
intercepts for parties, elections and (for Belgium) districts.  
Source: own dataset. 
 
at the effects of deviating from the party for those candidates who were a member of 
parliament for the first time. The first event analysis for this part (replication of analysis 
chapter 4) is less convincing than it is for the next part (replication of analysis chapter 5), 
since by definition the election of a candidate after his or hers first legislative period is 
already the second election in which the candidate participates. The behaviour of the MP 
therefore could have been influenced by the number of preference votes he or she received 
in his or her first election. This problem is not applicable when replicating the analysis for 
chapter 5, since here we look at the relationship between the election results of a candidate’s 
first election and the behaviour of the candidate in his or her first legislative term. 
Table E.6 shows the replication of the analyses presented in chapter 5 (see table 5.1, page 
107 and table 5.2, page 107), to test whether candidates who receive more preference votes, 
deviate more from the average party score in the legislative period after the election. For the 
Netherlands I include candidates from the elections between 2002 and 2012 (five elections) 
and for Belgium from 2007 until 2010 (two elections)108. I only include a candidate if he or 
she did not participate in the previous election. The effects of preference votes on the 
behaviour of an MP are visualized in figure e.1. The results based on this selection are not 
essentially different from the results presented in the fifth chapter. First, the effects of 
preference votes on the behaviour of MPs remain limited. Second, the direction of the 
effects is the same in almost all models. Only in the Netherlands the effect of preference 
                                                                
108 I do not include the Dutch elections of 1998 and the Belgium elections of 2003, because I have no data for all 
candidates whether they participated in the previous election or not.  
Appendices for chapter 5 
The causal link between preference votes & deviation from the party  
197 
 
votes on the deviation from the average party score, based on written questions, changes 
from a positive to a negative effect. However, in both cases the effect stays very limited and 
therefore we can hardly say that this has a substantial influence. 
 
Table E.6 Effect of preference votes on deviation in first legislative period 
 The Netherlands Belgium 
 Plenary 
sessions 
Written 
questions 
Plenary 
sessions 
Written 
questions 
(Constant) 0.030** 0.063*** 0.033** 0.097*** 
 (0.008) (0.013) (0.012) (0.022) 
Preference votes 0.010 -0.013 0.001 -0.047 
 (0.007) (0.014) (0.021) (0.043) 
List position 0.004 0.010 0.015* -0.008 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.011) 
Government party -0.001 -0.004 -0.018 -0.035* 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.017) 
AIC -1147.8 -681.1 -201.9 -134.6 
BIC -1122.7 -656.9 -186.6 -119.1 
Log likelihood 580.9 347.5 108.9 75.3 
Observations 267 235 50 51 
Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
Random intercepts for parties, elections and (in the case of Belgium) districts were included, there was 
no variation between the intercepts for the different groups. 
Source: Own dataset. 
 
Figure E.1 Effects of preference votes on deviation in first legislative period 
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Figure E.2 and figure e.3 show the evolution of preference votes for candidates who 
were an MP for 5 or 6 legislative periods in the Netherlands between 1998 and 2017, and 
their deviation from the average party score. In figure e.2 the deviation is based on the text 
analyses of speeches in plenary sessions and in figure e.3 on the written questions MPs 
submitted. These figures show no clear pattern. It also does not look like different types of 
MPs exist. There is for example not a group of MPs who constantly deviate more from the 
party line if they receive more preference votes, and vice versa. There are also no MPs who 
constantly receive more preference votes if they deviate more from the party line in the 
previous legislative period. Based on the additional evidence presented in this appendix the 
conclusions of chapter 4 and chapter 5 still stand. 
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Figure E.2 Preference votes & deviation from the party (Plenary sessions) 
 
The solid line represents the evaluation of the preference votes for a candidate, as a percentage of the 
individual threshold, with a maximum score of 1 (right y-axis). The dashed line represents the 
deviation from the average party score (left y-axis).  
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Figure E.3 Preference votes & deviation from the party (Written questions) 
 
The solid line represents the evaluation of the preference votes for a candidate, as a percentage of the 
individual threshold, with a maximum score of 1 (right y-axis). The dashed line represents the 
deviation from the average party score (left y-axis).
  
 
Nederlandstalige samenvatting 
Tweede Orde Personalisering: Voorkeurstemmen in België en Nederland 
In de politiek gaat het tegenwoordig steeds meer om de persoon van de politicus en minder 
om de partij. Kiezers zouden hun stem meer laten afhangen van het karakter en uiterlijk van 
de leider van een politieke partij dan van de standpunten van die partij. Althans, dat is een 
veelgehoorde uitspraak over de politiek die, hoewel het soms lijkt alsof er in de media en de 
politiek zelf geen discussie meer nodig is en ‘personalisering van de politiek’ als een 
vaststaand feit wordt gezien, in de wetenschappelijke literatuur nog ter discussie staat. 
Sommige wetenschappers vinden bewijs voor een trend van personalisering, andere vinden 
dit bewijs niet. Zo blijkt uit onderzoek in Nederland bijvoorbeeld dat maar een heel klein 
deel van de kiezers nog steeds op de kandidaat van hun keuze zou stemmen als deze bij een 
andere partij op de lijst zou staan.  
Toch blijkt uit onderzoek dat voor een aanzienlijk deel van het electoraat de 
kandidaat wel belangrijk is, maar pas nadat er een keuze is gemaakt voor de partij. Het 
uitgangspunt in dit proefschrift is dat personen er wel toe kunnen doen, maar dat de partij 
nog steeds belangrijker blijft. De keuze voor een kandidaat is bij de kiezer het resultaat van 
een proces van twee stappen: de kiezer kiest eerst welke partij hij of zij stemt, en maakt 
daarna een keuze tussen de kandidaten van die partij. De kandidaatskeuze is daarmee niet 
zozeer een gevolg van competitie tussen kandidaten (met name politiek leiders) van 
verschillende partijen, maar een gevolg van competitie tussen kandidaten binnen één partij. 
Er is wel sprake van personalisering, maar deze is van de tweede orde. Voor een goed begrip 
van personalisering is het dus niet alleen belangrijk om politieke leiders te onderzoeken, 
maar zullen alle kandidaten die deelnemen aan verkiezingen in onderzoek betrokken 
moeten worden. 
De centrale vraag in dit proefschrift is wat de oorzaken en gevolgen van 
voorkeurstemmen zijn (in systemen waar het mogelijk is om niet alleen een keuze te maken 
tussen partijen, maar ook tussen meerdere kandidaten van één partij). Vier verschillende 
onderwerpen worden behandeld, die samen een antwoord op deze vraag kunnen geven: 1) 
de invloed van het kiesstelsel op het uitbrengen van een voorkeurstem; 2) welke kiezers 
voorkeurstemmen uitbrengen; 3) welke kandidaten voorkeurstemmen ontvangen; en 4) 
welke gevolgen voorkeurstemmen voor kandidaten hebben voor hun politieke carrière en 
parlementair gedrag. In bestaande onderzoeken naar voorkeurstemmen staat veelal één van 
deze onderdelen centraal. De toegevoegde waarde van dit proefschrift is dat het kijkt naar al 
deze factoren, en dat conclusies per deelonderwerp met elkaar in verband gebracht worden 
om zo een completer beeld te krijgen van de oorzaken en gevolgen van voorkeurstemmen. 
Personalisering van de politiek wordt voor het nationale niveau onderzocht in België 
en Nederland, landen waar de kiezer door het uitbrengen van een voorkeurstem de 
mogelijkheid heeft een keuze te maken tussen kandidaten die voor dezelfde partij op de lijst 
staan. De competitie voor zetels in het parlement gaat in beide landen in de eerste plaats 
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tussen partijen: het aantal stemmen op de partij bepaalt het aantal zetels voor de partij. 
Vervolgens worden de zetels voor een partij verdeeld onder de kandidaten die voor de partij 
deelnamen aan de verkiezingen. Zowel in Nederland als België hebben de partijen en de 
kiezer invloed op welke kandidaten verkozen worden. De partij heeft invloed door het 
opstellen van een lijst met kandidaten, die in principe de volgorde bepaalt waarop de 
kandidaten verkozen worden. Met andere woorden: als een partij bij de verkiezing 5 zetels 
wint, zullen de 5 eerste kandidaten op de lijst de zetels innemen. Echter, ook de kiezer heeft 
invloed: als een kandidaat genoeg stemmen haalt, kan hij of zij de lijstvolgorde doorbreken. 
In Nederland moet een kandidaat bij verkiezingen voor de Tweede Kamer ten minste 25% 
van de kiesdeleri halen om op basis van voorkeurstemmen verkozen te worden. Als een 
kandidaat boven deze drempel komt (en de partij voldoende zetels heeft behaald), dan heeft 
die kandidaat, ongeacht zijn of haar positie op de lijst, recht op een plaats in het parlement. 
In België zijn de regels voor het verkiezen van de kandidaten iets complexer, maar het 
basisprincipe is daar hetzelfde. 
In het eerste deel van dit proefschrift zijn de resultaten gepresenteerd van een 
experiment gericht op de effecten van regels met betrekking tot voorkeurstemmen, met 
name op die aspecten waar de kiesstelsels van Nederland en België verschillen. Geen enkel 
kiesstelsel is (exact) hetzelfde, en door dit onderzoek is het mogelijk om van een aantal 
specifieke aspecten te achterhalen wat de invloed is op het uitbrengen van een 
voorkeurstem. 
De kiesstelsels van Nederland en België verschillen als het gaat om voorkeurstemmen 
op twee belangrijke punten. Ten eerste hebben Belgische kiezers de mogelijkheid om een 
partijstem uit te brengen, terwijl Nederlandse kiezers slechts op een kandidaat kunnen 
stemmen. Ten tweede kunnen Belgische kiezers, als ze ervoor kiezen op een kandidaat te 
stemmen, voor zoveel kandidaten stemmen als ze willen, als deze kandidaten voor dezelfde 
partij op de lijst staanii. In Nederland stemt een kiezer op één kandidaat. 
In het experiment zijn deelnemers in zowel Nederland als België gevraagd te 
stemmen in een willekeurig aan hun toegewezen combinatie van deze twee factoreniii, om te 
onderzoeken wat het effect van deze regels is. De verwachting met betrekking tot de 
partijstem was dat deze optie vooral ten koste zou gaan van (stemmen voor) de lijsttrekker, 
en niet van andere kandidaten op de lijst. De gedachte hierachter was dat in Nederland, bij 
afwezigheid van de mogelijkheid om op de partij als geheel te stemmen, een stem op de 
                                                                
i De kiesdeler is het aantal stemmen dat een partij minimaal nodig heeft om verkozen te worden. In Nederland 
staat deze gelijk aan het aantal uitgebrachte (geldige) stemmen op politieke partijen gedeeld door het aantal zetels 
(wat neerkomt op 0,67 procent van de stemmen). 
ii Als een kiezer op meer dan één kandidaat stemt, telt zijn of haar stem in de verdeling van de zetels onder partijen 
nog steeds maar als één stem mee. Het uitbrengen van een stem op meerdere kandidaten heeft wel invloed op de 
verdeling van de zetels onder de kandidaten. 
iii De twee factoren zijn partijstem (die wel of niet aanwezig kan zijn) en het aantal voorkeurstemmen dat mag 
worden uitgebracht (één of meerdere). In totaal waren er dus vier verschillende ‘kiesstelsels’, waarvan iedere 
respondent er willekeurig 1 kreeg toegewezen. 
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lijsttrekker voornamelijk wordt gezien als een stem op de partij. Een stem op de lijsttrekker 
is volgens die gedachte dus niet altijd een persoonlijke stem, terwijl een stem op een andere 
kandidaat dat wel. Als dat daadwerkelijk zo is, dan zou men verwachten dat als een 
partijstem beschikbaar komt, er minder kiezers op de lijsttrekker zouden stemmen indien ze 
geen specifieke voorkeur voor een kandidaat hebben. Andersom geredeneerd: een kiezer die 
normaal een partijstem uitbrengt, maar dat plotseling niet meer zou kunnen, zou 
waarschijnlijk op de lijsttrekker stemmen, simpelweg omdat dit de eerste kandidaat op de 
lijst is. De kiezer hoeft dan niet de moeite te nemen om een keuze te maken tussen de 
kandidaten op de lijst van de partij. Het resultaat bevestigde deze verwachting niet. Uit het 
experiment blijkt het invoeren van een partijstem zowel ten koste gaat van stemmen voor de 
lijsttrekker als van stemmen voor andere kandidaten. 
Het resultaat van het experiment roept de vraag op of het in Nederland 
veronderstelde onderscheid tussen een stem op een lijsttrekker bij wijze van partijstem en 
een stem op een andere kandidaat als een ‘echte’ voorkeurstem wel zo strikt moet zijn. Het 
lijkt veeleer het geval te zijn dat alle uitgebrachte stemmen zowel een stem op een specifieke 
kandidaat kunnen zijn als een stem die puur als doel heeft het steunen van de partij. Wat 
betreft de mogelijkheid om meerdere stemmen uit te brengen kwam de verwachting, 
althans voor België, wel uit: het zijn voornamelijk lager geplaatste kandidaten die profiteren 
van het feit dat een kiezer meerdere stemmen mag uitbrengen. In Nederland was dit effect 
niet zichtbaar: mogelijk omdat voor Nederlandse deelnemers aan het experiment deze regel 
nog onbekend was en daardoor minder gebruikt. 
Het tweede deel van het proefschrift behandelt de vraag welke kiezers 
voorkeurstemmen uitbrengen. In dit deel zijn bestaande verklaringen getest, en is een 
nieuwe verklaring toegevoegd. De meeste literatuur over stemgedrag gaat uit van positieve 
redenen om een stem uit te brengen: de kiezer maakt een keuze omdat hij of zij zich, om 
bepaalde redenen, voelt aangetrokken tot een partij of kandidaat. Ook wat betreft het 
uitbrengen van een voorkeurstem spelen zulke positieve factoren een rol: kiezers die deel 
uitmaken van een groep die in de volksvertegenwoordiging ondervertegenwoordigd is, 
brengen bijvoorbeeld eerder een voorkeurstem uit. Echter, de analyse laat zien dat ook 
negatieve factoren een rol kunnen spelen. Kiezers kunnen ervoor kiezen een voorkeurstem 
uit te brengen voor een kandidaat, niet omdat ze zich voelen aangetrokken tot die 
kandidaat, maar omdat ze niet willen stemmen op de eerste kandidaat op de lijst. Met name 
voor Nederland, waar de kiezer geen partijstem kan uitbrengen, speelt dit een rol. Als een 
kiezer geen specifieke voorkeur heeft voor een kandidaat van zijn of haar partij, maar wel 
een afkeur van de eerste kandidaat op de lijst, kan dat de kiezer ertoe brengen een stem op 
een andere kandidaat uit te brengen. Bij bestudering van motivaties voor het uitbrengen van 
een voorkeurstem in Nederland bleek dat ongeveer 7 procent van de kiezers die een 
voorkeurstem uitbrengen dat doet, omdat ze niet op de lijsttrekker willen stemmen. Het 
grootste deel van deze groep heeft geen specifieke reden voor de keuze voor de andere 
kandidaat: die lijkt willekeurig gekozen. In België komen zulke motivaties nauwelijks voor 
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als kiezers wordt gevraagd te motiveren waarom ze voor een bepaalde kandidaat hebben 
gestemd. Een voor de hand liggende verklaring van dit verschil is de aan- of afwezigheid van 
de partijstem. Immers: een kiezer zonder voorkeur maar met een afkeur van de lijsttrekker 
kan in België een partijstem uitbrengen. Een kiezer in Nederland heeft deze mogelijkheid 
niet, en is ‘gedwongen’ op een kandidaat te stemmen. Deze bevinding kan een verklaring 
zijn voor de verrassende resultaten van het experiment uit het eerste deel van het 
proefschrift. Het zou goed kunnen dat kiezers met een afkeur van de lijsttrekker in plaats 
van een voorkeurstem voor een andere kandidaat een partijstem uitbrengen, als die optie 
beschikbaar komt. 
Welke kandidaten ontvangen voorkeurstemmen? Deze vraag staat centraal in het 
derde deel van dit proefschrift. Het is niet alleen van belang om te weten welke kiezers een 
voorkeurstem uitbrengen, maar ook bij welk type kandidaat deze stemmen terecht komen. 
Ook hier zijn bestaande verklaringen getest en is een nieuwe verklaring toegevoegd, 
namelijk of het afwijken van de partijlijn invloed heeft op het aantal voorkeurstemmen dat 
een kandidaat krijgt. 
In de competitie tussen partijen spelen standpunten een belangrijk rol; de vraag is of 
dat ook het geval is bij competitie tussen kandidaten van eenzelfde partij. Om dit te 
onderzoeken is allereerst een tekstanalyse uitgevoerd van speeches in de Tweede Kamer (in 
Nederland) en Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers (België) en Kamervragen. Op basis van 
deze analyse is de positie van Kamerleden op een links-rechts schaal vastgesteld. Vervolgens 
is voor elk Kamerlid de (absolute) afstand genomen tussen zijn of haar positie en de 
gemiddelde positie van alle kandidaten van de partij. Hoe groter dit verschil, des te meer het 
Kamerlid afwijkt van de partijlijn. Vervolgens is een analyse gedaan waarin de invloed van 
het afwijken van de partijlijn op het aantal voorkeurstemmen is getest. In deze analyse zijn 
ook verklaringen opgenomen die volgens de literatuur een effect hebben op het aantal 
voorkeurstemmen: kandidaten afkomstig van groepen die onder-gerepresenteerd zijn in het 
parlement, met een hoge lijstpositie en/of politieke ervaring kunnen rekenen op meer 
voorkeurstemmen. Het afwijken van de partijlijn levert echter geen (extra) 
voorkeurstemmen opiv. In tegenstelling tot wanneer het gaat om de partijkeuze, lijkt bij de 
keuze tussen kandidaten binnen een partij voor de kiezer de inhoud er niet toe te doen. 
In het laatste deel van dit proefschrift is onderzocht wat de gevolgen voor kandidaten 
zijn van het aantal voorkeurstemmen dat ze krijgen voor zowel hun politieke carrière als 
hun parlementaire gedrag. Het meest directe effect van voorkeurstemmen is of ze 
daadwerkelijk invloed hebben op of kandidaten verkozen worden of niet. Dit effect is 
beperkt: weinig kandidaten worden verkozen volledig op basis van het aantal 
voorkeurstemmen dat ze krijgen. 
Maar wellicht zijn er meer indirecte effecten van voorkeurstemmen. Specifiek is 
onderzocht wat de gevolgen zijn voor de kansen op het verkrijgen van een positie als 
                                                                
iv Omdat de posities van kandidaten zijn vastgesteld op basis van speeches in het parlement, is deze analyse alleen 
uitgevoerd onder kandidaten die in de periode voorafgaand aan de geanalyseerde verkiezing al Kamerlid waren. 
Nederlandstalige samenvatting 
Tweede Orde Personalisering: Voorkeurstemmen in België en Nederland 
205 
 
minister of staatssecretaris, of meer voorkeurstemmen voor een betere lijstpositie zorgen bij 
volgende verkiezingen en of kandidaten die meer voorkeurstemmen krijgen in het 
parlement meer afwijken van de partijlijn. Dit laatste blijkt in ieder geval niet zo te zijn. 
Zowel in Nederland als in België is er geen effect van het aantal voorkeurstemmen op het 
afwijken van de partijlijn tijdens speeches of gestelde vragen in het parlement. In België 
hebben voorkeurstemmen wel invloed op de selectie van ministers en staatssecretarissen. In 
Nederland hebben voorkeurstemmen echter ook op dit proces geen invloed. De grootste 
effecten van voorkeurstemmen zijn te zien in de lijstpositie bij volgende verkiezingen. 
Evenals in eerder onderzoek blijkt dat kandidaten die relatief beter presteren dan mag 
worden verwacht op basis van hun lijstpositie, bij volgende verkiezingen door de partij 
hoger op de lijst geplaatst worden. Hierbij dient wel een kanttekening gemaakt te worden: 
waar dit effect in Nederland met name voor vrouwen bestaat, zijn het in België 
voornamelijk mannelijke kandidaten die van dit effect profiteren. Het effect voor 
Nederlandse vrouwen kan wellicht worden verklaard door het feit dat in Nederland bij de 
meeste partijen relatief meer mannen bovenaan de lijst staan. Omdat vrouwen daardoor van 
lagere posities moeten komen, is het voor hen relatief gezien gemakkelijk om te profiteren 
van een goed verkiezingsresultaat.  
Op basis van deze bevindingen worden in het afsluitende hoofdstuk drie conclusies 
getrokken over de oorzaken en gevolgen van voorkeurstemmen. Ten eerste blijkt uit de 
bevindingen van zowel het eerste als tweede deel van mijn proefschrift dat een 
voorkeurstem niet automatisch een voorkeur voor een kandidaat betekent. Indien een 
kiezer verplicht is op een kandidaat te stemmen, kan een voorkeurstem ook voornamelijk 
een stem op de partij of zelfs een ‘negatieve voorkeurstem’ zijn. In dat geval stemmen 
kiezers op een willekeurige kandidaat, omdat ze niet willen stemmen op de eerste kandidaat 
van de lijst. Er is dan wel sprake van een motivatie (namelijk dat de kiezer niet op een 
bepaalde kandidaat wil stemmen), maar geen motivatie voor de kandidaat van keuze. In 
Nederland komt dit fenomeen voor, terwijl het in België afwezig is. Het is aannemelijk dat 
dat komt doordat in België kiezers in een dergelijke situatie gebruik kunnen maken van de 
partijstem. Om deze reden wordt in de conclusie gepleit voor de invoering van een 
partijstem in het Nederlandse kiesstelsel. Dit heeft als voordeel dat er meer transparantie 
ontstaat over wat de kiezer wil. Een kiezer die geen voorkeur heeft voor een specifieke 
kandidaat kan dan een partijstem uitbrengen, en op kandidaten uitgebrachte stemmen 
geven een betere indicatie van de steun van het electoraat aan die kandidaten. 
Ten tweede blijkt uit het derde en vierde deel dat de rol die ideologie inneemt binnen 
de competitie tussen kandidaten van dezelfde partij afwezig is. Kandidaten die afwijken van 
de partijlijn krijgen niet meer (of minder) stemmen en kandidaten die meer 
voorkeurstemmen krijgen, wijken daarna niet meer dan andere kandidaten af van de 
partijlijn. De centrale gedachte binnen dit proefschrift is dat de persoon van een politicus 
pas een rol gaat spelen, nadat de partijkeuze is gemaakt. Hier spelen andere factoren een rol 
dan de standpunten van de kandidaten. Voor een partij lijkt het dus van belang een lijst van
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kandidaten te presenteren die weliswaar een ideologie delen, maar op andere, socio-
demografische factoren, van elkaar verschillen. 
Tot slot hebben voorkeurstemmen beperkte consequenties. Het meest directe gevolg 
van het verkrijgen van voorkeurstemmen is of ze de kandidaat aan een zetel helpen. In 
Nederland en België is voor maar enkele kandidaten het aantal voorkeurstemmen alleen de 
bepalende factor om verkozen te worden. Voor veruit het overgrote deel van de kandidaten 
is de lijstpositie bepalend voor hun verkiezing. Wel zijn er enkele indirecte gevolgen van 
voorkeurstemmen. Zo heeft in België het aantal voorkeurstemmen invloed op benoemingen 
voor regeringsposities, en heeft zowel in Nederland als België het aantal voorkeurstemmen 
invloed op de lijstpositie van een kandidaat bij een volgende verkiezing. Dit versterkt het 
argument voor invoering van een partijstem in Nederland, zodat ook voor deze zaken 
voorkeurstemmen een betere weergave vormen van wat de kiezer met zijn of haar stem 
beoogt. In tijden waarin kritiek op het democratische systeem niet ongewoon is, zou dit 
kunnen bijdragen aan een versterking van de representatieve democratie. 
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